NFCC
National Fire
Chiefs Council

Operational Guidance: Scheduled review

Operational Guidance topic
Operational Guidance: *Major incidents*
Change originator
NFCC – Continuous Improvement
Change requested

The current *Major incidents* guidance was published in 2018, making it due for a scheduled review.

A pre-review survey was carried out in mid-2022; the feedback included comments such as:

- There is repetition of already published guidance and in some areas there is too much detail unless for a foundation document. Overall it is still a high quality document.

- While the guidance makes many references to JESIP, no mention is made of ResilienceDirect™ despite it representing the single largest repository of material produced by collaborative effort for the purposes of compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act

- We think that guidance is very useful as a sense check of our approach to major incidents, and is very useful for multiple departments who work on this subject outside of the policy team. However, a shorter version, which references (rather than repeats) other guidance such as JESIP and Search, rescue and casualty care may be easier to use.

- NILO are not mentioned and as part of co-ordination of major incidents they would be an asset for incident commanders. It may not be a terrorist attack, but a reference or signpost at least would be useful.

Since the publication of this guidance, the *Operations* and *Incident command* guidance has been revised, and *Corporate guidance for operational activity* and *Fire control* guidance introduced. There has also been publication of the revised *JESIP Joint Doctrine.*

This review aims to present a piece of guidance, which has a better and more user-friendly structure that complies with the style guide developed as the Operational Guidance has matured. The review also aims to remove content that is published elsewhere as it does not only apply to major incidents.

Changes proposed	**Rationale for change**
Include appropriate references to ResilienceDirect™	Fire and rescue services need to understand the benefits of accessing the ResilienceDirect™ when responding to a

	multi-agency major incident
Include content about National Inter-agency Liaison Officers	National Inter-agency Liaison Officers provide a beneficial role for major incidents, especially those that involve multi-agencies
Rationalise the hazards *Ineffective multi-agency working* and *Ineffective strategic response arrangements to support major incidents,* and relocate to the hazard Major incidents and its relevant control measures	Some of the current hazard knowledge should be published as control measure knowledge, and this also aims to make the guidance more structured
Relocate the content of the control measure *National Resilience Assurance Team and National Resilience Fire Control* into a retitled control measure *National Coordination and Advisory Framework and National Resilience*	Rationalisation of content to remove duplication and provide a better guidance structure
Remove the control measures *Identifying the need for enhanced logistics support* and *National Resilience: Provide enhanced logistics support* as these are published in the Incident command guidance, and are not unique to major incidents	Rationalisation of content to remove duplication and provide a better guidance structure
Remove the control measures Carry out triage and Use casualty transport equipment as these are published in the Search, rescue and casualty care guidance, and are not unique to major incidents	Rationalisation of content to remove duplication and provide a better guidance structure
Addition of two control measures for *Casualty management plan: Major incidents* and *Casualty care: Mass casualties of major incidents*	Provide additional control measure knowledge, strategic actions and tactical actions that are appropriate for mass casualties of major incidents; this supports the Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations
Removal of the hazard, *Overwhelmed/overloaded communications systems* and its control measure *Manage congestion of digital network communications on the incident ground*	This hazard and its control measure are now covered by Fire control guidance
Relocate strategic and tactical actions relating to communications to the Incident command control measure *Interpersonal communications*, and create supporting control measure knowledge	This content is not unique to major incidents, and should be considered at all incidents

Consultation process
- Pre-review research (four weeks)   - Open consultation (six weeks)
Governance process
☐ Recommended by NFCC Operational Guidance Forum Click or tap to enter a date.
☐ Approved by NFCC Operations CommitteeClick or tap to enter a date.
☐ Approved by NFCC Steering GroupClick or tap to enter a date.
Impacts on other guidance products
- Updates to the *Major incidents training specification*   - Scenarios

Operational Guidance

Major incidents

Contents

Major incidents

Introduction

This Operational Guidance highlights key actions for fire and rescue services in the event of a major incident. It is 'context' guidance; it addresses the hazards that relate specifically to the scale of major incidents rather than the activity that needs to take place. Guidance dealing with the hazards of the activity of major incidents such as terrorist attacks, flooding, CBRN(e) events or a large-scale fire are covered elsewhere within the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) Operational Guidance framework.

Fire and rescue services and other emergency responders do not use terms such as disaster or crisis to describe a large-scale emergency. They respond to incidents, or major incidents, and this guidance sets out the additional activities or responsibilities that may be required to manage a major incident. It is important that the individuals who could be first on scene for their respective responding agency are able to declare a major incident according to service and local arrangements, and that they understand the benefits of doing so early.

The Cabinet Office Lexicon of civil protection terminology defines a major incident as:

> *An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.*

They are likely to be larger or more complex, endanger more people or threaten larger areas, and will require additional levels of command, control and co-ordination. This will be likely to involve many emergency services and other responding agencies in a long and high impact event. This fire and rescue service context guidance should therefore be read in conjunction with Operational Guidance: Incident command and the JESIP Principles.

Legislation

Civil resilience in the UK is underpinned by The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA). Part 1 sets out the local arrangements for civil protection, and part 2 the emergency powers. In part 1 of the CCA, local responder organisations are divided into two categories; Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

Category 1 responders include the emergency services, local authorities and NHS bodies, while Category 2 responders include organisations such as the Health & Safety Executive, utility and transport companies.

| 28 | Non-categorised responders may support a major incident; this includes the military and |
| 29 | voluntary organisations, which are not bound by the CCA. |

30 **Category 1** responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response. They are
31 subject to the full set of civil protection duties and are required to:

32 - Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning

33 - Put emergency plans in place

34 - Put business continuity management arrangements in place

35 - Put arrangements in place to make information available to the public about civil
36   protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in
37   the event of an emergency

38 - Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination

39 - Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency

40 - Provide local authority advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations
41   about business continuity management

42 **Category 2** organisations are co-operating bodies. They are less likely to be involved in the
43 heart of planning work, but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their own sector.
44 Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties, which includes co-operating and sharing
45 relevant information with other Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

46 **Military Aid to the Civil Authorities** (MACA), details the support of the armed forces to civil
47 authorities in the UK, which is concentrated on two main areas:

48 - Providing niche capabilities, which the Ministry of Defence (MOD) needs for its own
49   purposes and which would not be efficient for the rest of government to generate
50   independently, for example Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

51 - Standing ready to support the civil authorities when their capacity is overwhelmed. The
52   armed forces provide this support from spare capacity, so it is subject to the availability of
53   resources, without affecting core MOD objectives. The MOD does not generate and
54   maintain forces specifically for this task.

55 The **voluntary sector** has an important role to play in supporting the statutory services in the
56 planning, response and recovery phases of many major incidents. Their role is detailed in:

57 - Emergency Preparedness Chapter 14: The Role of the Voluntary Sector

58 - Ready Scotland – Voluntary Response guide

59 The Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations require Category 1 responders
60 to consider the contribution of the voluntary sector. This includes determining how the voluntary
61 sector can be involved at every stage, including training and exercising for responding to
62 emergencies.

63 **UK coverage**

64 The CCA applies to the whole of the UK to varying degrees that reflect devolved administration
65 arrangements. Part 1 provides local arrangements for civil protection.

66 **Wales**

67 In Wales, UK ministers will make legislation and issue guidance in relation to responders in
68 Wales. However, the CCA requires UK ministers to obtain the consent of the Welsh
69 Government before taking action in relation to a responder in Wales, which falls within devolved
70 competence.

71 **Scotland**

72 Part 1 of the CCA applies to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish
73 Ministers if they relate to devolved matters. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a
74 devolved matter and therefore the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, certain responders in
75 Scotland operate in reserved areas, with regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers.
76 More information can be found here.

77 **Northern Ireland**

78 Some Category 1 and Category 2 responders in Northern Ireland are subject to Part 1 of the
79 CCA and the Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations. This includes the
80 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and
81 telecommunications providers.

82 However, the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service is not designated as a Category 1
83 responder and so Part 1 of the CCA does not apply to them. Instead, [The Northern Ireland Civil
84 Contingencies Framework](#) aligns the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service to the duties set
85 out in the CCA.

86 **Emergency powers**

87 The use of emergency powers is a last resort option, which is subject to a robust set of
88 safeguards. They can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances. Local-level planning
89 arrangements should not assume that emergency powers will be made available.

90 Part 2 of the CCA ensures the governments and devolved administrations will be consulted
91 wherever possible if emergency powers are to be used in their territory. It allows emergency
92 powers to be used in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland alone for the first time, though the use
93 of emergency powers remains with Westminster.

94 Concordats setting out in more detail how these arrangements will work in practice have been
95 agreed:

96 • [Concordat between the UK Government and the Welsh Assembly Government](#)
97 • [Concordat between the UK Government and the Scottish ministers](#)

98 The signed concordats can be viewed on the Cabinet Office site, ResilienceDirect™ and
99 websites for the devolved administrations.

Legislation or formal arrangements	England	Scotland	Wales	Northern Ireland
Civil Contingencies Act The Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations	Yes	Yes, *Schedule 1, Part 2, Category 1 Responders: Scotland*	Yes, *Schedule 1, Part 2A, Category 1 Responders: Wales*	Yes, for Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework applies to other responders
Emergency preparedness guidance	Yes	Yes, specifically Chapter 10	Yes, specifically Chapter 11	Yes, specifically Chapter 12
Emergency response and recovery guidance	Yes	Ready Scotland	Yes	Yes
National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) England	Yes	Fire and Rescue Service Supporting Guidance to the National Coordination and Advisory Framework		
		Section 6.2	*Section 6.1*	*Section 6.3*
Government arrangements	The UK Government Resilience Framework	The Scottish Resilience Partnership	Wales Resilience	Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies

100

Intraoperability and interoperability

102 Major incidents often require a co-ordinated multi-agency response, sometimes with cross-
103 border assistance. For more information refer to:

104 • Incident command – Intraoperability and interoperability

105 • Operations – Communication to support intraoperability and interoperability

106 Intraoperability and interoperability are supported by co-location at or near to the incident, one
107 of the JESIP principles. There are many benefits of co-location, such as improved
108 communication and understanding, that support joint working. With the use of technology, co-
109 location can be virtual, at least initially, to prevent delays in joint working and decision-making.
110 However, the physical co-location of commanders and responders should occur as soon as
111 reasonably practicable.

112 Where feasible, fire and rescue services should understand how national frameworks and
113 mutual aid arrangements can support the local, regional or national response to major incidents.

114 **Learning**

115 The lessons identified from major incidents, or from training and exercises for such incidents,
116 need to be methodically captured, preferably while events are fresh in the minds of those
117 involved.

118 All debriefs should involve the full range of operational and fire control personnel, to ensure the
119 lessons identified are captured from every aspect of the response. For more information refer to
120 Incident command – Hold debriefing or post-incident reviews.

121 Fire and rescue services must share learning from incidents, training and exercises. This may
122 be within the service to improve their own policies, procedures and training, or through the
123 National Operational Learning process. For more information refer to Corporate guidance for
124 operational activity – Operational learning.

125 Lessons from multi-agency incidents should be captured and uploaded to Joint Organisational
126 Learning (JOL Online). JOL should also be used to capture notable practice; this is where
127 emergency responders have found and wish to share a solution that works well to address an
128 interoperability issue.

129 Lessons that involve protected information will be processed via the National Inter-agency
130 Liaison Officer (NILO) Operational Learning Group to JOL.

131 **Site-Specific Risk Information**

132 Fire and rescue authorities must make arrangements to obtain the information necessary to
133 deliver their legislative responsibilities. This includes the requirement for site-specific
134 assessment.

135 Developing Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) will also help to inform the wider topic of
136 operational risk planning and management. This could include capturing information about
137 evacuation plans, buildings and transport networks, and the location of specified access routes
138 and points. For more information refer to guidance on Site-Specific Risk Information.

139 **Risk management plan**

140 Each fire and rescue authority must develop their strategic direction through their risk
141 management plan. To determine the extent of their services, strategic managers will consider
142 their statutory duties and the foreseeable risk within their area.

143 Work to identify risk and prepare operational plans should consider all stakeholders, including
144 local emergency planning groups and the fire and rescue service risk management plan.

145 **Responsibility of fire and rescue services**

146 Fire and rescue services are responsible, under legislation and regulations, for developing
147 policies and procedures and to provide information, instruction, training and supervision to their
148 personnel about foreseeable hazards and the control measures used to reduce the risks arising
149 from those hazards.

150 This guidance sets out to provide fire and rescue services with sufficient knowledge about the
151 potential hazards their personnel could encounter when attending incidents. Fire and rescue
152 services should ensure their policies, procedures and training cover all of the hazards and
153 control measures contained within this guidance.

154

155

Hazard – Major incidents

157 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

158 Major incidents are likely to be complex, protracted, and involve many different organisations in
159 their resolution. The scale of such incidents, the impact on large numbers of people over a wide
160 area and the potential demand this will put on local or regional resources mean that additional
161 levels of response arrangements will be required.

162 Without an appropriate level of co-location, communication, co-ordination, joint understanding of
163 risk and shared situational awareness, the risk to the public and responders will be increased,
164 and the resolution of the incident may be delayed.

165 When one or more agencies declare a major incident, it should trigger well-rehearsed and well-
166 practised planning arrangements across the emergency services, local government and partner
167 agencies. A major incident may require the full force of organisations working collaboratively to
168 bring the situation under control.

169 Whenever a major incident is declared, it is essential for all local, regional or national
170 organisations that may be affected or become involved to be made aware of this. Failure to
171 ensure there is awareness of an ongoing major incident could result in a lack of shared
172 situational awareness, resulting in an ineffective response.

173 Major incidents can impact on housing, welfare, and the health and safety of people who live or
174 work in the area. Without a cohesive strategy and a co-ordinated approach, the agencies
175 involved may not be able to effectively control the incident, which could also result in a delay to
176 recovery and normality.

177 It is important to understand that a major incident can require either a single-agency or multi-
178 agency response. In the early stages of a major incident that requires a multi-agency response,
179 one agency may be in attendance first with their responders needing to carry out tasks that are
180 not normally their responsibility. Without appropriate command and control arrangements
181 between agencies being established as soon as practicable, the emergency response may be
182 less effective.

183 Shared situational awareness is not always easy to achieve, especially while inherent
184 uncertainties and obstacles that limit individual situational awareness are operating in the
185 background. Interaction of individuals, a team or multiple teams also increases the level of
186 difficulty. Some common barriers to achieving effective shared situational awareness are:

187 - Concepts not commonly understood

188 - Terminology not commonly understood

189 - Unawareness of the use of differing metrics and measurements

190 - Graphical representations, such as signs and symbols, not commonly understood

191 - Team assumptions made about other teams going unchallenged or unacknowledged

192 - Operating procedures and objectives of one team not understood by others

193 • Information not shared among individuals or teams

194 • Expertise or information held by one team not made available to others

195 • Challenge and critique suppressed by dominance of one person or team

196 **Control measure – Preparedness for major incidents**

197 **This control measure should be read in conjunction with Emergency response plans**

198 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

199 Legislative arrangements are provided in the introduction section to this guidance. The Civil
200 Contingencies Act (CCA) and The Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations
201 are supported by the Emergency Preparedness guidance.

202 Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between Category 1 and
203 Category 2 responders, or reciprocal arrangements for Northern Ireland. They should also be
204 conducted according to a practical doctrine beginning with anticipation and assessment of risk
205 to enable effective response and recovery arrangements.

206 The main civil protection duties for fire and rescue services include:

207 • Risk assessment

208 • Business continuity management

209 • Emergency planning

210 • Maintaining public awareness

211 • Maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise people

212 • Co-operation with other responders

213 • Information sharing with other responders

214 Military and voluntary organisations may have an important role when responding to a major
215 incident. As part of the work of the local emergency planning groups, they should be invited to
216 take part in planning, training, awareness, testing and exercising wherever possible. This will
217 ensure that voluntary organisations are aware of and work within the relevant command
218 structures, to maintain assertive, safe and effective operations.

219 Information on the police response for major incidents can be found in the Authorised
220 Professional Practice for Civil emergencies. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU)
221 Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response Group (EPRRG) are the ambulance
222 emergency preparedness lead.

223 **Military aid**

224 • The MOD Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to
225 Resilience incorporates the policy on military aid to the civil authorities (MACA).

226 The Ministry of Defence has a key role to play supporting lead government departments,
227 devolved administrations and civil authorities as they prepare for, respond to, and recover from
228 disruptive challenges and major national events. The joint doctrine publication provides military
229 and non-military readers with the necessary guidance and practical understanding on how the
230 Ministry of Defence can contribute military support for dealing with natural hazards, major
231 incidents or malicious attacks. Further information about military support is provided in section
232 13 of the [JESIP Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework](#).

233 **ResilienceDirect™**

234 ResilienceDirect™ is a digital online private network, which enables civil protection practitioners
235 to work together during the preparation, response and recovery phases of an event or
236 emergency. It supports:

237 • Multi-agency working through:
238 o Sharing emergency plans
239 o Maintaining awareness of plans
240 o Exercising plans
241 o Collaboration on response, recovery and learning
242 o Real-time information sharing, including data visualisation
243 • The development of situational awareness
244 • The use of clear communications
245 • Informed decision-making

246 It enables organisations to fulfil these functions by readily and consistently providing key
247 information to account users.

248 ResilienceDirect™ is a web-based service built on a resilient and secure platform. It is
249 accredited to hold electronic documents with protective markings. It is available for use by
250 Category 1 responders, such as the emergency services, and Category 2 responders, such as
251 public, private and voluntary sector organisations.

252 Fire and rescue services should ensure they have sufficient resources who are familiar with how
253 to access and use ResilienceDirect™ for operational preparedness, response and recovery
254 purposes.

255 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

256 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20401	Ensure that their arrangements comply with the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act or the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework	Amend

20404	Ensure they have sufficient resilience arrangements in place, to be able to manage an ongoing major incident	Amend
	Be able to maintain business continuity for the duration of a major incident, or until special arrangements are no longer required	New
	Ensure they have sufficient resources who are familiar with how to access and use ResilienceDirect™ for operational preparedness, response and recovery purposes	New

257   *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

258   Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Understand the legislative requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act or the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework	New
	Understand how to request information that can be accessed from ResilienceDirect™	New
	Understand how to provide information that can be uploaded to ResilienceDirect™	New

259   **Control measure – Apply the JESIP principles: Major incidents**

260   *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

261   Previous major incidents, public inquiries and national learning identified the ineffectiveness of
262   single-agency working. As a result, JESIP was established and developed the Joint Doctrine:
263   The Interoperability Framework, which provides a framework for multi-agency working.

264   Whenever they work together, especially at major incidents, the responding agencies need to
265   ensure they deliver the most coherent and effective joint response possible.

266   Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means that predetermined
267   arrangements can be established early, as it can take time for effective operational structures,
268   resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaration of a major incident requires special
269   arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.

270   This guidance contains a summary of the information contained in the JESIP publication.
271   Relevant operational and fire control personnel should have an appropriate level of
272   understanding of the JESIP Principles for joint working, and how to apply them at a major
273   incident. It may be useful for relevant personnel to have access to the JESIP app or JESIP aide-
274   memoires.

CO-LOCATE

Co-locate with other responders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location.

COMMUNICATE

Communicate using language which is clear, and free from technical jargon and abbreviations.

CO-ORDINATE

Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead organisation. Identify priorities, resources, capabilities and limitations for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

JOINTLY UNDERSTAND RISK

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards, to agree appropriate control measures.

SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Establish shared situational awareness by using M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

275

276 *Figure: Diagram showing the JESIP Principles for joint working*

277 **Co-locate**

278 When responders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and co-
279 ordination face-to-face most effectively. The benefits of co-location include improved
280 communication and understanding, which support joint working. While physical co-location on
281 the scene or in control rooms should remain a consideration, by using technology co-location
282 can be virtual; this may be particularly beneficial for incidents that involve a regional or national
283 response, or are protracted.

284 Co-location aims to improve the functions of command, control and co-ordination, supporting
285 the establishment of jointly agreed objectives and a co-ordinated plan. The benefits of co-
286 location apply equally at all levels of response.

287 At the higher level this is achieved at the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) and tactical co-
288 ordinating group (TCG). At the operational level the focal point is the rendezvous point (RVP) or
289 forward command point (FCP), which will be decided by control in the initial stages and
290 reviewed by responders when at the scene.

291 The location of the SCG and TCG meetings, and the location of the RVP and FCP, should be
292 suitable for all responding agencies. The locations should be monitored for impacts of the
293 incident and relocated if required during or following a major incident.

Communicate

Meaningful and effective communication between responders and responding agencies underpins effective joint working. Communication links start from the time of the first call or contact, instigating communication between control rooms as soon as possible to start the process of sharing information. For more information refer to Clear multi-agency communication.

Sharing information in a way that can be understood by the intended recipient aids the development of shared situational awareness, which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident. This can be assisted by using plain language and avoiding the use of technical jargon and abbreviations.

At multi-agency incidents, responders may use interoperability 'talk groups', which are held by the emergency services. The use of these 'talk groups' are usually assigned to key roles, for example, incident commanders. Where appropriate, other Category 1 and Category 2 responders involved should be included. For more information refer to Effective communication systems between agencies.

Co-ordinate

Co-ordination underpins joint working by avoiding potential conflicts, preventing duplication of effort and minimising risk.

Control rooms should co-ordinate multi-agency communications at the earliest opportunity in order to carry out the initial actions required to manage the incident. Co-ordination involves responders of all levels, whether they are on-scene or at an SCG or TCG. It involves commanders discussing the available resources and activities of each responding agency, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident.

For effective co-ordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. To decide who the lead should be, factors such as the phase of the incident, the need for specialist capabilities and investigation, during both the response and recovery phases should be considered. There is specific guidance for some types of incidents, highlighting which agency should take the lead role. The decision on who takes the lead role should be recorded, as should any changes to the lead agency as the incident develops.

Jointly understand risk

By jointly understanding risks and associated mitigating actions, agencies can promote the safety of responders and reduce the impact that risks may have on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

Different responding agencies may see, understand and treat risks differently. Each agency should carry out their own risk assessments, then share the outcomes with all responding agencies to develop a joint understanding of risk. Individual dynamic risk assessment findings may be used to develop the analytical risk assessment for the incident.

Shared situational awareness

332 Shared situational awareness is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate
333 consequences and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available
334 capabilities and the priorities of the responding agencies.

335 Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. Establishing
336 shared situational awareness is important for developing a common operating picture (COP) at
337 all levels of command, and between incident commanders and control rooms.

338 Communications between control rooms greatly assists the creation of shared situational
339 awareness in the initial stages and throughout the incident. Communicating with incident
340 commanders before they arrive on-scene and throughout the incident, will contribute to shared
341 situational awareness. The process should include identifying risks and hazards that could
342 impact on all responders. For more information refer to Shared situational awareness between
343 agencies.

Developing a common operating picture

345 A COP has been defined as a common overview of an incident that is created by assessing and
346 fusing information from multiple sources, and is shared between appropriate command, control
347 and co-ordinating groups to support joint decision-making. It should be a continuously evolving
348 but common point of reference.

349 The form of the COP will differ between areas, but it should provide an overview of the incident
350 which is accessible through a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing
351 platform, such as ResilienceDirect™. It may include graphics, maps and contextual information.

352 There is no set format for the COP, which will reflect local requirements and practices, but
353 whatever is developed should be user-friendly and easy to navigate and geared to the
354 requirements of busy decision makers who are under pressure.

M/ETHANE model

356 The M/ETHANE model brings structure and clarity to the initial stages of managing any multi-
357 agency or major incident. The M/ETHANE model is an established reporting framework which
358 provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share incident
359 information.

360 It is recommended that this format is used for all major incidents and that it is updated as the
361 situation develops. When using the Joint Decision Model (JDM), there should be periodic
362 consideration by responders to establish whether a developing situation has become or ceased
363 to be a major incident.

364

365   *Figure: Diagram showing the JESIP M/ETHANE model*

366   **Gather and share information and intelligence**

367   Information and intelligence should be gathered and shared to establish shared situational
368   awareness. At any incident, no single responder agency can appreciate all the relevant
369   dimensions of an emergency straightaway.

370   Information refers to all forms of information obtained, recorded or processed, for example
371   M/ETHANE messages. Anyone supplying sensitive information should also provide an
372   understanding about how it can be used, shared and stored.

373   Intelligence is obtained from information that has been subject to:

374   • Evaluation, to determine its significance

375   • Risk assessment, to determine the need for it to be acted on

376 • Analysis, to identify critical links and associations that assist understanding of the
377 incident

378 Responding agencies should consider and not discount sources of local or specialist
379 knowledge, as they may be able to provide information about the incident or the location.

380 **Briefing**

381 Once decisions have been made and actions agreed, information should be relayed in a
382 structured way that can be easily understood by those who will carry out actions or support
383 activities. This is commonly known as briefing.

384 In the initial phases of an incident, the JDM may be used to structure a briefing. As incidents
385 develop past the initial phases, or if they are protracted and require a handover of responsibility,
386 then a more detailed briefing tool should be used. The mnemonic 'IIMARCH' is a commonly
387 used briefing tool.

388

389 *Figure: Diagram showing the JESIP IIMARCH briefing tool*

390 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

391 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment

| Reference		Comment
20414	Ensure relevant operational and fire control personnel have an appropriate level of understanding of the JESIP Principles for joint working, and know how to apply them at a major incident	Amend
~~20416~~	~~Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff~~	Archive
~~20422~~	~~Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training and exercising for all levels of response staff~~	Archive
~~20473~~	~~Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff~~	Archive
~~20474~~	~~Ensure staff are trained in operational risk assessment and understand the fire and rescue service Firefighter safety maxim~~	Archive
~~20477~~	~~Develop procedures, training, awareness initiatives and exercising for all levels of response staff to enhance situational awareness~~	Archive
	Consider providing relevant personnel with access to the JESIP app or JESIP aide-memoires, which may be required for a major incident	New
	Ensure communication links and technology can support the application of JESIP Principles during a major incident	New
	Provide a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform, such as ResilienceDirect™, for use when developing a common operating picture for a major incident	New
	Ensure operational and fire control personnel can readily use the M/ETHANE model when sharing incident information about a major incident	New

392   *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

393   Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Apply the JESIP Principles when attending a major incident	New
	Be prepared to co-locate with commanders of other responding agencies for major incidents, including at strategic co-ordinating groups, tactical co-ordinating groups, rendezvous points or forward command points	New
	Consider using technology for virtual co-location, especially if a major incident involves a regional or national response, or is protracted	New
20415	Monitor the location of the strategic co-ordinating group and tactical co-ordinating group meetings, and the location of the rendezvous	Amend

	point and forward command point for their suitability throughout the major incident	
20421	Share information in a way that can be understood by the intended recipient to aid the development of shared situational awareness for a major incident	Amend
20418	When sharing information for a major incident, communicate clearly using plain language and avoid using technical jargon and abbreviations	Amend
	Discuss the available resources and activities of each responding agency, to agree priorities and make joint decisions throughout a major incident	New
	Be involved in the decision about which agency takes a lead role for effective co-ordination of a major incident, which may change for different phases of the response or recovery	New
20475	Carry out risk assessments for the major incident, then share the outcomes with all other responding agencies to develop a joint understanding of risk	Amend
	Use individual dynamic risk assessment findings to develop the analytical risk assessment for the major incident	New
20478	Establish shared situational awareness to help development of a common operating picture for the major incident for all responding agencies, including control rooms	Amend
	Develop a common operating picture to support joint decision-making for a major incident, and ensure it is accessible through a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform	New
20479	Use the M/ETHANE model when sharing initial or updated information about a major incident	Amend
	When using the Joint Decision Model, periodically consider whether a developing situation has become or ceased to be a major incident	New
20417	Gather and share information and intelligence to establish shared situational awareness for a major incident	New
	Provide an understanding about how sensitive information can be used, shared and stored when it is being supplied about a major incident	New
	Consider sources of local or specialist knowledge, as they may be able to provide information about the major incident or the location	New

20419	Ensure information shared is free from acronyms and other potential sources of confusion	Archive
20420	Provide briefings by structuring the information so that it can be easily understood by those who will carry out actions or support activities for the major incident	Amend
20476	Where appropriate, contribute to developing a shared risk assessment with other responding agencies	Archive
20480	Use concepts that are commonly understood by all agencies	Archive
20481	Use terminology that is commonly understood by all agencies	Archive
20482	Confirm the use of commonly understood metrics and measurements used by different teams	Archive
20483	Ensure graphical representations (e.g. signs and symbols) are commonly understood	Archive
20484	Challenge and/or acknowledge natural team assumptions both internally and externally to clarify understanding	Archive
20485	Confirm operating procedures and objectives to ensure they are understood by all teams	Archive
20486	Engender information sharing amongst teams	Archive
20487	Encourage the sharing of relevant expertise of all available teams	Archive

394 **Control measure – Local emergency planning for major incidents**

395 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

396 The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) and The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework
397 places requirements on responding agencies, including fire and rescue services, to participate
398 in local emergency planning to make arrangements for the strategic co-ordination of major
399 incidents.

400 Emergency planning is a civil protection duty for Category 1 responders. Category 1 responders
401 are required to maintain plans for preventing emergencies, and for reducing, controlling or
402 mitigating the effects of emergencies. They should draw on risk assessments and must
403 maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of an emergency.

404 Local emergency plans must include details about how it will be determined whether an
405 emergency has occurred, and make provision for training and exercising of relevant employees.
406 Category 1 responders should involve Category 2 responders in the planning, training and
407 exercising. They are also required to consider the activities of relevant voluntary organisations,
408 which are not subject to the CCA, to ensure local emergency plans are effective. Fire and
409 rescue services must ensure that local emergency plans are reviewed and updated periodically.

410 **Statutory resilience forums**

411 Statutory resilience forums are multi-agency partnerships made up of local Category 1 and
412 Category 2 responders, including fire and rescue services. They are referred to as Local
413 Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England and Wales, as Local Resilience Partnerships (LRPs) in
414 Scotland, and as Emergency Preparedness Groups (EPGs) in Northern Ireland.

415 The National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) is a set of individual
416 standards that are intended to:

417 • Establish a consistent and progressive means for LRFs and their constituent local
418   responder organisations

419 • Enable them to self-assure their capabilities and overall level of readiness

420 • Guide continuous improvement against mandatory requirements

421 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

422 Fire and rescue services must:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20428	Be a member of a statutory resilience forum to participate in developing local emergency planning for the strategic co-ordination of major incidents	Amend
20434	Maintain plans for preventing emergencies, and for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies	Amend
	Maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of an emergency	New
20425	Ensure local emergency plans include details about how it will be determined whether an emergency has occurred	Amend
20426	Train and exercise relevant employees for responding to the local emergency plans	Amend
20427	Ensure that local emergency plans are reviewed and updated periodically	Amend

423 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20429	Ensure relevant personnel are aware of their responsibilities for emergency planning as detailed in the Civil Contingencies Act or Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework	Amend
	Involve Category 2 responders in the planning, training and exercising for local emergency plans	New

	Consider the activities of relevant voluntary organisations to ensure local emergency plans are effective	New
~~20431~~	~~Embed the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) in their ways of working~~	Archive
~~20433~~	~~As part of the emergency planning group, ensure an adequate programme of multi-agency training, exercising and planning~~	Archive

424 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

425 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20435	Access local emergency plans during a major incident to influence decision-making to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the emergency	Amend
	Be prepared to involve Category 2 responders and voluntary organisations in the response for a major incident	New
~~20436~~	~~Work with tactical incident commanders and other members at the co-ordinating group to develop a common operating picture and joint understanding of risk based on related local emergency planning assumptions~~	Archive

426

~~20437~~	~~Access the appropriate level and type of support from strategic commanders at major incidents~~	Archive
~~20438~~	~~Share situational awareness with tactical and strategic commanders to inform a common operating picture (COP)~~	Archive

427 **Control measure – Strategic co-ordinating groups for major incidents**

428 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

429 Strategic co-ordination arrangements should support and complement tactical and operational
430 command, not replace them. Strategic co-ordinating groups (SCG) should always operate at an
431 appropriate level and degree of detail to be effective.

432 At a major incident, the co-ordination of multi-agency resources will be the most effective way of
433 resolving the situation. Emergency planning needs to have arrangements for SCG, which are
434 established at a pre-agreed strategic co-ordination centre (SCC). An SCC should be at a
435 location away from the scene that provides a support infrastructure. The SCG are comprised of
436 strategic leaders from all the response and recovery agencies that are or may become involved.

437 Fire and rescue service commanders should be familiar with the JESIP guidelines:

438 • Strategic Command role and responsibilities

439 • Strategic Co-ordinating Group role and responsibilities

440 • Template for the SCG Standing Agenda

441 An SCG will operate under the Civil Contingencies Act or The Northern Ireland Civil
442 Contingencies Framework. The JESIP Principles should be at the centre of the group's thinking,
443 so that the actions taken will ensure the best possible response to and recovery from the
444 incident, enhancing public and responder safety and improving the outcomes.

445 An SCG will usually be chaired and managed by the police strategic commander but may be led
446 by other agencies as appropriate, depending on the nature of the incident. The SCG will also
447 co-ordinate any requests for national assets, including military assistance. They will also ensure
448 that both the response and recovery phases of the incident are given equal importance and that
449 the transition in the phases is managed effectively. It is the role of the SCG chair to ensure that
450 the Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) is updated with the appropriate information

451 Fire and rescue service commanders who attend the SCG should have an appropriate level of
452 authority to make decisions on behalf of their service, and be able to support the establishment
453 and continuation of an SCG for as long as is necessary. They may need to chair the SCG
454 meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident. Commanders will
455 need to brief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the SCG meetings, and
456 may also need to request National Resilience resources based on the response required.

457 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

458 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
~~20440~~	~~Identify, train, exercise and equip personnel to operate in a strategic co-ordinating environment, in line with National Operational Guidance: Incident command~~	Archive
	Maintain a register of the locations for pre-agreed strategic co-ordination centres that may be used for strategic co-ordinating group meetings for a major incident	New
20441	Ensure that all commanders are familiar with the JESIP guidelines for the role and responsibilities of strategic command and strategic co-ordinating groups	Amend
20442	Ensure that commanders who may attend a strategic co-ordinating group have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service	Amend
~~20430~~	~~Train all relevant personnel in the role of co-ordinating groups~~	Archive

459 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

460 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service at strategic co-ordinating group meetings for major incidents	New
	Be able to support the establishment and continuation of a strategic co-ordinating group for as long as is necessary	New
20423	Be prepared to chair strategic co-ordinating group meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident	Amend
20443	Brief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the strategic co-ordinating group meetings for a major incident	Amend
	Request National Resilience resources for the major incident based on the response required by the strategic co-ordinating group	New
~~20444~~	~~Carry out delegated actions to deliver co-ordinating groups' objectives~~	Archive

462 **Control measure – Tactical co-ordinating groups for major incidents**

463 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

464 At a major incident, a tactical co-ordinating group (TCG) should be established to ensure multi-
465 agency tactical commanders communicate and co-ordinate effectively with each other, and with
466 strategic and operational functions.

467 The TCG should meet at an appropriate and mutually agreed location as soon as practicable.
468 The location should be capable of providing appropriate administrative and technical support
469 and be suitable for holding effective meetings. For some sites, pre-existing locations may have
470 been identified.

471 TCG meetings should include commanders of all responding agencies, who have relevant
472 decision-making skills and will undertake tactical co-ordination of the response or recovery
473 phases of a major incident.

474 Fire and rescue service commanders should be familiar with the JESIP guidelines for [Tactical
475 Command roles and responsibilities]. If local arrangements are not in place, the Joint Decision
476 Model (JDM) can be used as the standing agenda for the TCG meetings.

477 Clear lines of communication between responder organisations and the TCG are required. If
478 agencies are responding at Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) level or above, it is the role of
479 the SCG chair to ensure that the TCG is updated with the appropriate information.

480 Tactical commanders in the TCG are responsible for interpreting strategic direction, where
481 strategic level command is in use, and developing and co-ordinating the tactical plan. Although
482 most fire and rescue personnel acting in a TCG capacity will have specific service
483 responsibilities, they should work with other TCG tactical commanders to deliver tactical multi-
484 agency management of the major incident.

485 Fire and rescue service commanders who attend the TCG should have an appropriate level of
486 authority to make decisions on behalf of their service, and be able to support the establishment
487 and continuation of a TCG for as long as is necessary. They may need to lead the TCG
488 meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident.

489 Fire and rescue service tactical commanders will need to brief relevant personnel with the
490 decisions and outcomes of the TCG meetings, and ensure that operational personnel have the
491 resources, direction and co-ordination required to deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is
492 an obvious and urgent need for intervention, tactical commanders should not become directly
493 involved in the detailed operational tasks being carried out at the operational level.

494 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

495 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20488	~~Identify, train, exercise and equip personnel to operate in a tactical co-ordinating environment in line with Incident command~~	Archive
20489	Ensure that all commanders are familiar with the JESIP guidelines for the role and responsibilities of tactical command and tactical co-ordinating groups	Amend
20490	Ensure that commanders who may attend a tactical co-ordinating group have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service	Amend

496 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

497 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service at tactical co-ordinating group meetings for major incidents	New
	Be able to support the establishment and continuation of a tactical co-ordinating group for as long as is necessary	New

	Be prepared to lead tactical co-ordinating group meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident	New
20491	Brief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the tactical co-ordinating group meetings for a major incident	Amend
~~20493~~	~~Plan and co-ordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken~~	Archive
~~20495~~	~~Establish effective communications with both on-scene commanders and any strategic co-ordinating group~~	Archive
~~20492~~	~~Determine priorities for allocating available resources~~	Archive

499

Hazard – Insufficient resources: Major incidents

This hazard should be read in conjunction with Insufficient resources

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

The majority of emergencies in the UK are dealt with at a local level by emergency services, local authorities and statutory resilience forums. In some instances, the scale or complexity of a major incident will put a significant demand on local services and may require government involvement a. Major incidents may occur over a protracted period of time and require extensive use of:

- Resources

- Logistical support

- Specialist advice and assistance

Levels of emergencies

The defined UK Government response arrangements are set out in the Cabinet Office publication, Responding to Emergencies – The UK Central Government Response – Concept of Operations. These are large, often protracted or complex incidents which may require a higher level of co-ordination and central government involvement, in response to an incident, and have been defined within three broad levels, which are:

Level 1 – Significant Emergency

Central Government support is provided through a Lead Government Department (LGD), or devolved administration, alongside the work of the emergency services and local authorities. This will usually be via the Local Resilience Forum for the affected area.

Level 2 – Serious Emergency

This level reflects an incident which has or threatens prolonged impact requiring sustained central government co-ordination. This co-ordination would likely be through the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) under the leadership of the lead government department.

Level 3 – Catastrophic Emergency

These events present exceptionally high and potentially widespread impact and require immediate central government direction and support, The Prime Minister, or nominated Secretary of State, will lead the co-ordinated emergency function of central government to deliver a national response, or where emergency powers are invoked. COBR and the Civil Contingencies Committee co-ordinate activity, rather than the LGD.

Control measure – Additional resources: Major incidents

This control measure should be read in conjunction with Additional resources

533 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

534 Responding to major incidents will involve large numbers of fire and rescue service personnel,
535 vehicles and equipment, potentially over prolonged periods of time. This requires significant
536 resilience and logistical arrangements to be managed successfully.

537 The scale of operations is likely to be outside the usual experiences of operational or fire control
538 personnel, and normal incident support arrangements that are in place for routine activities.

539 Operational support for ongoing major incidents requires an additional level of support to
540 manage the incident successfully. This will require scalable support arrangements and systems,
541 including command support as well as sufficient numbers of trained personnel to sustain
542 extended periods of operation. For more information refer to Incident command – Command
543 support function.

544 Tactical advisers may be required, including National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs); this
545 is a nationally agreed multi-agency advisory role implemented across the emergency services,
546 primarily designed for counter terrorism and other major incidents. Some fire and rescue service
547 NILOs will be given access to police radios, which can enhance multi-agency communication.

548 Fire and rescue services should ensure that appropriate personnel attend the strategic co-
549 ordinating group (SCG)and tactical co-ordinating group (TCG) meetings, both of which may
550 identify the need for additional resources for the response or recovery phases of a major
551 incident.

552 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

553 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20502	Ensure that they have scalable support arrangements and systems for major incidents	Amend
20503	~~Consider the provision of a major incident room or support cell to provide additional support to fire control, and strategic, tactical and operational commanders~~	Archive
20504	~~Ensure that sufficient resources are available and considered within risk management plans and that planning assumptions and exercising includes preparation for major incidents~~	Archive
	Have tactical advisers in place, including National Inter-agency Liaison Officers, to provide support for major incidents	New
	Nominate appropriate personnel to attend the strategic co-ordinating group and tactical co-ordinating group meetings during a major incident	New

TACTICAL ACTIONS

555 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20505	Ensure that they are aware of the type and level of support arrangements that an ongoing major incident may be allocated	Amend
20506	Plan ahead at the major incident to predict and request additional resources as far in advance as practicable	Amend
20448	Seek appropriate advice from tactical advisers to support the response to a major incident	Amend
~~20507~~	~~Establish clear lines of communication with all the relevant parties that are in place to assist them~~	Archive
~~20494~~	~~Obtain additional resources if required~~	Archive
	Be prepared to attend the strategic co-ordinating group or tactical co-ordinating group meetings for a major incident	New

556 **Control measure – National Coordination and Advisory Framework and National**
557 **Resilience**

558 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

559 **The National Coordination and Advisory Framework**

560 [The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) England](#) co-ordinates fire and
561 rescue service National Resilience assets. This is accompanied by the [Fire and Rescue Service](#)
562 [Supporting Guidance to the National Coordination and Advisory Framework](#).

563 Home Office departments will work with other government departments, partner organisations
564 and devolved administrations during no notice and rising tide major incidents to provide policy
565 advice, ministerial briefings, co-ordination across government and management of
566 communications.

567 NCAF enables decision makers, both locally and nationally, to receive clear and unambiguous
568 advice on how best to co-ordinate the fire and rescue service response to relevant
569 emergencies. It also enables fire and rescue services to identify the training and exercising
570 requirements for NCAF compliance.

571 Fire and rescue services can draw on mutual assistance under Sections 13 and 16 of the Fire
572 and Rescue Services Act. These arrangements ensure continuity of service provision across
573 authority boundaries.

574 There will be occasions where fire and rescue services require assistance from, or provide
575 assistance to, other services. The National Mutual Aid Protocol for Serious Incidents outlines
576 the principles and purpose or such arrangements. Given the national implications, fire and

577   rescue services should highlight the specific need to retain National Resilience assets from

578   deployment with the National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) Duty Officer or National

579   Strategic Advisory Team (NSAT) on a case-by-case basis.

580   The effectiveness of NCAF arrangements is dependent on individual fire and rescue services

581   releasing resources for national deployment when requested to do so. It is recognised that

582   during exceptional or widespread events, some individual services may wish to retain assets for

583   deployment, in accordance with their risk management plan.

584   **National Resilience**

585   The NCAF electronic support system is overseen by NRAT and National Resilience Fire Control

586   (NRFC), based in Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service. It maintains a 24/7 overview of the

587   availability and deployment of National Resilience assets.

588   Before and during an incident, the NRFC monitors, manages and co-ordinates the mobilisation

589   of National Resilience assets in conjunction with NRAT, the National Resilience Duty Officer,

590   and supporting fire and rescue services by using the Electronic Supporting System (ESS). It will

591   also co-ordinate deployment of the National Strategic Advisory Team (NSAT), which provides

592   advice and support to co-ordinating groups if required.

593   If in place, the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) and tactical co-ordinating group (TCG)

594   should provide relevant personnel with briefings about their decisions, especially relating to the

595   need for NCAF arrangements to be implemented. This could include requesting National

596   Resilience assets or military assistance.

597   Fire and rescue services should ensure relevant personnel have an understanding about the

598   range of National Resilience assets that may be deployed for major incidents, and how to

599   request them through the NRFC.

600   **Requesting a National Resilience response for a major incident**

601   Assets and skills hosted by individual fire and rescue services, and other agencies, can respond

602   if specifically requested to do so as a national capability and where incident timescales allow. If

603   the incident commander believes that National Resilience major incident resources are

604   required, they should use agreed protocols to provide the following information to National

605   Resilience Fire Control (NRFC):

606   • Location of incident or the expected time and location of impact

607   • Nature of the incident and any specific hazards

608   • Prevailing weather

609   • Estimated number of people affected

610   • Local resources already in attendance or available

611   • Host fire and rescue service point of contact name and contact details

612   • Initial location for:

| 613 | | o A rendezvous point (RVP) |

613   o A rendezvous point (RVP)

614   o Strategic holding area (SHA)

615   o Multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA); predetermined locations should be
616   identified by the statutory resilience forum

617   • Safe approach route to the incident

618 **Hosting a National Resilience response for a major incident**

619 The requesting fire and rescue service may need to provide support to the National Resilience
620 resources, including the following activities:

621   • Establish the number of resources being provided and identify suitable locations for them
622   such as RVPs, SHAs or MASHAs

623   • Collate team data sheets on the arrival of National Resilience resources

624   • Record all National Resilience assets being deployed

625   • Establish communications protocols with National Resilience resources, including the
626   issue of radios if not already held

627   • Establish and record agreed call signs for National Resilience resources

628   • Nominate a site for each team at the RVPs, SHAs or MASHAs

629   • Request welfare facilities for National Resilience teams

630 For more information refer to Responding to Emergencies – The UK Central Government
631 Response – Concept of Operations.

632 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

633 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20446	Consider the requirements of the National Coordination and Advisory Framework and the National Mutual Aid Protocol for Serious Incidents when planning their response strategies and arrangements for major incidents	Amend
20447	Train and exercise relevant personnel against the National Coordination and Advisory Framework requirements for responding to major incidents	Amend
20432	Provide relevant personnel with an understanding about the range of National Resilience assets that can be deployed for major incidents	Amend
	Have systems in place to request National Resilience major incident resources	New

	Consider predetermining locations for rendezvous points, strategic holding areas or multi-agency strategic holding areas for major incidents	New
~~20452~~	~~Implement standard procedures for reporting to the NRFC~~	Archive
~~20453~~	~~Provide the NRFC with daily electronic updates on the availability of National Resilience assets using the NCAF Electronic Support System (NCAF ESS)~~	Archive
~~20454~~	~~Establish and maintain communications with NRFC at all times~~	Archive

634   *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

635   Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20449	Implement the appropriate NCAF arrangements for a major incident	Amend
	Request major incident resources using agreed National Resilience protocols	New
20450	Establish appropriate rendezvous points, strategic holding areas or multi-agency strategic holding areas for National Resilience resources responding to a major incident	Amend
20455	Provide support to the National Resilience resources responding to a major incident as required	Amend
~~20456~~	~~Establish contact where necessary with NSAT~~	Archive

636   **Control measure – Government response, support or co-ordination**

637   *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

638   In some circumstances, the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of
639   central government response, support or co-ordination becomes necessary. Government will
640   not duplicate the role of local responders. A designated Lead Government Department (LGD),
641   or where appropriate a devolved administration, will be responsible for the overall management
642   of the central government response.

643   The Home Office provides the cross Whitehall co-ordinating function for the response policy
644   arrangements to emergencies involving the fire and rescue service sector. Cabinet Office will
645   provide the cross Whitehall co-ordinating function for the recovery policy arrangements to
646   emergencies involving the fire and rescue service sector. The co-ordination of response policy
647   arrangements across government within the devolved administrations will differ accordingly and
648   are set out as individual addendums to The National Coordination and Advisory Framework
649   (NCAF) England.

650 The Home Office response to major or noteworthy incidents will be delivered by either the
651 Home Office Public Safety Group (PSG) or Homeland Security Operations Support Teams for
652 no notice and rising tide incidents. Fire Resilience and Major Events (FRaME) will provide policy
653 support to these arrangements. These arrangements are set out in Annex A of NCAF.

654 Fire and rescue services should be aware of the role governments take for major incidents, and
655 that the Cabinet Office or devolved administrations may co-ordinate response and recovery
656 policies.

657 Fire and rescue services may need to share relevant and timely information with central
658 government or devolved administrations about a major incident, and incident commanders
659 should be aware of this duty.

660 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

661 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Be aware of the role governments take for major incidents	New
20458	Be prepared to share relevant and timely information with central government or devolved administrations about a major incident	Amend
~~20459~~	~~Establish and maintain a relationship with the government resilience division~~	Archive

662 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

663 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20460	Be prepared to provide relevant and timely information that will be shared with central government or devolved administrations about a major incident	Amend
~~20461~~	~~Establish priorities and provide advice to COBR when required~~	Archive
~~20462~~	~~Request deployment of additional resources where appropriate~~	Archive

664

Hazard – People: Major incidents

This hazard should be read in conjunction with People

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

During major incidents it is important to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to the public to:

- Reassure those who may or may not be affected

- Provide public safety information

- Avoid mass panic

- Reduce the burden of requests for information

- Preserve the reputation of the responding agencies

If people are not provided with relevant and clear information during a major incident, it is likely to undermine the level of public confidence.

In the confusion that often follows a major incident, it can be a difficult and lengthy process to establish clear, concise and accurate facts and figures about what has happened. However, the media will constantly request this information and may try to obtain it from official or unofficial sources.

In the immediate aftermath of a major incident many people may travel to the scene or to meeting points, such as transport terminals, if they believe their family or friends could be involved. Family or friends of those involved in the major incident may be feeling intense anxiety, shock or grief, and will need a sympathetic and understanding approach.

Family and friends may be concerned about the safety of emergency responders they know to be on duty. This could prompt them to go to the scene or call the relevant responder agency for information and reassurance.

Providing an inconsistent message to the media and the public may demonstrate a lack of joint working and shared situational awareness across the responder organisations. Inconsistent communications may lead to a loss of confidence in the response to the incident.

Control measure – Warn, inform and advise people: Major incidents

This control measure should be read in conjunction with Warn, inform and advise people

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Co-ordination of information during a major incident can improve the consistency of the details provided by the responder organisations.

In the event of a major incident, the commanders of all responding agencies should establish a communications plan. This should aim to ensure that all channels of communication used to

698 warn, inform and advise people provide appropriate and aligned information, to avoid any panic,
699 conflict or confusion.

700 Appropriate and effective liaison and control should be put in place to ensure that information
701 provided to those involved, and their family and friends, is accurate and consistent.

702 It may be necessary for fire and rescue services to put in place a channel for family and friends
703 of personnel to obtain updates about the incident. Keeping fire and rescue service stations and
704 fire control rooms briefed about the major incident may help to reduce the psychological impacts
705 on personnel.

706 Incident commanders should ensure that relevant operational and fire control personnel are
707 regularly briefed about the current information and advice that should be provided to the public.

708 For audit and learning purposes, a log should be maintained of the information that was
709 provided, the channels used, by whom and when.

710 Fire and rescue services should be aware of and help to develop local communication protocols
711 with other Category 1 and Category 2 responder organisations to:

712 • Agree the process to be used to identify the lead responder to warn, inform and advise
713   people about emergencies

714 • Agree the identity of lead responders to warn, inform and advise people on reasonably
715   foreseeable scenarios

716 • Agree joint working procedures and allocation of responsibilities in support of the lead
717   responder who will warn, inform and advise people

718 • Agree the trigger points and procedures for handing over the responsibility to warn,
719   inform and advise people from one responder organisation to another

720 • Agree how services, products or equipment for warning, informing and advising people
721   will be sourced or procured

722 The application of any local communication protocols should be considered when responding to
723 a major incident

724 It may be necessary to use a number of communication channels, including:

725 • Television and radio

726 • Websites and social media of:

727   o Councils

728   o Police forces

729   o Fire and rescue services

730   o Ambulance trusts

731 • GOV.UK Emergency Alerts service

732 • Press conferences

733 • Visiting residential and commercial premises

734 • Public announcements in areas such as public buildings, shopping centres, sports
735 venues and transport networks

736 It may also be possible to establish plans with local companies or organisations for their
737 assistance during a major incident. This could include the use of their facilities or resources,
738 such as call centres, to help deliver information and advice to the public.

739 The release of sensitive information, such as the number and details of those involved, needs to
740 be strictly controlled. It should follow the established multi-agency process between the relevant
741 organisations, such as the police, disaster victim identification (DVI) and the coroner.

742 **Government communications**

743 The UK Resilience section on the Cabinet Office website and other sites can be a central
744 source of information for the media inside and outside the UK, including press releases,
745 briefings, statistics, response figures, maps, graphics and instructions. It can also be used to
746 distribute emergency plans and transmit alerts and warnings.

747 The scale and nature of any emergency will dictate the level of national involvement in its
748 handling, particularly in communications. If ministerial involvement becomes necessary, the
749 News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will be set up by staff in the Cabinet Office. The NCC will
750 function alongside the government department leading the response and liaise closely with staff
751 from the Central Office of Information News and Public Relations at the scene of the
752 emergency, if outside London.

753 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

754 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20508	Be aware of and help to develop local communication protocols for major incidents with other Category 1 and Category 2 responder organisations	Amend
20509	Consider establishing plans with local companies and organisations for their assistance during a major incident to help deliver information and advice to the public	Amend

755 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

756 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment

	Liaise with the other commanders of responding agencies to establish a communications plan to warn, inform and advise people about a major incident	New
	Ensure that relevant operational and fire control personnel are regularly briefed about the current information and advice that should be provided to the public about the major incident	New
	Maintain a log of the information that was provided to the public about the major incident, the channels used, by whom and when	New
20510	Be aware of and implement local communication protocols for a major incident	Amend
	Use appropriate communication channels to warn, inform and advise people about a major incident	New
	Use established arrangements with local companies or organisations to help deliver information and advice to the public about a major incident	New
	Ensure the release of sensitive information about a major incident is strictly controlled	New

757 **Control measure – Seek assistance for dealing with people: Major incidents**

758 **This control measure should be read in conjunction with Seek assistance for dealing**
759 **with people**

760 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

761 Depending on the scale and nature of the major incident, suitable locations and logistics for the
762 reception of large numbers of people may need to be identified and arranged.

763 Local pre-planning should identify reception centres, such as survivor reception centres,
764 emergency rest centres and humanitarian assistance centres, which are designed to cater for
765 the needs of all people involved in a major incident.

766 Local authorities work with statutory and specialist agencies and the voluntary sector; these
767 organisations can provide assistance at a major incident that requires additional logistical and
768 public support. Agencies include:

769 • Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum

770 • British Red Cross Emergency Response

771 • Disaster Action

772 • The Salvation Army

773 • Samaritans

774 • [St John Ambulance](#)

775 • [St John Ambulance Cymru](#)

776 • [St John Scotland](#)

777 • [St Andrew's First Aid](#)

778 • [St John Ambulance Northern Ireland](#)

779 • [Royal Voluntary Service](#)

780 For more information refer to [Emergency Response and Recovery: Non statutory guidance](#)
781 [accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act](#).

782 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

783 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
12496	Be involved in local pre-planning for the reception centres that may be required for a major incident	Amend
12497	Be involved in developing local support service arrangements for the people who may be affected by a major incident	Amend
12498	Ensure that relevant operational and fire control personnel understand the local arrangements for obtaining logistical and public support assistance for a major incident	Amend

784 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

785 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
12499	Be aware of the process for establishing reception centres for a major incident	Amend
	Establish or assist with appropriate and effective liaison and control to ensure that information provided to family and friends of those involved in the major incident is accurate and consistent	New
12500	Request additional logistical and public support provided by agencies under local arrangements for a major incident	Amend

786 **Control measure – Media liaison for major incidents**

787 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

788 Media liaison for a major incident may include production and distribution of a core media brief
789 for distribution among key stakeholders, central co-ordination of interviews, or even a

790 centralised press office. It could also mean an agency providing additional press officers to
791 support another agency that may be under particular pressure.

792 Attendance of a media liaison officer (MLO) at the scene of a major incident should help to ease
793 pressure on operational personnel from the media. It is vital that the MLO is able to quickly
794 establish a procedure for working with media requests and for regularly briefing them on
795 developments. Rumour and conjecture will flourish in a vacuum, and it is far better that the MLO
796 gains the trust and confidence of the media by providing regular updates on events, even if
797 there is little new to say.

798 Demonstrating awareness of the need for media representatives to meet deadlines or broadcast
799 live reports will assist the MLO in establishing credibility. This is important as they may need to
800 seek the co-operation of the media, for example to:

801 • Publicise contact numbers for family and friends to use, such as for a casualty bureau if
802 activated by the police

803 • Organise pooled access to the major incident site for filming

804 • Broadcast urgent appeals for donations of bedding or clothing

805 • Provide details of evacuation or shelter arrangements

806 To remove workload pressure from the incident commander, it may be appropriate to nominate
807 senior officers from responder agencies to act as the primary lead for media interviews.

808 Fire and rescue services should ensure all employees understand who is responsible for media
809 briefings, and how they can be contacted. The MLO, or nominated person, should regularly brief
810 relevant people in the fire and rescue service to ensure:

811 • Requests for information from the media are routed correctly

812 • Appropriate information is provided to family and friends of:

813 o Those involved in the incident

814 o Personnel on-duty

815 • Website and social media updates are appropriate

816 • There is an awareness of how the major incident is progressing and its potential impacts
817 on:

818 o Operational response to other incidents

819 o Other fire and rescue service activities

820 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

821 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment

Reference		Comment
20511	Have arrangements for a media liaison officer to attend major incidents	Amend
20513	Ensure media liaison officers understand the scope of their role and how it can improve public confidence following a major incident	Amend

822   *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

823   Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20512	Liaise with media liaison officers to co-ordinate media interaction for the major incident	Amend

824   All personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Understand who is responsible for media briefings for major incidents, and how they can be contacted	New
	Use the briefings received from the medial liaison officer or nominated person about the major incident, when providing information to members of the public	New

825

826 **Hazard – Mass casualties of major incidents**

827 **This hazard should be read in conjunction with Multiple casualties**

828 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

829 A major incident can result in a large number of casualties, often referred to as mass casualties.
830 The number of casualties for the application of the term 'mass' will depend on the geographical
831 structure of the area where the major incident occurs, and the number of casualties that local
832 resources can normally deal with.

833 Mass casualties could be the result of events including:

834 • Fire-related incidents

835 • Transport incidents

836 • Terrorist attacks

837 • Hazardous materials incidents, including those with chemical, biological, radiological and
838 nuclear (CBRN) materials involved

839 • Explosions

840 • Flooding or other geophysical hazards

841 The type of incident will affect the ability of the responder agencies to provide casualty care to
842 those involved. Other sections of guidance provide further information for the incident-specific
843 casualty care that may be required.

844 The speed at which casualties are treated and moved from the point of injury into definitive
845 medical care will affect survival rates. Some casualties may require immediate intervention to
846 prevent their death. Early intervention, based on an assessment of the benefits and risks, is
847 required to maximise survival rates. First aid delivered in the critical minutes following injury and
848 before professional emergency services arrive on-scene can mitigate the 'care gap'.

849 A different approach to casualty care may be required, in order to balance high casualty
850 numbers with the availability of emergency responders who can provide life-saving care.

851 If there are casualties with significant trauma injuries, there will be a risk of infectious disease
852 transmission. For more information refer to Operations – Infectious diseases.

853 Due to the nature of injuries to the casualties, and the number of casualties, personnel may be
854 subject to physiological stress. The psychological hazards of the incident may affect
855 operational, non-operational and fire control personnel. For more information refer to:

856 • Operations – Physiological stress

857 • Operations – Psychological hazards

858 The behaviour of people involved in the major incident may be influenced by their:

859 • Familiarity with the location

860 • Awareness about the need to evacuate

861 • Willingness or ability to evacuate

862 • Ability to hear or understand evacuation instructions

863 • Understanding of evacuation procedures

864 • Impairment by alcohol or drugs

865 • Perception of the incident and emergency response

866 People may be extremely distressed and, especially if they were with companions, be unwilling
867 to leave the hazard area. Even if people do not have any visible injuries, they may be suffering
868 from visual or hearing impairment as a result of the incident. For more information refer to
869 Operations – People.

870 **Control measure – Mass casualty plan: Major incidents**

871 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

872 A major incident that involves mass casualties requires a multi-agency response that applies
873 the JESIP principles. As these incidents have the potential to rapidly overwhelm the responder
874 agencies, thorough planning and a co-ordinated response should provide the best outcome for
875 casualties. This can be supported by multi-agency training and exercising.

876 Fire and rescue sources should identify the roles, resources and equipment they may need to
877 provide to support a mass casualty plan at a major incident.

878 Mass casualty plans are designed as an effective response to conventional major incidents that
879 result in mass casualties; this could be at a single location or at multiple locations. Plans are
880 normally activated by the ambulance service of where the incident occurs.

881 Conventional major incidents are defined as those that cause traumatic injuries, such as burns,
882 fractures or bleeding, but do not involve CBRN materials. For more information refer to
883 Hazardous materials – Exposed members of the public.

884 The activation of mass casualty plans for a major incident will need to be based on the:

885 • Nature and severity of the trauma suffered

886 • Ratio of ambulance and medical responders available

887 • Accessibility and appropriateness of clinical expertise and resources available within the
888   critical timeframe to reduce fatalities

889 It is difficult to plan for fixed casualty thresholds as the tactical options for the major incident will
890 vary. However, planning should be based on predetermined emergency preparedness
891 arrangements, which outline agreed multi-agency actions and responsibilities in responding to
892 major incidents involving mass casualties.

893 The level of fire and rescue service participation in the implementation of any mass casualty
894 plan will need to be agreed, based on the type of hazards present at the major incident and the
895 specialist resources that may be required.

896 If a major incident involving mass casualties is declared, it may be necessary for all responder
897 agencies to activate their own major incident plans, if they have not already done so.

898 A strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) should be established to identify the resources required
899 to maintain or increase safe levels of emergency service response in the area.

900 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

901 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Participate in multi-agency planning, training and exercising, based on predetermined emergency preparedness arrangements for major incidents involving mass casualties	New
20605	Identify the roles, resources and equipment they may need to provide to support a mass casualty plan at a major incident	Amend
20606	Ensure that staff are suitably trained in the tactical options used as part of a casualty or fatality management plan	Archive

902 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

903 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20608	Communicate hazards identified in the inner cordon or hazard zone	Archive
20609	Support other on-scene commanders with the nomination of casualty collection point (CCP) and casualty clearing station (CCS) locations	Archive
	Implement the agreed level of fire and rescue service participation in a mass casualty plan for a major incident	New
	Activate fire and rescue service major incident plans for mass casualties if required	New
	Provide resource and other information to the strategic co-ordinating group if established for a major incident	New

904 All personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20611	Carry out the tactical options included in the jointly-agreed casualty management plan	Archive

905 **Control measure – Casualty management plan: Major incidents**

906 The ambulance service will approve the casualty management plan (CMP) to save lives. A
907 CMP, which may initially be basic in nature, should be developed before the deployment of
908 responders. As the incident progresses, the CMP should be formalised, reviewed, adjusted and
909 approved by the ambulance on-scene commander as part of their tactical plan.

910 While the ambulance service retains lead responsibility for the management of casualties,
911 decisions regarding the deployment of responders will be made as part of a joint understanding
912 of risk. The joint understanding of risk should be established by the commanders for each
913 emergency service in attendance.

914 The CMP forms part of the joint decision-making process, which ensures that the commanders
915 for each emergency service in attendance understand its contents and implications. The current
916 CMP should be included in deployment briefings, to ensure that emergency responders are
917 aware of the tactics and procedures to be followed, emphasising the overarching aim of rapid
918 deployment to save lives and reduce harm. Any changes to the CMP need to be promptly
919 shared with partner agencies.

920 Personnel may be able to provide assistance to the ambulance service to deliver the CMP, by
921 treating and removing casualties. All personnel should be briefed before being deployed to carry
922 out casualty management. They may be deployed with ambulance responders to assist with
923 casualty management.

924 Fire control personnel may be able to provide the incident commander with details of the
925 location of casualties or zero responders who are assisting casualties. This information,
926 including details of the condition of the casualty if known, should be provided to the ambulance
927 service for inclusion in the CMP.

928 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

929 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Ensure all incident commanders are practiced in applying the JESIP principles to support a casualty management plan for a major incident	New

930 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

931 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20607	Participate in the development of a joint understanding of risk before deploying personnel to assist the ambulance service with delivering the casualty management plan for a major incident	Amend

		Ensure they are kept fully aware of the current casualty management plan and its progress, including the role of personnel and the tactics and procedures to be followed for casualties of a major incident	New
		Relay any information about the location of casualties, or zero responders who are assisting casualties, and the condition of the casualty if known, to the ambulance service for inclusion in the casualty management plan for a major incident	New
	20610	Brief personnel being deployed to assist with casualty management, including tactics, procedures and who they will be assisting for casualties of a major incident	Amend

932 Fire control personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Provide the incident commander with details of the location of casualties or zero responders who are assisting casualties of a major incident, including details of the condition of the casualty if known	New

933 **Control measure – Casualty care: Mass casualties of major incidents**

934 The ambulance on-scene commander will direct and co-ordinate the casualty management plan
935 (CMP) to deliver life-saving care. As non-ambulance emergency responders will have varying
936 levels of first aid knowledge and training, they should be tasked appropriately.

937 Maximising the number of emergency responders to deliver mass casualty care aims to save
938 lives. Multi-agency teams may deliver basic clinical care or be tasked with the removal or
939 transfer of casualties to or from:

940 • Casualty collection points (CCP)

941 • Casualty clearing stations (CCS)

942 • Casualty loading points (CLP)

943 Ambulance responders will direct and oversee the treatment provided by other emergency
944 responders.

945 Personnel should be aware of the tactical options that may be deployed when delivering mass
946 casualty care for a major incident. The tactical response is flexible, and commanders may
947 amend tactics according to threat and risk. All emergency responders should be advised about
948 the safest routes in and out of the scene to reach and rescue casualties.

949 The aim of deploying emergency responders is to rapidly assess and treat casualties, then
950 move on to the next casualty if required. Personnel need to understand that they may not be
951 able to stay with a casualty after providing basic treatment.

952 The CMP will detail the multi-agency tactical options in use, including:

953	• Deployment of specialist responders
954	• Deployment of non-specialist responders
955	• Triage and triage labelling
956	• Treat and take casualties
957	• Treat and leave casualties

958 Initial casualty care

959 Members of the public, with the necessary knowledge, skills and access to equipment, can
960 deliver care in the critical minutes following a casualty being injured and before professional
961 emergency services arrive on-scene. This action can help to fill or mitigate the 'care gap'.

962 There may be equipment provided at a public venue that can be used by 'zero responders'
963 (somebody at the scene of the incident who can provide first aid) or 'first responders' (such as a
964 police officer or firefighter with first aid or more advanced trauma care skills). Fire control
965 personnel or ambulance control may be providing zero responders with initial medical advice.

966 Emergency responders should be trained, exercised and equipped to be able to operate
967 effectively. They should be familiar with the equipment they may need to use, including trauma
968 kits, tourniquets, rapid evacuation stretchers and defibrillators.

969 Deployments should be undertaken safely, but at pace, balancing the need for the safety of
970 emergency responders with the need to improve the chances of survival and recovery of
971 casualties with serious injuries.

972 Triage and triage labelling

973 All emergency services in attendance should be prepared to perform the initial triage, especially
974 if there are multiple casualties of major incidents.

975 To avoid the repeated assessment of casualties, especially at complex incidents, appropriate
976 triage labelling should be used. For more information about the triage process, refer to Search,
977 rescue and casualty care – Carry out triage.

978 Treat and take casualties

979 Once a casualty has been assessed and treated, they should immediately be removed so that
980 they can receive further treatment. Depending on the circumstances, nature of injuries and the
981 availability of resources, urgent removal of casualties direct to a CLP should be considered.

982 Removal or transfer of casualties to either a CCP or CCS will commence on the instruction of
983 the ambulance on-scene commander.

984 Casualties may have received or applied first aid prior to removal from the scene. This could
985 include the use of medical or improvised tourniquets, which may be under clothing. Although a
986 thorough check for these should be made in the CCP, if personnel are handing over a casualty
987 who they know has a tourniquet applied, they should bring this to the attention of a medical
988 responder.

989 Consideration should be given to the use of any appropriate equipment or vehicles that are
990 available, to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties. This may include the use of
991 stretchers or skeds, as well as improvised casualty carrying equipment. It may be necessary to
992 request additional equipment for this purpose, depending on the number of casualties. For more
993 information refer to Search, rescue and casualty care – Use casualty transport equipment.

994 **Treat and leave casualties**

995 If casualty numbers are high, the CMP may require the use of the 'treat and leave' option. This
996 will involve emergency responders providing rapid and minimal clinical intervention, focused on
997 controlling major haemorrhage or using basic airway control techniques, such as placing
998 casualties into the recovery position. These actions aim to provide the maximum benefit to the
999 greatest number of casualties.

1000 **Uninjured people and ambulant casualties**

1001 Emergency responders should not allow members of the public to distract them from treating
1002 the maximum number of casualties possible. Therefore, uninjured people and ambulant
1003 casualties should be told to leave the scene by the safest route.

1004 However, some uninjured people will want to stay and assist casualties, especially off-duty
1005 medical staff or emergency responders, or first aiders. If appropriate, emergency responders
1006 can instruct these people to assist a casualty, for example by applying potentially life-saving
1007 dressings.

1008 If there has been an explosion, people may be suffering from visual or hearing impairment,
1009 which may make it difficult for them to comply with instructions. They may need physical
1010 assistance to help them leave the scene.

1011 Uninjured people who are distressed or confused may not follow instructions from emergency
1012 responders; they should be given directions to leave the scene by the safest route in a firm and
1013 clear manner.

1014 Details should be captured about the people who leave or are evacuated from the hazard area
1015 without requiring triage. To make this process efficient, there should be a joint decision about
1016 who will undertake this task, what information will be captured and how it will be recorded.
1017 Consideration should be given about how to share the information appropriately and sensitively.
1018 For more information refer to Operations – Evacuation and shelter.

1019 Welfare or shelter arrangements may be required for people affected by the incident, either
1020 directly or indirectly. Depending on the scale and nature of the incident, it may be necessary to
1021 identify and arrange suitable locations and logistics to provide shelter for large numbers of
1022 people. For more information refer to Seek assistance for dealing with people: Major incidents.

1023 **Communication**

1024 Information communicated to, or withheld from, people can influence their behaviour.
1025 Communicating with people, particularly those in groups or crowds, is essential to maintain
1026 order and manage behaviour. In emergencies, the key communications objective will be to

1027 deliver accurate, clear and timely warnings, information and advice to people, so they feel
1028 confident, safe and well-informed. For more information refer to Warn, inform and advise
1029 people: Major incidents.

1030 **Searching for casualties**

1031 A thorough search of the scene is necessary to ensure that everyone is located and led or
1032 assisted to safety. The search plan should be devised and led by the fire and rescue service,
1033 informed by the CMP. If the search will be multi-agency resourced, it needs to be co-ordinated
1034 to ensure it is carried out efficiently. For more information refer to Search, rescue and casualty
1035 care – Effective search management.

1036 **Fire and rescue service clinical governance for casualty care**

1037 As part of risk management planning, fire and rescue services may identify the requirement to
1038 provide casualty care that is over and above the first aid regulations when responding to a
1039 major incident. If this preplanning decision is taken, it is strongly advised that they obtain clinical
1040 governance leadership from a healthcare professional. This person should have the
1041 competencies to lead and co-ordinate clinical governance for the organisation, to ensure that
1042 any casualty care provided is of an appropriate standard and to support personnel in its
1043 delivery.

1044 For more information refer to Search, rescue and casualty care – Risk assess and adopt the
1045 appropriate level of casualty care.

1046 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

1047 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Determine how many personnel should be competent in providing the type of casualty care that may be required for a major incident	New
	Consider obtaining appropriate clinical governance to enable personnel to provide casualty care for a major incident	New
	Ensure relevant personnel receive training about the delivery of multi-agency casualty care for a major incident	New
	Consider equipping fire and rescue service vehicles with an appropriate type and number of stretchers or skeds for mass casualty management for major incident	New
	Consider equipping fire and rescue service vehicles with first aid equipment suitable for treating mass casualties of a major incident	New

1048 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

1049 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Take direction from the ambulance on-scene commander about the deployment of personnel to assist with casualties of a major incident	New
	Ensure personnel are aware of the location and purpose of the casualty collection points, casualty clearing stations and casualty loading points for a major incident	New
	Ensure personnel are aware of the tactical options that are to be used for casualties of a major incident, and are briefed about any changes in the tactical response	New
	Ensure personnel understand that they may not be able to stay with a casualty of a major incident after providing basic treatment	New
	Ensure personnel are aware of the triage process and labelling in use for casualties of a major incident	New
	Ensure personnel understand the need to follow ambulance responder instructions about the removal or transfer of casualties of a major incident to an appropriate location	New
	Ensure personnel understand that when handing over a casualty of a major incident who has a tourniquet applied, they should bring this to the attention of a medical responder	New
	Determine what equipment or vehicles are available to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties of a major incident; this may include stretchers, skeds or improvised equipment	New
	Consider requesting additional equipment to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties of a major incident	New
	Deploy personnel who are able to provide assistance with a treat and leave response for casualties of a major incident if required	New
	Ensure personnel understand the need to instruct uninjured people or ambulant casualties to leave the scene of a major incident and to be aware that they may need assistance	New
	Ensure personnel understand when it may be appropriate for uninjured people to remain and assist with first aid for casualties of a major incident	New

		Develop and co-ordinate a search plan for the scene of a major incident, to ensure all uninjured people and casualties have been found, if required by the casualty management plan	New

1050

Appendix A – Relocated content

Incident command: Control measure - Interpersonal communication

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Good interpersonal communication skills are essential for effective incident command; communication is the tool used by commanders to facilitate many aspects of their role. Interpersonal communication skills are used to transfer information between incident commanders and other people. Effective use of these skills will ensure that what is said and emphasised is supported by the way it is said and the body language of the speaker.

Effective communication between incident commanders and others is of primary importance at an incident. The quality of communication moderates the degree to which people communicate, co-operate and co-ordinate with each other.

Effective interpersonal communicators should:

- Actively listen to others

- Communicate with clarity and confidence

- Adopt the most appropriate communication style for the situation

- Verify information communicated to them to avoid making assumptions

- Avoid barriers to effective communication

- Ensure their verbal and non-verbal communication aligns

- Check for confirmation of understanding

Fire and rescue services should be aware that the culture of their organisation can influence behaviours on and off the incident ground. This may affect the way in which incident commanders communicate with others and the way in which personnel respond.

The manner in which an incident commander communicates may affect the perception of them in terms of their competence, confidence and trustworthiness. This perception can influence the actions and behaviours of others, which may impact on several important aspects of command, including:

- How information is managed in support of incident commanders

- How information is received by others

- The quality and frequency of information that is shared with incident commanders

- The transfer of command

- The extent of personal, team and organisational learning from incident reviews

Fire and rescue services should reference the important characteristics of effective interpersonal communicators in relevant policies.

1084 Communication can be a direct one-way process such as an order, which may need to convey
1085 a sense of urgency. Communication can be a simple two-way process that involves an
1086 exchange of information; effective interpersonal communication skills can be used to ensure
1087 that the information received has also been understood, by using active listening and
1088 confirmatory questions.

1089 When transferring command, briefing or debriefing, incident commanders should communicate
1090 clearly and concisely, following a recognised structure. This assists others, including personnel,
1091 command support functions, fire control rooms and other agencies, to engage, follow and
1092 understand the information and to identify when something may have been inadvertently
1093 omitted.

1094 Commanders should check the other person's understanding of important communications to
1095 ensure there is a shared understanding of the information.

1096 For more information refer to Incident command: Knowledge, skills and competence:
1097 Interpersonal communication.

1098 Operational and fire control personnel should be made aware of the limitations of the secure
1099 digital network in their service. To avoid communication systems being overwhelmed, especially
1100 during a multi-agency incident or major incident, personnel should follow standard
1101 communication protocols and keep radio and mobile communication to a minimum.

1102 It may be beneficial to obtain advice from a communications tactical adviser to avoid radio and
1103 mobile communications becoming congested at larger or protracted incidents.

1104 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

1105 Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
31527	Establish the command competencies, training, validation and revalidation required for interpersonal communication skills	
31528	Ensure their organisational culture supports the use of good interpersonal communication between all personnel	
20469	Ensure operational and fire control personnel are made aware of the limitations of the secure digital network in their service	Relocated and revised

1106 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

1107 Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment

31531	Use interpersonal communication skills and behaviours to demonstrate their competence, instil confidence, and foster trust with others	
31530	Value and support others to establish open, two-way communication to gather and share information using interpersonal communication skills	
31532	Using interpersonal communication skills, apply the most appropriate communication style to suit the audience or situation	
31671	Use interpersonal communication skills when communicating objectives, priorities and tactics to be adopted to resolve an incident	
31673	Provide regular situation updates to all responders by using interpersonal communication skills and protocols, such as M/ETHANE	
31674	Apply interpersonal communication skills and use a recognised structure when transferring command, briefing or debriefing	
20472	Obtain advice from a communications tactical adviser to avoid radio and mobile communications becoming congested at larger or protracted incidents	Relocated and revised

1108   All personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20471	Follow standard communication protocols and keep radio and mobile communication to a minimum	Relocated

1109

Appendix B – Content to be archived

Hazard – Ineffective multi-agency working [REMOVE – CONTENT RELOCATED TO HAZARD – MAJOR INCIDENTS AND RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES]

Hazard – Ineffective strategic response arrangements to support major incidents [REMOVE – CONTENT RELOCATED TO HAZARD – MAJOR INCIDENTS AND RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES]

Hazard – Overwhelmed/overloaded communications systems [REMOVE – IN FIRE CONTROL GUIDANCE: MULTIPLE CALLS AND MULTIPLE INCIDENTS]

Control measure – Manage congestion of digital network communications on the incident ground [REMOVE – IN FIRE CONTROL GUIDANCE: MULTIPLE CALLS AND MULTIPLE INCIDENTS, AND MULTI-AGENCY]

Control measure – National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) and National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC) [REMOVE – RELOCATED TO NATIONAL COORDINATION AND ADVISORY FRAMEWORK AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE]

Control measure – Identifying the need for enhanced logistics support [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN INCIDENT COMMAND]

Control measure – National Resilience: Provide enhanced logistics support [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN INCIDENT COMMAND]

Control measure – Carry out triage [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN SEARCH, RESCUE AND CASUALTY CARE]

Control measure – Use casualty transport equipment [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN SEARCH, RESCUE AND CASUALTY CARE]

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