Reference number	N.O.G. CC 083	
Date	March 2023	



Operational Guidance: Scheduled review

Operational Guidance topic

Operational Guidance: Major incidents

Change originator

NFCC - Continuous Improvement

Change requested

The current *Major incidents* guidance was published in 2018, making it due for a scheduled review.

A pre-review survey was carried out in mid-2022; the feedback included comments such as:

- There is repetition of already published guidance and in some areas there is too much detail unless for a foundation document. Overall it is still a high quality document.
- While the guidance makes many references to JESIP, no mention is made of ResilienceDirect[™] despite it representing the single largest repository of material produced by collaborative effort for the purposes of compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act
- We think that guidance is very useful as a sense check of our approach to major incidents, and is very useful for multiple departments who work on this subject outside of the policy team. However, a shorter version, which references (rather than repeats) other guidance such as JESIP and Search, rescue and casualty care may be easier to use.
- NILO are not mentioned and as part of co-ordination of major incidents they would be an asset for incident commanders. It may not be a terrorist attack, but a reference or signpost at least would be useful.

Since the publication of this guidance, the *Operations* and *Incident command* guidance has been revised, and *Corporate guidance for operational activity* and *Fire control* guidance introduced. There has also been publication of the revised *JESIP Joint Doctrine*.

This review aims to present a piece of guidance, which has a better and more user-friendly structure that complies with the style guide developed as the Operational Guidance has matured. The review also aims to remove content that is published elsewhere as it does not only apply to major incidents.

Changes proposed	Rationale for change
Include appropriate references to	Fire and rescue services need to understand
ResilienceDirect™	the benefits of accessing the
	ResilienceDirect™ when responding to a

Major incidents 2023 review 0.1.docx

	multi agangy major incident
	multi-agency major incident
Include content about National Inter-agency Liaison Officers	National Inter-agency Liaison Officers provide a beneficial role for major incidents, especially those that involve multi-agencies
Rationalise the hazards Ineffective multi- agency working and Ineffective strategic response arrangements to support major incidents, and relocate to the hazard Major incidents and its relevant control measures	Some of the current hazard knowledge should be published as control measure knowledge, and this also aims to make the guidance more structured
Relocate the content of the control measure National Resilience Assurance Team and National Resilience Fire Control into a retitled control measure National Coordination and Advisory Framework and National Resilience	Rationalisation of content to remove duplication and provide a better guidance structure
Remove the control measures Identifying the need for enhanced logistics support and National Resilience: Provide enhanced logistics support as these are published in the Incident command guidance, and are not unique to major incidents	Rationalisation of content to remove duplication and provide a better guidance structure
Remove the control measures Carry out triage and Use casualty transport equipment as these are published in the Search, rescue and casualty care guidance, and are not unique to major incidents	Rationalisation of content to remove duplication and provide a better guidance structure
Addition of two control measures for Casualty management plan: Major incidents and Casualty care: Mass casualties of major incidents	Provide additional control measure knowledge, strategic actions and tactical actions that are appropriate for mass casualties of major incidents; this supports the Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations
Removal of the hazard, Overwhelmed/overloaded communications systems and its control measure Manage congestion of digital network communications on the incident ground	This hazard and its control measure are now covered by Fire control guidance
Relocate strategic and tactical actions relating to communications to the Incident command control measure <i>Interpersonal communications</i> , and create supporting control measure knowledge	This content is not unique to major incidents, and should be considered at all incidents

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Consultation process

- Pre-review research (four weeks)
- Open consultation (six weeks)

Governance process

- $\hfill\square$ Recommended by NFCC Operational Guidance Forum Click or tap to enter a date.
- $\hfill \square$ Approved by NFCC Operations CommitteeClick or tap to enter a date.
- ☐ Approved by NFCC Steering GroupClick or tap to enter a date.

Impacts on other guidance products

- Updates to the Major incidents training specification
- Scenarios



Operational Guidance Major incidents

Draft review 0.1 for consultation

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Major incidents

Introduction

This National Operational Guidance highlights key actions for fire and rescue services responders in the event of a major incident. It is 'context' guidance; it addresses the hazards that relate specifically to the scale of major incidents rather than the activity that needs to take place. Guidance dealing with the hazards of the activity of major incidents such as terrorist attacks, flooding, CBRN(e) events or a larger-scale fire are covered elsewhere within the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) Operational Guidance framework.

Fire and rescue services and other emergency responders do not use terms such as disaster or crisis to describe a large_scale emergency. They respond to incidents, or major incidents, and this guidance sets out the additional activities or responsibilities that may be required to manage a major incident. It is important that the individuals who could be first on scene for their respective respondinger agency are able to declare a major incident according to service and local arrangements, and that they understand the benefits of doing so early.

The Cabinet Office Lexicon of civil protection terminology definesition of a major incident ias:

<u>"aA</u>n event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency".

-They are likely to be larger or, more complex, endanger more people or threaten larger areas, and will require additional levels of command, control and co-ordination. This will be likely to involve many emergency services and other responding agencies in a long and high impact event. This fire and rescue service context guidance should therefore be read in conjunction with National-Operational Guidance: Incident command and the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability PrinciplesJESIP Principles.

Legislation

Civil resilience in the UK is underpinned by The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA). Part 1 sets out the local arrangements for civil protection, and part 2 the emergency powers. In part 1 of the CCA, local responder organisations are divided into two categories; Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

Category 1 responders include the emergency services, local authorities and NHS bodies, while Category 2 responders include organisations such as the Health & Safety Executive, utility and transport companies.

Non-categorised responders may support a major incident; this includes the military and voluntary organisations, which are not bound by the CCA.

Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response. They are subject to the full set of civil protection duties and are required to:

- Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
- Put emergency plans in place
- Put business continuity management arrangements in place
- Put arrangements in place to make information available to the public about civil
 protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in
 the event of an emergency
- Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
- Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency
- Provide <u>local authority</u> advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management

Category 2 organisations are co-operating bodies. They are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work, but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their own sector. Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties, which includes co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA), details the support of the armed forces to civil authorities in the UK, which is concentrated on two main areas:

- Providing niche capabilities, which the Ministry of Defence (MOD) needs for its own purposes and which would not be efficient for the rest of government to generate independently, for example Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
- Standing ready to support the civil authorities when their capacity is overwhelmed. The
 armed forces provide this support from spare capacity, so it is subject to the availability of
 resources, without affecting core MOD objectives. The MOD does not generate and
 maintain forces specifically for this task.

The <u>voluntary sector</u> has an important role to play in supporting the statutory services in the planning, response and recovery phases of many major incidents. Their role is <u>detailed in:</u>

detailed in:

detailed in: Emergency Preparedness Chapter 14: The Role of the Voluntary Sector

• Ready Scotland - Voluntary Response guide

The Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations require Category 1 responders to consider the contribution of the voluntary sector. This includes determining how the voluntary sector can be involved at every stage, including training and exercising for responding to

emergencies.

UK coverage

The <u>CCA</u> applies to the whole of the UK <u>to varying degrees that</u> reflect devol<u>ved administration arrangements</u>. Part 1 <u>provides</u> <u>l</u>ocal arrangements for civil protection.

Wales

In Wales, UK ministers will make legislation and issue guidance in relation to responders in Wales. However, the CCA requires UK ministers to obtain the consent of the Welsh Government before taking action in relation to a responder in Wales, which falls within devolved competence.

Scotland

Part 1 of the <u>CCA</u> applies to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish Ministers if they relate to devolved matters. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a devolved matter and therefore the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, certain responders in Scotland operate in reserved areas, with <u>regulations</u> and guidance issued by UK Ministers. More information can be found here.

Northern Ireland

Some Category 1 and Category 2 responders in Northern Ireland are subject to Part 1 of the CCA and the Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations. This includes the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and telecommunications providers.

<u>However, the</u> Northern Ireland <u>Fire</u> and <u>Rescue</u> <u>Service</u> is not designated as a Category 1 responder and so Part 1 of the CCA does not apply to them

- . <u>Instead, The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework aligns the Northern Ireland Fire</u> . <u>Instead, The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework aligns the Northern Ireland Fire</u>
- Instead, The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework aligns the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service to

the duties set out in the CCA.

Emergency powers

The use of emergency powers is a last resort option, which is subject to a robust set of safeguards. They can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances. Local-level planning arrangements should not assume that emergency powers will be made available.

Part 2 of the CCA ensures the governments and devolved administrations will be consulted Part 2 of the CCA ensures the governments and devolved administrations will be consulted Part 2 of the CCA ensures the governments and devolved administrations will be consulted wherever possible if emergency powers are to be used in their territory. It allows

emergency powers to be used in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland alone for the first time, though the use of emergency powers remains with Westminster.

Concordats setting out in more detail how these arrangements will work in practice have been agreed:

- Concordat between the UK Government and the Welsh Assembly Government
- Concordat between the UK Government and the Scottish ministers

The signed concordats can be viewed on the <u>Cabinet Office</u> site, Resilience Direct $^{\text{TM}}$ and websites for the devolved administrations.

Legislation or formal arrangements	England	Scotland	Wales	Northern Ireland
Civil Contingencies Act The Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations	Yes	Yes, Schedule 1, Part 2, Category 1 Responders: Scotland	Yes, Schedule 1, Part 2A, Category 1 Responders: Wales	Yes, for Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework applies to other responders
Emergency preparedness guidance	Yes	Yes, specifically Chapter 10	Yes, specifically Chapter 11	Yes, specifically Chapter 12
Emergency response and recovery guidance	Yes	Ready Scotland	Yes	Yes
National Coordination and	Yes		Service Supporting dination and Advisor	
Advisory Framework (NCAF) England		Section 6.2	Section 6.1	Section 6.3
Government arrangements	The UK Government	The Scottish Resilience Partnership	Wales Resilience	Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies

Resilience		
Framework		

Intraoperability and interoperability

<u>Major incidents often require a co-ordinated multi-agency response, sometimes with cross-border assistance.</u> For more information refer to:

- Incident command Intraoperability and interoperability
- Operations Communication to support intraoperability and interoperability

Intraoperability and interoperability are supported by co-location at or near to the incident, one of the JESIP principles. There are many benefits of co-location, such as improved communication and understanding, that support joint working. With the use of technology, co-location can be virtual, at least initially, to prevent delays in joint working and decision-making. However, the physical co-location of commanders and responders should occur as soon as reasonably practicable.

Where feasible, fire and rescue services should understand how national frameworks and mutual aid arrangements can support the local, regional or national response to major incidents.

Learning

The lessons identified from major incidents, or from training and exercises for such incidents, need to be methodically captured, preferably while events are fresh in the minds of those involved.

All debriefs should involve the full range of operational and fire control personnel, to ensure the lessons identified are captured from every aspect of the response. For more information refer to Incident command – Hold debriefing or post-incident reviews.

Fire and rescue services must share learning from incidents, training and exercises. This may be within the service to improve their own policies, procedures and training, or through the National Operational Learning process. For more information refer to Corporate guidance for operational activity — Operational learning.

Lessons from multi-agency incidents should be captured and uploaded to Joint Organisational Learning (JOL Online). JOL should also be used to capture notable practice; this is where emergency responders have found and wish to share a solution that works well to address an interoperability issue.

Lessons that involve protected information will be processed via the National Inter-agency Liaison Officer (NILO) Operational Learning Group to JOL.

Site-Specific Risk Information

Fire and rescue authorities must make arrangements to obtain the information necessary to deliver their legislative responsibilities. This includes the requirement for site-specific assessment.

Developing Site-Specific Risk Information (SSRI) will also help to inform the wider topic of operational risk planning and management. This could include capturing information about evacuation plans, buildings and transport networks, and the location of specified access routes and points. For more information refer to guidance on Site-Specific Risk Information.

Risk management plan

Each fire and rescue authority <u>must develop</u> their strategic direction <u>through</u> their risk management plan. <u>To determine the extent of their services, strategic managers will consider their statutory duties</u> and <u>the foreseeable risk</u> within their area.

Work to identify risk and prepare operational plans should consider all stakeholders, including local emergency planning groups and the fire and rescue service risk management plan.

Responsibility of fire and rescue services

Fire and rescue services are responsible, under legislation and regulations, for developing policies and procedures and to provide information, instruction, training and supervision to their personnel about foreseeable hazards and the control measures used to reduce the risks arising from those hazards.

This guidance sets out to provide fire and rescue services with sufficient knowledge about the potential hazards their personnel could encounter when attending incidents. Fire and rescue services should ensure their policies, procedures and training cover all of the hazards and control measures contained within this guidance.

Hazard - Major incidents

HAZARD KNOWI FDGF

Major incidents are likely to be complex, protracted, and involve many different organisations in their resolution. The scale of such incidents, the impact on large numbers of people over a wide area and the potential demand this will put on local or regional resources mean that additional levels of response arrangements will be required.

Without an appropriate level of co-location, communication, co-ordination, joint understanding of risk and shared situational awareness

, the risk to the public and

responders will be increased, and the resolution of the incident may be delayed

.

When one or more agencies declare a major incident, it should trigger well-rehearsed and well-practised planning arrangements across the emergency services, local government and partner agencies. A major incident may require the full force of organisations working collaboratively to bring the situation under control.

Whenever a major incident is declared, it is essential for all local, regional or national organisations that may be affected or become involved to be made aware of this. Failure to ensure there is awareness of an ongoing major incident could result in a lack of shared situational awareness, resulting in an ineffective response.

Major incidents can impact on housing, welfare, and the health and safety of people who live or work in the area. Without a cohesive strategy and a co-ordinated approach, the agencies involved may not be able to effectively control the incident, which could also result in a delay to recovery and normality.

It is important to understand that a major incident can require either a single-agency or multi-agency response. In the early stages of a major incident that requires a multi-agency response, one agency may be in attendance first with their responders needing to carry out tasks that are not normally their responsibility. Without appropriate command and control arrangements between agencies being established as soon as practicable, the emergency response may be less effective.

Shared situational awareness is not always easy to achieve, especially while inherent uncertainties and obstacles that limit individual situational awareness are operating in the background. Interaction of individuals, a team or multiple teams also increases the level of difficulty. Some common barriers to achieving effective shared situational awareness are:

- Concepts not commonly understood
- Terminology not commonly understood
- Unawareness of the use of differing metrics and measurements

- Graphical representations, such as signs and symbols, not commonly understood
- Team assumptions made about other teams going unchallenged or unacknowledged
- Operating procedures and objectives of one team not understood by others
- Information not shared among individuals or teams
- Expertise or information held by one team not made available to others
- Challenge and critique suppressed by dominance of one person or team

Control measure - Preparedness for major incidents

This control measure should be read in conjunction with Emergency response plans

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

<u>Legislative arrangements are provided in the introduction section to this guidance. The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) and The Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations are supported by the Emergency Preparedness guidance.</u>

Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between Category 1 and Category 2 responders, or reciprocal arrangements for Northern Ireland. They should also be conducted according to a practical doctrine beginning with anticipation and assessment of risk to enable effective response and recovery arrangements.

The main civil protection duties for fire and rescue services include:

- Risk assessment
- Business continuity management
- Emergency planning
- Maintaining public awareness
- Maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise people
- Co-operation with other responders
- Information sharing with other responders

Military and voluntary organisations

may have an important role when responding to a

major incident. As part of the work of the local emergency planning groups, they should be invited to take part in planning, training, awareness, testing and exercising wherever possible. This will ensure that voluntary organisations are aware of and work within the relevant command structures, to maintain assertive, safe and effective operations.

Information on the police response for major incidents can be found in the <u>Authorised</u> Professional Practice for Civil emergencies. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU)

<u>Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response Group</u> (EPRRG) are the ambulance emergency preparedness lead.

Military aid

The MOD Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience

incorporates the policy on military aid to the civil authorities (MACA).

The Ministry of Defence has a key role to play supporting lead government departments, devolved administrations and civil authorities as they prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptive challenges and major national events. The joint doctrine publication provides military and non-military readers with the necessary guidance and practical understanding on how the Ministry of Defence can contribute military support for dealing with natural hazards, major incidents or malicious attacks.

Further information about military support is provided in section 13 of the JESIP Joint Doctrine: Further information about military support is provided in section 13 of the JESIP Joint Doctrine: Further information about military support is provided in section 13 of the JESIP Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework

ResilienceDirect™

ResilienceDirect™ is a digital online private network, which enables civil protection practitioners to work together during the preparation, response and recovery phases of an event or emergency. It supports:

- Multi-agency working through:
 - o Sharing emergency plans
 - o Maintaining awareness of plans
 - Exercising plans
 - o Collaboration on response, recovery and learning
 - o Real-time information sharing, including data visualisation
- The development of situational awareness
- The use of clear communications
- · Informed decision-making

It enables organisations to fulfil these functions by readily and consistently providing key information to account users.

ResilienceDirect™ is a web-based service built on a resilient and secure platform. It is accredited to hold electronic documents with protective markings. It is available for use by

<u>Category 1 responders, such as the emergency services, and Category 2 responders, such as public, private and voluntary sector organisations.</u>

Fire and rescue services should ensure they have sufficient resources who are familiar with how to access and use ResilienceDirect™ for operational preparedness, response and recovery purposes.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20401	Ensure that their arrangements comply with the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act or the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework. The main civil protection duties for fire and rescue authorities as Category 1 responders (or reciprocal arrangements for Northern Ireland) are as follows: Risk assessment Business continuity management (BCM) Emergency planning Maintaining public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public Co-operation Information sharing	Amend
20404	Ensure they have that the organisation is resilient, or has sufficient resilience arrangements in place, to be able to manage the an ongoing major incident, as well as maintain business continuity in the rest of the organisation for the duration of the incident or until special arrangements are no longer required	Amend
	Be able to maintain business continuity for the duration of a major incident, or until special arrangements are no longer required	New
	Ensure they have sufficient resources who are familiar with how to access and use ResilienceDirect™ for operational preparedness, response and recovery purposes	New

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Understand the legislative requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act or the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework	New
	Understand how to request information that can be accessed from ResilienceDirect™	New
	Understand how to provide information that can be uploaded to ResilienceDirect™	New

Control measure - Apply the JESIP principles: Major incidents

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Previous major incidents, <u>public inquiries and national learninghave</u> identified the ineffectiveness of single_agency working which has led to a number of public inquires and national learning. As a result, <u>JESIP</u> was established and developed the <u>Jeint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework</u>, <u>whichhas been produced to provides</u> a framework for multi-agency working.

Whenever they work together, <u>and</u> especially at major incidents, <u>joint the responding</u> agencies need to ensure that they <u>deliver</u> have the most coherent and effective joint response possible.

Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means that pre-determined arrangements can be established early, as it can take time for effective operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaration of a major incident triggers a strategic and tactical response from each affected emergency service and other responder agencies.requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.

This guidance contains a summary of the information contained in the JESIP publication.

Relevant operational and fire control personnel should have an appropriate level of understanding of the JESIP Principles for joint working, and how to apply them at a major incident. It may be useful for relevant personnel to have access to the JESIP app or JESIP aidememoires.

CO-LOCATE

Co-locate with other responders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location.

COMMUNICATE

Communicate using language which is clear, and free from technical jargon and abbreviations.

CO-ORDINATE

Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead organisation. Identify priorities, resources, capabilities and limitations for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

JOINTLY UNDERSTAND RISK

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards, to agree appropriate control measures.

SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Establish shared situational awareness by using M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

Figure: Diagram showing the JESIP Principles for joint working

Co-locate

When responders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination face-to-face most effectively. The benefits of co-location include improved communication and understanding, which support joint working. While physical co-location on the scene or in control rooms should remain a consideration, by using technology co-location can be virtual; this may be particularly beneficial for incidents that involve a regional or national response, or are protracted.

Co-location aims to improve the functions

of command, control and co_ordination, <u>supporting</u> the establishment of jointly agreed objectives and a co_ordinated plan. The benefits of co-location apply equally at all levels of <u>response</u>.

At the higher level this is achieved at the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) and tactical co-ordinating group (TCG). At the operational level the focal point is the rendezvous point (RVP) or forward command point (FCP), which will be decided by control in the initial stages and reviewed by responders when at the scene.

The location of the SCG and TCG meetings, and the location of the RVP and FCP, should be suitable for all responding agencies. The locations should be monitored for impacts of the incident and relocated if required during or following a major incident.

Communicate

Meaningful and effective communication between responders and responding agencies underpins effective joint working. Communication links start from the time of the first call or contact, instigating communication between control rooms as soon as possible to start the process of sharing information. For more information refer to Clear multi-agency communication.

Sharing information in a way that can be understood by the intended recipient aids the development of shared situational awareness, which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident. This can be assisted by using plain language and avoiding the use of technical jargon and abbreviations.

At multi-agency incidents, responders may use interoperability 'talk groups', which are held by the emergency services. The use of these 'talk groups' are usually assigned to key roles, for example, incident commanders. Where appropriate, other Category 1 and Category 2 responders involved should be included. For more information refer to Effective communication systems between agencies.

Co-ordinate

Co-ordination underpins joint working by avoiding potential conflicts, preventing duplication of effort and minimising risk.

Control rooms should co-ordinate multi-agency communications at the earliest opportunity in order to carry out the initial actions required to manage the incident. Co-ordination involves responders of all levels, whether they are on-scene or at an SCG or TCG. It involves commanders discussing the available resources and activities of each responding agency, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident.

For effective co-ordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. To decide who the lead should be, factors such as the phase of the incident, the need for specialist capabilities and investigation, during both the response and recovery phases should be considered. There is specific guidance for some types of incidents, highlighting which agency should take the lead role. The decision on who takes the lead role should be recorded, as should any changes to the lead agency as the incident develops.

Jointly understand risk

By jointly understanding risks and associated mitigating actions, <u>agencies</u> can promote the safety of responders and reduce the impact that risks may have on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

Commented [AG1]: Add hyperlink when published

Commented [AG2]: Add hyperlink when published

<u>Different responding agencies</u> may see, understand and treat risks differently. <u>Each agency should carry out their own risk assessments, then share the outcomes with all responding agencies to develop a joint understanding of risk. <u>Individual dynamic risk assessment findings may be used to develop the analytical risk assessment for the incident.</u></u>

Shared situational awareness

Shared situational awareness is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the-priorities of the responding agencies.

Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. <u>Establishing</u> shared situational awareness is important for developing a common operating picture (COP) at all levels of command, and between incident commanders and control rooms.

Communications between control rooms greatly assists the creation of shared situational awareness in the initial stages and throughout the incident. Communicating with incident commanders before they arrive on-scene and throughout the incident, will contribute to shared situational awareness. The process should include identifying risks and hazards that could impact on all responders. For more information refer to Shared situational awareness between agencies.

Developing a common operating picture

A COP has been defined as a common overview of an incident that is created by assessing and fusing information from multiple sources, and is shared between appropriate command, control and co-ordinating groups to support joint decision-making. It should be a continuously evolving but common point of reference.

The form of the COP will differ between areas, but it should provide an overview of the incident which is accessible through a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform, such as ResilienceDirect™. It may include graphics, maps and contextual information.

There is no set format for the COP, which will reflect local requirements and practices, but whatever is developed should be user-friendly and easy to navigate and geared to the requirements of busy decision makers who are under pressure.

M/ETHANE model

The M/ETHANE model brings structure and clarity to the initial stages of managing any multiagency or major incident. The M/ETHANE model is an established reporting framework which provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share incident information.

It is recommended that this format is used for all major incidents and that it is updated as the situation develops. When using the Joint Decision Model (JDM), there should be periodic consideration by responders to establish whether a developing situation has become or ceased to be a major incident.

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


Figure: Diagram showing the JESIP M/ETHANE model

Gather and share information and intelligence

Information and intelligence should be gathered and shared to establish shared situational awareness. At any incident, no single responder agency can appreciate all the relevant dimensions of an emergency straightaway.

Information refers to all forms of information obtained, recorded or processed, for example M/ETHANE messages. Anyone supplying sensitive information should also provide an understanding about how it can be used, shared and stored.

Intelligence is obtained from information that has been subject to:

- Evaluation, to determine its significance
- Risk assessment, to determine the need for it to be acted on

 Analysis, to identify critical links and associations that assist understanding of the incident

Responding agencies should consider and not discount sources of local or specialist knowledge, as they may be able to provide information about the incident or the location.

Briefing

Once decisions have been made and actions agreed, information should be relayed in a structured way that can be easily understood by those who will carry out actions or support activities. This is commonly known as briefing.

In the initial phases of an incident, the JDM may be used to structure a briefing. As incidents develop past the initial phases, or if they are protracted and require a handover of responsibility, then a more detailed briefing tool should be used. The mnemonic 'IIMARCH' is a commonly used briefing tool.



Figure: Diagram showing the JESIP IIMARCH briefing tool

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment

Ensure relevant operational and fire control personnel have an appropriate level of understanding of the Embed JESIP Principles for joint working, and know how to apply them at a major incident within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff	Amend
Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff	Archive
Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training and exercising for all levels of response staff	Archive
Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff	Archive
Ensure staff are trained in operational risk assessment and understand the fire and rescue service Firefighter safety maxim	Archive
Develop procedures, training, awareness initiatives and exercising for all levels of response staff to enhance situational awareness	Archive
Consider providing relevant personnel with access to the JESIP app or JESIP aide-memoires, which may be required for a major incident	New
Ensure communication links and technology can support the application of JESIP Principles during a major incident	New
Provide a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform, such as ResilienceDirect™, for use when developing a common operating picture for a major incident	New
Ensure operational and fire control personnel can readily use the M/ETHANE model when sharing incident information about a major incident	New
	appropriate level of understanding of the Embed JESIP Principles for joint working, and know how to apply them at a major incidentwithin policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training and exercising for all levels of response staff Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels of response staff Ensure staff are trained in operational risk assessment and understand the fire and rescue service Firefighter safety maxim Develop procedures, training, awareness initiatives and exercising for all levels of response staff to enhance situational awareness Consider providing relevant personnel with access to the JESIP app or JESIP aide-memoires, which may be required for a major incident Ensure communication links and technology can support the application of JESIP Principles during a major incident Provide a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform, such as ResilienceDirect™, for use when developing a common operating picture for a major incident Ensure operational and fire control personnel can readily use the METHANE model when sharing incident information about a major

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Strategic and tactical ilncident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Apply the JESIP Principles when attending a major incident	New
	Be prepared to co-locate with commanders of other responding agencies for major incidents, including at strategic co-ordinating groups, tactical co-ordinating groups, rendezvous points or forward command points	New
	Consider using technology for virtual co-location, especially if a major incident involves a regional or national response, or is protracted	New

20415	Monitor the location of the strategic co-ordinating group and tactical co-ordinating group meetings, and the location of the rendezvous point and forward command point for their suitability throughout the major incident with tactical incident commanders as soon as possible and confirm the established Forward Command Post (FCP)	Amend
20421	Ensure Share information in a way that can be shared is understood by the intended recipient to aid the development of shared situational awareness for a major incident and agreed by all involved in the response	Amend
20418	When sharing information for a major incident, Ccommunicate clearly using plain languageEnglish and avoid using technical jargon and abbreviations	Amend
	Discuss the available resources and activities of each responding agency, to agree priorities and make joint decisions throughout a major incident	New
	Be involved in the decision about which agency takes a lead role for effective co-ordination of a major incident, which may change for different phases of the response or recovery	New
20475	Complete Carry outan appropriate risk assessments for the major incident, then and share the outcomes with all other responding agencies to develop a joint understanding of risk	Amend
	Use individual dynamic risk assessment findings to develop the analytical risk assessment for the major incident	New
20478	EstablishDevelop shared situational awareness to help development of a common operating picture for the major incident for allwith other responding agencies, including and control rooms using the common operating picture methodology	Amend
	Develop a common operating picture to support joint decision-making for a major incident, and ensure it is accessible through a suitably resilient and secure common information sharing platform	New
20479	Use the M/ETHANE model when sharing initial or updated information about a major incident Communicate outcomes of the common operating picture to the relevant internal and external agencies using the M/ETHANE message structure	Amend
	When using the Joint Decision Model, periodically consider whether a developing situation has become or ceased to be a major incident	New
20417	Gather and share Exchange reliable and accurate information and intelligence to establish shared situational awareness about hazards, risks and threats for a major incident	New

	Provide an understanding about how sensitive information can be	New
	used, shared and stored when it is being supplied about a major	IVOV
	incident	
	<u>Incident</u>	
	Consider sources of local or specialist knowledge, as they may be	New
	able to provide information about the major incident or the location	
20419	Ensure information shared is free from acronyms and other potential	Archive
	sources of confusion	
20420	Provide briefings by structuring the information so that it can be easily	Amend
	understood by those who will carry out actions or support activities for	
	the major incidentUse multi-agency briefings to gain an	
	understanding of the capabilities of other responding agencies	
20476	Where appropriate, contribute to developing a shared risk	Archive
	assessment with other responding agencies	
20480	Use concepts that are commonly understood by all agencies	Archive
20481	Use terminology that is commonly understood by all agencies	Archive
20482	Confirm the use of commonly understood metrics and measurements	Archive
	used by different teams	
20483	Ensure graphical representations (e.g. signs and symbols) are	Archive
	commonly understood	
20484	Challenge and/or acknowledge natural team assumptions both	<u>Archive</u>
	internally and externally to clarify understanding	
20485	Confirm operating procedures and objectives to ensure they are	<u>Archive</u>
	understood by all teams	
20486	Engender information sharing amongst teams	Archive
20487	Encourage the sharing of relevant expertise of all available teams	Archive

Control measure – Local emergency planning for major incidents group arrangements

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

The <u>Civil Contingencies Act</u> (CCA) and <u>The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework (or devolved equivalent)</u> places requirements on responding agencies, <u>including fire and rescue services</u>, to <u>participate in local emergency planning to make arrangements for the strategic coordination of major incidents.</u>

-and places eEmergency planning is aat the heart of the civil protection duty on-for Category 1 responders. The Act requires Category 1 responders are required to maintain plans for preventing emergencies, and for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies and taking other action in the event of emergencies. They should draw on risk assessments and

must maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of an emergency.

Local emergency plans must include details about how it will be determined whether an emergency has occurred, and make provision for training and exercising of relevant employees. Category 1 responders should involve Category 2 responders in the planning, training and exercising. They are also required to consider the activities of relevant voluntary organisations, which are not subject to the CCA, to ensure local emergency plans are effective. Fire and rescue services must ensure that local emergency plans are reviewed and updated periodically.

Statutory resilience forums

Statutory resilience forums are multi-agency partnerships made up of local Category 1 and Category 2 responders, including fire and rescue services. They are referred to as Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England and Wales, as Local Resilience Partnerships (LRPs) in Scotland, and as Emergency Preparedness Groups (EPGs) in Northern Ireland.

<u>The National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) is a set of individual standards that are intended to:</u>

- Establish a consistent and progressive means for LRFs and their constituent local responder organisations
- Enable them to self-assure their capabilities and overall level of readiness
- Guide continuous improvement against mandatory requirements

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services must:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20428	Be a member of a statutory resilience forum to Pparticipate in developingtheir local emergency planning groupfor the strategic coordination of major incidents	Amend
20434	Ensure that an appropriate level of planning for foreseeable major risks is in place Maintain plans for preventing emergencies, and for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies	Amend
	Maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of an emergency	New
20425	Ensure local emergency plans include details about how it will be Develop a precedure for determined whether an emergency has occurred	Amend

20426	Make provision for tTraining and exercise relevant employeeskey	<u>Amend</u>
	staff; and provision for exercising for responding to the local	
	emergency plans to ensure it is effective	
20427	Ensure that the local emergency plans are reviewed and updated periodically and kept up-to-date	Amend

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20429	Train allEnsure relevant personnel are aware of their responsibilities for emergency planning as detailed in the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) and or Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework (or devolved equivalent)	Amend
	Involve Category 2 responders in the planning, training and exercising for local emergency plans	New
	Consider the activities of relevant voluntary organisations to ensure local emergency plans are effective	New
20431	Embed the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) in their ways of working	Archive
20433	As part of the emergency planning group, ensure an adequate programme of multi-agency training, exercising and planning	Archive

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Strategic Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20435	Access appropriate local emergency plans during a major incident to influence decision-making to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the emergency	Amend
	Be prepared to involve Category 2 responders and voluntary organisations in the response for a major incident	New
20436	Work with tactical incident commanders and other members at the co-ordinating group to develop a common operating picture (COP) and joint understanding of risk based on related local emergency planning assumptions	Archive

Tactical incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20437	Access the appropriate level and type of support from strategic	<u>Archive</u>
	commanders at major incidents	

20438	Share situational awareness with tactical and strategic commanders	<u>Archive</u>
	to inform a common operating picture (COP)	

Control measure - Strategic co-ordinating groups for major incidents

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Strategic co-ordination arrangements shouldare designed to support and compliment complement tactical and operational command, not replace them. Strategic co-ordinating groups (SCG) should always operate at an appropriate level and degree of detail to be effective.

At a major incident, the co-ordination of multi-agency resources will be the most effective way of resolving the situation. All emergency planning needsgroups are required to have arrangements for SCGthe-strategic coordinating groups, which These groups are established at a pre-agreed strategic co-ordination centre (SCC). An SCC should be at a location away from the scene that provides a support infrastructure. The SCG are and comprised of strategic leaders from all the response and recovery agencies that are or may become involved.

Fire and rescue service commanders should be familiar with the JESIP guidelines:

- Strategic Command role and responsibilities
- Strategic Co-ordinating Group role and responsibilities
- Template for the SCG Standing Agenda

In this guidance we refer to these as co-ordinating groups. An SCGSuch a group, will operateing under the auspices of the Civil Contingencies Act or The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework (or devolved equivalent) and with temperate the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability JESIP Principles should be at the centre of the group'sir thinking, so that the and actions taken will ensure the best possible response to and recovery from the incident, enhancing public and responder safety and improving the outcomes.

-An SCG-co-ordinating group will usually be chaired and managed by the police strategic commander but may be led by other agencies as appropriate, depending on the nature of the incident. Theis SCGgroup will also co-ordinate any requests for national assets, including military assistance. They will also ensure that both the response and recovery phases of the incident are given equal importance and that the transition in the phases is managed effectively. It is the role of the SCG chair to ensure that the Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) is updated with the appropriate information

Fire and rescue service commanders who attend the SCG should have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service, and be able to support the establishment and continuation of an SCG for as long as is necessary. They may need to chair the SCG meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident. Commanders will need to brief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the SCG meetings, and may also need to request National Resilience resources based on the response required.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20440	Identify, train, exercise and equip personnel to operate in a strategic ce-ordinating environment, in line with National Operational Guidance: Incident command	<u>Archive</u>
	Maintain a register of the locations for pre-agreed strategic co- ordination centres that may be used for strategic co-ordinating group meetings for a major incident	New
20441	Ensure that strategic all commanders are familiar with the JESIP guidelines for the role and responsibilities of strategic command and strategic co-ordinating groups-establishment and ways of working, and that they can support the establishment and continuation of a coordinating group for as long as is necessary	Amend
20442	Ensure that strategic commanders who are may attended a strategic co-ordinating group have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their organisations	Amend
20430	Train all relevant personnel in the role of co-ordinating groups	Archive

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Strategic-Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service at strategic co-ordinating group meetings for major incidents	New
	Be able to support the establishment and continuation of a strategic co-ordinating group for as long as is necessary	New
20423	Be prepared to Where agreed, chair/attend strategic co-ordinating group meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident and make sure they take place regularly	Amend
20443	Brief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the strategic co-ordinatingDelegate appropriate actions to tactical incident commanders to deliver the group meetings' objectives for a major incident	Amend
	Request National Resilience resources for the major incident based on the response required by the strategic co-ordinating group	New

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20444	Carry out delegated actions to deliver co-ordinating groups' objectives	Archive

Control measure - Tactical co-ordinating groups for major incidents

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

At a major incident, a <u>tactical</u> co-ordinating group <u>(TCG)</u> at the tactical level should be established to ensure <u>multi-agency</u> tactical commanders or <u>managers</u> communicate and co-ordinate effectively with each other, and with strategic and operational functions.

Tactical coordinating groups The TCG should meet at an appropriate and mutually agreed location as soon as practicable. The location should be capable of providing appropriate administrative and technical support and be suitable for holding effective meetings. For some sites, pre-existing locations may have been identified ean be convened at the scene of an incident or a remote location (e.g. a police building); this will depend on the type of incident and speed of escalation.

TCG meetings should They will include appropriately qualified commanders of all respondingeach agenciesy committed within the area of operations, who have relevant decision—making powers—skills and will undertake tactical co-ordination of the response or recovery phases of a major incident.

Fire and rescue service commanders should be familiar with the JESIP guidelines for Tactical Command roles and responsibilities. If local arrangements are not in place, the Joint Decision Model (JDM) can be used as the standing agenda for the TCG meetings.

Clear lines of communication between responder organisations and the TCG are required. If agencies are responding at Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) level or above, it is the role of the SCG chair to ensure that the TCG is updated with the appropriate information.

Tactical commanders in the TCG are responsible for interpreting strategic direction, where strategic level command is in use, and developing and co-ordinating the tactical plan. Although each of the most fire and rescue personnel acting in a TCG capacitysenior officers at the tactical level will have specific service or agency-responsibilities, they should work with other TCG tactical commanders together deliver tactical multi-agency management of the major incident.

Fire and rescue service commanders who attend the TCG should have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service, and be able to support the establishment and continuation of a TCG for as long as is necessary. They may need to lead the TCG meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident.

Fire and rescue service tactical commanders will need to brief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the TCG meetings, and They should ensure that operational commanders personnel have the means resources, direction and co-ordination required to

deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, <u>tactical commanders</u> should not become directly involved in the detailed operational tasks being <u>carried out</u> at the operational level.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20488	Identify, train, exercise and equip personnel to operate in a tactical co-ordinating environment in line with National Operational Guidance: Incident command	<u>Archive</u>
20489	Ensure that <u>alltactical</u> commanders <u>are familiar with the JESIP</u> guidelines for the role and responsibilities of tactical command and <u>tactical</u> both remote and on-scene are familiar with co_ordinating groups_establishment and ways of working, and that they can support the establishment and continuation of a co-ordinating group for as long as is necessary	Amend
20490	Ensure that tactical commanders who may attendare sent to a tactical co-ordinating group have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their organisation service	Amend

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Tactical Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Have an appropriate level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their service at tactical co-ordinating group meetings for major incidents	New
	Be able to support the establishment and continuation of a tactical co-ordinating group for as long as is necessary	New
	Be prepared to lead tactical co-ordinating group meetings according to JESIP guidelines, based on the type of major incident	New
20491	Assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of operational commandersBrief relevant personnel with the decisions and outcomes of the tactical co-ordinating group meetings for a major incident	Amend
20493	Plan and co-ordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken	Archive
20495	Establish effective communications with both on scene commanders and any strategic co_ordinating group	<u>Archive</u>

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20492	Determine priorities for allocating available resources	Archive

Hazard - Insufficient resources: Major incidents

This hazard should be read in conjunction with Insufficient resources

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

The majority of emergencies in the UK are dealt with at a local level by emergency services, local authorities and <u>statutory</u> resilience <u>forums</u>. In some instances, the scale or complexity of a <u>major incident will</u> <u>put a</u> significant demand on local services and may require <u>government</u> involvement <u>a</u>. <u>Major</u> incidents may occur over a protracted period of time and

Resources

require extensive use of:

- Logistical support
- Specialist advice and assistance

Levels of emergencies

The defined UK Government response arrangements are set out in the Cabinet Office The defined UK

Government response arrangements are set out in the Cabinet Office publication, Responding to Emergencies – The UK Central Government Response – Concept of Operations. These are large, often protracted or complex incidents which may require a higher level of co-ordination and central government involvement, in response to an incident, and have been defined within three broad levels, which are:

Level 1 – Significant Emergency

Central Government support is provided through a Lead Government Department (LGD), or devolved administration, alongside the work of the emergency services and local authorities. This will usually be via the Local Resilience Forum for the affected area.

Level 2 - Serious Emergency

This level reflects an incident which has or threatens prolonged impact requiring sustained central government co-ordination. This co-ordination would likely be through the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) under the leadership of the lead government department.

Level 3 – Catastrophic Emergency

These events present exceptionally high and potentially widespread impact and require immediate central government direction and support, The Prime Minister, or nominated Secretary of State, will lead the co-ordinated emergency function of central government to deliver a national response, or where emergency powers are invoked. COBR and the Civil Contingencies Committee co-ordinate activity, rather than the LGD.

Control measure - Additional resources: Major incidents

This control measure should be read in conjunction with Additional resources

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Responding to major incidents will involve large numbers of fire and rescue service personnel, vehicles and equipment, potentially over prolonged periods of time. This requires significant resilience and logistical arrangements to be managed successfully.

The scale of operations is likely to be outside the usual experiences of operational or fire control personnel, and

normal incident support arrangements that are in place for routine activities.

Operational support for ongoing major incidents requires an additional level of support to manage the incident successfully. This will require scalable support arrangements and systems, including command support as well as sufficient numbers of trained personnel to sustain extended periods of operation. For more information refer to Incident command – Command support function.

Tactical advisers may be required, including National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs); this is a nationally agreed multi-agency advisory role implemented across the emergency services, primarily designed for counter terrorism and other major incidents. Some fire and rescue service NILOs will be given access to police radios, which can enhance multi-agency communication.

Fire and rescue services should ensure that appropriate personnel attend the strategic coordinating group (SCG)and tactical co-ordinating group (TCG) meetings, both of which may identify the need for additional resources for the response or recovery phases of a major incident.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20502	Ensure that they have scalable command-support arrangements and systems for majoral incidents, however large or protracted	Amend
20503	Consider the provision of a major incident room or support cell to provide additional support to fire control, and strategic, tactical and operational commanders	Archive
20504	Ensure that sufficient resources are available and considered within risk management plans and that planning assumptions and exercising includes preparation for major incidents	Archive
	Have tactical advisers in place, including National Inter-agency Liaison Officers, to provide support for major incidents	New

	Nominate appropriate personnel to attend the strategic co-ordinating	New
	group and tactical co-ordinating group meetings during a major	
	<u>incident</u>	

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Tactical ilncident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20505	Ensure that they are aware of the type and level of support arrangements that an ongoing major incident may be allocated will receive and how the structural arrangements work	Amend
20506	Plan ahead at the <u>major</u> incident to predict and request <u>additional</u> resources requirements as far in advance as practicable	Amend
20448	Seek appropriate advice from tactical advisers to support the response to a major incidentestablish resource requirements	Amend
20507	Establish clear lines of communication with all the relevant parties that are in place to assist them	Archive
20494	Obtain additional resources if required	Archive
	Be prepared to attend the strategic co-ordinating group or tactical co- ordinating group meetings for a major incident	New

Control measure – National Coordination and Advisory Framework <u>and National</u>
Resilience(NCAF) and mutual aid arrangements

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

The National Coordination and Advisory Framework

<u>The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) England</u> co-ordinates fire and rescue service National Resilience assets. <u>This is accompanied by the Fire and Rescue Service Supporting Guidance to the National Coordination and Advisory Framework.</u>

Home Office <u>departments will(HO) National Resilience and Fire Directorate (NRFD) and the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT)</u> work with other government departments, partner organisations and devolved administrations during no notice and rising tide major incidents to provide policy advice, ministerial briefings, co-ordination across government and management of communications.

-NCAF enables decision makers, both locally and nationally, to receive clear and unambiguous advice on how best to co-ordinate the fire and rescue service response to relevant emergencies. It also enables fire and rescue services to identify the training and exercising requirements for NCAF compliance.

Fire and rescue services can draw on mutual assistance under Sections 13 and 16 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act. These arrangements ensure continuity of service provision across authority boundaries.

There will be occasions where fire and rescue services require assistance from, or provide assistance to, other services. The National Mutual Aid Protocol for Serious Incidents outlines the principles and purpose or such arrangements. Given the national implications, fire and rescue services should highlight the specific need to retain National Resilience assets from deployment with the National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) Duty Officer or National Strategic Advisory Team (NSAT) on a case-by-case basis.

The effectiveness of NCAF arrangements is dependent on individual fire and rescue services releasing resources for national deployment when requested to do so. It is recognised that during exceptional or widespread events, some individual services may wish to retain assets for deployment, in accordance with their risk management plan.

National Resilience

The NCAF electronic support system

<u>is</u> overseen by NRAT and National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC), based in Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service, <u>It</u> maintains a 24/7 overview of the availability and deployment of National Resilience assets.

Before and during an incident, the NRFC monitors, manages and co-ordinates the mobilisation of National Resilience assets in conjunction with NRAT, the National Resilience Duty Officer, and supporting fire and rescue services by using the Electronic Supporting System (ESS). It will also co-ordinate deployment of the National Strategic Advisory Team (NSAT), which provides advice and support to co-ordinating groups if required.

If in place, the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) and tactical co-ordinating group (TCG) should provide relevant personnel with briefings about their decisions, especially relating to the need for NCAF arrangements to be implemented. This could include requesting National Resilience assets or military assistance.

Fire and rescue services should ensure relevant personnel have an understanding about the range of National Resilience assets that may be deployed for major incidents, and how to request them through the NRFC.

Requesting a National Resilience response for a major incident

Assets and skills hosted by individual fire and rescue services, and other agencies, can respond if specifically requested to do so as a national capability and where incident timescales allow. If the incident commander believes that National Resilience major incident resources are required, they should use agreed protocols to provide the following information to National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC):

- Location of incident or the expected time and location of impact
- Nature of the incident and any specific hazards
- Prevailing weather
- Estimated number of people affected
- · Local resources already in attendance or available
- Host fire and rescue service point of contact name and contact details
- Initial location for:
 - A rendezvous point (RVP)
 - Strategic holding area (SHA)
 - Multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA); predetermined locations should be identified by the statutory resilience forum
- · Safe approach route to the incident

Hosting a National Resilience response for a major incident

The requesting fire and rescue service may need to provide support to the National Resilience resources, including the following activities:

- Establish the number of resources being provided and identify suitable locations for them such as RVPs, SHAs or MASHAs
- Collate team data sheets on the arrival of National Resilience resources
- Record all National Resilience assets being deployed
- Establish communications protocols with National Resilience resources, including the issue of radios if not already held
- Establish and record agreed call signs for National Resilience resources
- Nominate a site for each team at the RVPs, SHAs or MASHAs
- Request welfare facilities for National Resilience teams

F<u>or more</u> information <u>refer to</u> <u>Responding to Emergencies – The UK</u> <u>Central Government Response – Concept of Operations.</u>

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20446	Integrate Consider the requirements of the National Coordination and Advisory Framework NCAF and the National Mutual Aid Protocol for Serious Incidents when planning their fully into response strategies and arrangements for major incidents	Amend

20447	Train and exercise relevant personnel against the National Coordination and Advisory Framework requirements for responding to major and complex incidents incorporating NCAF arrangements	Amend
20432	Provide Train all relevant personnel with an understanding abouten the current National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) arrangements and the range of local and nNational rResilience assets and other specialist assets that can be deployed for major incidents as a national capability	Amend
	Have systems in place to request National Resilience major incident resources	New
	Consider predetermining locations for rendezvous points, strategic holding areas or multi-agency strategic holding areas for major incidents	New
20452	Implement standard procedures for reporting to the NRFC	Archive
20453	Provide the NRFC with daily electronic updates on the availability of National Resilience assets using the NCAF Electronic Support System (NCAF ESS)	Archive
20454	Establish and maintain communications with NRFC at all times	Archive

At the strategic co-ordinating group, Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20449	Implement the appropriate NCAF arrangements for a major incident	Amend
	Request major incident resources using agreed National Resilience protocols	New
20450	Establish appropriate rendezvous points, strategic holding areas or multi-agency strategic holding areas for National Resilience resources responding to a major incident Identify and agree the establishment of multi and single agency strategic holding areas using specific functional officers	Amend
20455	Liaise with the NRAT duty officer Provide support to the National Resilience resources responding to a major incident as required	Amend
20456	Establish contact where necessary with NSAT	Archive

Control measure - Government response, support or co-ordination

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

In some circumstances, the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of central government response, support or co-ordination becomes necessary. Government will not duplicate the role of local responders. A designated Lead Government Department (LGD), or where appropriate a devolved administration, will be responsible for the overall management of the central government response.

The Home Office provides the cross Whitehall co-ordinating function for the response policy arrangements to emergencies involving the fire and rescue service sector. Cabinet Office will provide the cross Whitehall co-ordinating function for the recovery policy arrangements to emergencies involving the fire and rescue service sector. The co-ordination of response policy arrangements across government within the devolved administrations will differ accordingly and are set out as individual addendums to The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) England.

The Home Office response to major or noteworthy incidents will be delivered by either the Home Office Public Safety Group (PSG) or Homeland Security Operations Support Teams for no notice and rising tide incidents. Fire Resilience and Major Events (FRaME) will provide policy support to these arrangements. These arrangements are set out in Annex A of NCAF.

Fire and rescue services should be aware of the role governments take for major incidents, and that the Cabinet Office or devolved administrations may co-ordinate response and recovery policies.

Fire and rescue services may need to share relevant and timely information with central government or devolved administrations about a major incident, and incident commanders should be aware of this duty.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Be aware of the role governments take for major incidents	New
20458	Have procedures to ensure appropriate reporting and communications arrangements with relevant government departmentsBe prepared to share relevant and timely information with central government or devolved administrations about a major incident	Amend
20459	Establish and maintain a relationship with the government resilience division	Archive

Incident commanders should

:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20460	Be prepared to provide Share relevant and timely information that will be shared with central government or devolved administrations about a major incident	Amend
20461	Establish priorities and provide advice to COBR when required	Archive
20462	Request deployment of additional resources where appropriate	Archive

Hazard - People: Major incidents

This hazard should be read in conjunction with People

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

During major incidents it is important to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to the public to:

- · Reassure those who may or may not be affected
- Provide public safety information
- Avoid mass panic
- Reduce the burden of requests for information
- Preserve the reputation of the responding agencies

If people are not provided with relevant and clear information during a major incident, it is likely to undermine the level of

public confidence.

In the confusion that often follows a major incident, it can be a difficult and lengthy process to In

the confusion that often follows a major incident, it can be a difficult and lengthy process to establish clear, concise and accurate facts and figures about what has happened. However, the media will constantly request this information and may try to obtain it from official or unofficial sources.

In the immediate aftermath of a major incident many people may travel to the scene or to meeting points, such as transport terminals, if they believe their family or friends could be involved. Family or friends of those involved in the major incident may be feeling intense anxiety, shock or grief, and will need a sympathetic and understanding approach.

<u>Family and friends may be concerned about the safety of emergency responders they know to be on duty.</u> This could prompt them to go to the scene or call the relevant responder agency for information and reassurance.

Providing an inconsistent message to the media and the public may demonstrate <u>a lack of joint working</u> and shared situational awareness across <u>the responder organisations</u>. <u>Inconsistent communications</u> may

lead to a loss of confidence in the response to the incident.

Control measure - Warn, inform and advise people: Major incidents

This control measure should be read in conjunction with Warn, inform and advise people

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

<u>Co-ordination of information during a major incident can improve the consistency of the details provided by the responder organisations.</u>

In the event of a major incident, the commanders of all responding agencies should establish a communications plan. This should aim to ensure that all channels of communication used to warn, inform and advise people provide appropriate and aligned information, to avoid any panic, conflict or confusion.

Appropriate and effective liaison and control <u>should</u> be <u>put</u> in place to ensure that information <u>provided to those involved</u>, and their family and friends, is accurate <u>and</u> consistent.

It may be necessary for fire and rescue services to put in place a channel for family and friends of personnel to obtain updates about the incident. Keeping fire and rescue service stations and fire control rooms briefed about the major incident may help to reduce the psychological impacts on personnel.

<u>Incident commanders should ensure that relevant operational and fire control personnel are</u> regularly briefed about the current information and advice that should be provided to the public.

For audit and learning purposes, a log

should be maintained of the information that was provided, the channels used, by whom and when.

<u>Fire and rescue services should be aware of and help to develop local communication protocols</u> with other Category 1 and Category 2 responder organisations to:

- Agree the process to be used to identify the lead responder to warn, inform and advise people about emergencies
- Agree the identity of lead responders to warn, inform and advise people on reasonably foreseeable scenarios
- Agree joint working procedures and allocation of responsibilities in support of the lead responder who will warn, inform and advise people
- Agree the trigger points and procedures for handing over the responsibility to warn, inform and advise people from one responder organisation to another
- Agree how services, products or equipment for warning, informing and advising people
 will be sourced or procured

The application of any local communication protocols should be considered when responding to a major incident

It may be necessary to use a number of communication channels, including:

Television and radio

Television and radio

Television and radio

- Websites and social media of:
 - o Councils
 - o Police forces
 - Fire and rescue services
 - o Ambulance trusts
- GOV.UK Emergency Alerts service
- Press conferences
- Visiting residential and commercial premises
- Public announcements in areas such as public buildings, shopping centres, sports venues and transport networks

It may also be possible to establish plans with local companies or organisations for their assistance during a major incident. This could include the use of their facilities or resources, such as call centres, to help deliver information and advice to the public.

The release of sensitive information, such as the number and details of those involved, <u>needs to</u> be strictly controlled. <u>It</u> should follow the established multi-agency process between the relevant organisations, such as the police, disaster victim identification (DVI) and the coroner.

Government communications

The UK Resilience section on the Cabinet Office website and other sites can be a central source of information for the media inside and outside the UK, including press releases, briefings, statistics, response figures, maps, graphics and instructions. It can also be used to distribute emergency plans and transmit alerts and warnings.

The scale and nature of any emergency will dictate the level of national involvement in its handling, particularly in communications. If ministerial involvement becomes necessary, the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will be set up by staff in the Cabinet Office. The NCC will function alongside the government department leading the response and liaise closely with staff from the Central Office of Information News and Public Relations at the scene of the emergency, if outside London.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20508	Be aware of and help to develop local communication Have established protocols for major incidents with other ecategory 1 and Category 2 responder organisations to:	Amend

20509	Consider establishing plansAs appropriate, agree with local companies and organisations for their assistance during a major	Amend
	incident the circumstances in which their facilities or resources (e.g. premises, call centres), may be made available to the responder bodies, to help deliver information and advice and information to the public	

At the strategic co-ordinating group, Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Liaise with the other commanders of responding agencies to establish a communications plan to warn, inform and advise people about a major incident	New
	Ensure that relevant operational and fire control personnel are regularly briefed about the current information and advice that should be provided to the public about the major incident	New
	Maintain a log of the information that was provided to the public about the major incident, the channels used, by whom and when	New
20510	Be aware of and implement local communication Agree protocols for a major incidentfor sharing information and brief relevant personnel	Amend
	Use appropriate communication channels to warn, inform and advise people about a major incident	New
	Use established arrangements with local companies or organisations to help deliver information and advice to the public about a major incident	New
	Ensure the release of sensitive information about a major incident is strictly controlled	New

Control measure – Plan reception centres Seek assistance for dealing with people: Major incidents

This control measure should be read in conjunction with Seek assistance for dealing with people

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Depending on the scale and nature of the <u>major</u> incident, suitable locations and logistics for the <u>safe</u>-reception of large numbers of people may need to be identified and arranged.

<u>Local pre-planning should identify reception centres, such as survivor reception centres, emergency rest centres and humanitarian assistance centres, which are designed to cater for the needs of all people involved in a major incident.</u>

Local authorities work with statutory and specialist agencies and the voluntary sector; these organisations can provide assistance at a major incident that requires additional logistical and public support. Agencies include:

- Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum
- British Red Cross Emergency Response
- Disaster Action
- The Salvation Army
- Samaritans
- St John Ambulance
- St John Ambulance Cymru
- St John Scotland
- St Andrew's First Aid
- St John Ambulance Northern Ireland
- Royal Voluntary Service

For <u>more information refer to Emergency Response and Recovery: Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act.</u>

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
12496	Make appropriate arrangementsBe involved in with local authorities and partner agencies for pre-planninged public for the reception centres that may be required for a major incidentas part of the community risk assessment	Amend
12497	Be involved in Ddeveloping local guidance and appropriate support service arrangements on the available support services for the people who may be affected by a majoremergency incidents	Amend
12498	Ensure that incident commanders relevant operational and fire control personnel have an understanding of the processes and local arrangements for obtaining logistical and local emergency public support services assistance for a major incident	Amend

Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
12499	Be aware of the process for Carry out timely liaison with partner agencies on the establishingment of reception centres for a major incident	Amend
	Establish or assist with appropriate and effective liaison and control to ensure that information provided to family and friends of those involved in the major incident is accurate and consistent	New
12500	Request additional logistical and public support provided by agencies under Instigate local arrangements for a major incidentemergency services	Amend

Control measure - Media Lliaison for major incidents Officer (MLO)

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Geod public communication Media liaison for a major incident may include production and distribution of a core media brief for distribution among key stakeholders, central co-ordination of interviews, or even a centralised press office. It could also mean an agency providing additional press officers by one agency to support the efforts of another agency that may be coming under particular pressure.

Attendance of an experienced media liaison officer (MLO)_T at the scene of a major incident should help to ease pressure on operational personnel from the media. It is vital that the MLOthis person is able to quickly establish a procedure for working with media requests and for regularly briefing them on developments. Rumour and conjecture will flourish in a vacuum, and it is far better that the MLO gains the trust and confidence of the media by providing regular updates on events, even if there is little new to say.

Demonstrating awareness of the media's need for media representatives to meet deadlines or broadcasting live reports will assist the MLO in establishing credibility with the media at the scene. This is important as they may need to seek the media's co-operation of the media in, for example to:

- Publicise contact numbers for family and friends to use, such as for a casualty bureau if activated by the police
- ___, Organiseing pooled access to the major incident site for filming
- or bBroadcasting urgent appeals for blood donors donations of bedding or clothing
- Provide-or details of evacuation or shelter arrangements-

<u>To remove workload pressure from the incident commander, lit</u> may be appropriate to nominate senior officers from respondering agencies who are outside the main command structure to act

as the primary lead for media interviews.

Fire and rescue services should ensure all employees understand who is responsible for media briefings, and how they can be contacted. The MLO, or nominated person, should regularly brief relevant people in the fire and rescue service to ensure:

- Requests for information from the media are routed correctly
- Appropriate information is provided to family and friends of:
 - o Those involved in the incident
 - Personnel on-duty
- Website and social media updates are appropriate
- There is an awareness of how the major incident is progressing and its potential impacts on:
 - o Operational response to other incidents
 - o Other fire and rescue service activities

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
20511	Have arrangements for an experienced media liaison officer (MLO) to be able to attend major incidents	Amend
20513	Ensure media liaison officers understand the scope of their role and how it can improve public confidence following a major incident trained staff available to co-ordinate media interaction	Amend

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Tactical ilncident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20512	Liaise with media liaison officers (MLO) and strategic commanders onto co-ordinateing ongoing media interaction for the major incident	Amend

All personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Understand who is responsible for media briefings for major incidents, and how they can be contacted	New

Use the briefings received from the medial liaison officer or	New
nominated person about the major incident, when providing	
information to members of the public	

Hazard - Mass casualties of major incidents

This hazard should be read in conjunction with Multiple casualties

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

A major incident can result in a large number of casualties, often referred to as mass casualties.

The number of casualties for the application of the term 'mass' will depend on
the geographical structure of the area where the major incident occurs, and the number
of casualties that local resources can normally deal with.

Mass casualties could be the result of events including:

- · Fire-related incidents
- Transport incidents
- Terrorist attacks
- Hazardous materials incidents, including those with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials involved
- Explosions
- Flooding or other geophysical hazards

The type of incident will affect the ability of the responder agencies to provide casualty care to those involved. Other sections of guidance provide further information for the incident-specific casualty care that may be required.

The speed at which casualties are treated and moved from the point of injury into definitive medical care will affect survival rates. Some casualties may require immediate intervention to prevent their death. Early intervention, based on an assessment of the benefits and risks, is required to maximise survival rates. First aid delivered in the critical minutes following injury and before professional emergency services arrive on-scene can mitigate the 'care gap'.

A different approach to casualty care may be required, in order to balance high casualty numbers with the availability of emergency responders who can provide life-saving care.

If there are casualties with significant trauma injuries, there will be a risk of infectious disease transmission. For more information refer to Operations – Infectious diseases.

<u>Due to the nature of injuries to the casualties, and the number of casualties, personnel may be subject to physiological stress. The psychological hazards of the incident may affect operational, non-operational and fire control personnel. For more information refer to:</u>

- Operations Physiological stress
- Operations Psychological hazards

The behaviour of people involved in the major incident may be influenced by their:

• Familiarity with the location

- Awareness about the need to evacuate
- Willingness or ability to evacuate
- Ability to hear or understand evacuation instructions
- Understanding of evacuation procedures
- Impairment by alcohol or drugs
- Perception of the incident and emergency response

People may be extremely distressed and, especially if they were with companions, be unwilling to leave the hazard area. Even if people do not have any visible injuries, they may be suffering from visual or hearing impairment as a result of the incident. For more information refer to Operations – People.

Control measure - Mass casualty plan: Major incidents

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

<u>A major incident that involves</u> mass casualties requires a <u>multi-agency</u> response that applies the <u>JESIP</u> principles

. <u>As these incidents have the potential to rapidly overwhelm the responder agencies, thorough</u> planning and a co-ordinated response <u>should</u> provide the best outcome for casualties. <u>This can be supported by multi-agency training and exercising.</u>

<u>Fire and rescue sources should identify the roles, resources and equipment they may need to provide to support a mass casualty plan at a major incident.</u>

Mass casualty plans are designed as an effective response to <u>conventional</u> major incidents <u>that</u> result in mass

casualties; this could be at a single location or at multiple locations.

Plans are normally activated by the ambulance service of where the incident occurs.

Conventional <u>major</u> incidents are defined as those that cause traumatic injuries, <u>such</u> <u>as</u> burns, fractures <u>or</u> bleeding, <u>but</u> do not <u>involve</u>

CBRN materials. For more information refer to

Hazardous materials – Exposed members of the public.

The activation of mass casualty plans for a major incident will need to be based on the:

- Nature and severity of the trauma suffered
- Ratio of ambulance and medical <u>responders</u> available
- Accessibility and appropriateness of clinical expertise and resources available within the critical timeframe to reduce <u>fatalities</u>

It is difficult to <u>plan for</u> fixed casualty thresholds <u>as</u> the <u>tactical</u> options <u>for the major incident</u> will vary. <u>However</u>, <u>planning</u> should be based on predetermined emergency preparedness arrangements.

which outline agreed multi-agency actions and responsibilities in responding to <u>major incidents</u> <u>involving</u> mass casualt<u>ies</u>.

The level of fire and rescue service participation in the implementation of any mass casualty plan will need to be agreed, based on the <u>type of</u> hazards present at <u>the major</u> incident and <u>the specialist resources that may be required.</u>

If a major incident involving mass casualties is declared, it may be necessary for all responder agencies to activate their own major incident plans, if they have not already done so.

<u>A</u> strategic co-ordinating group (<u>SCG</u>) should be established to identify the <u>resources</u> required to maintain or increase safe levels of <u>emergency</u> service <u>response in the area</u>.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Participate in multi-agency planning, training and exercising, based on predetermined emergency preparedness arrangements for major incidents involving mass casualties	New
20605	Identify fire and rescue servicethe roles, resources and equipmentassets they may need to provide required to support any mass casualty or mass fatality plan at a major incidents	Amend
20606	Ensure that staff are suitably trained in the tactical options used as part of a casualty or fatality management plan	Archive

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Tactical ilncident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20608	Communicate hazards identified in the inner cordon or hazard zone	Archive
20609	Support other on-scene commanders with the nomination of casualty collection point (CCP) and casualty clearing station (CCS) locations	<u>Archive</u>
	Implement the agreed level of fire and rescue service participation in a mass casualty plan for a major incident	New
	Activate fire and rescue service major incident plans for mass casualties if required	New

Provide resource and other information to the strategic co-ordinating	New
group if established for a major incident	

All personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20611	Carry out the tactical options included in the jointly-agreed casualty	<u>Archive</u>
	management plan	

Control measure - Casualty management plan: Major incidents

The ambulance service will approve the casualty management plan (CMP) to save lives. A CMP, which may initially be basic in nature, should be developed before the deployment of responders. As the incident progresses, the CMP should be formalised, reviewed, adjusted and approved by the ambulance on-scene commander as part of their tactical plan.

While the ambulance service retains lead responsibility for the management of casualties, decisions regarding the deployment of responders will be made as part of a joint understanding of risk. The joint understanding of risk should be established by the commanders for each emergency service in attendance.

The CMP forms part of the joint decision-making process, which ensures that the commanders for each emergency service in attendance understand its contents and implications. The current CMP should be included in deployment briefings, to ensure that emergency responders are aware of the tactics and procedures to be followed, emphasising the overarching aim of rapid deployment to save lives and reduce harm. Any changes to the CMP need to be promptly shared with partner agencies.

Personnel may be able to provide assistance to the ambulance service to deliver the CMP, by treating and removing casualties. All personnel should be briefed before being deployed to carry out casualty management. They may be deployed with ambulance responders to assist with casualty management.

Fire control personnel may be able to provide the incident commander with details of the location of casualties or zero responders who are assisting casualties. This information, including details of the condition of the casualty if known, should be provided to the ambulance service for inclusion in the CMP.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Ensure all incident commanders are practiced in applying the JESIP principles to support a casualty management plan for a major incident	New

Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20607	Participate in the development of a joint understanding of risk before deploying personnel to assist the ambulance service with delivering the Jointly agree a casualty management plan, taking account of the tactical options available for a major incident	Amend
	Ensure they are kept fully aware of the current casualty management plan and its progress, including the role of personnel and the tactics and procedures to be followed for casualties of a major incident	New
	Relay any information about the location of casualties, or zero responders who are assisting casualties, and the condition of the casualty if known, to the ambulance service for inclusion in the casualty management plan for a major incident	New
20610	Brief personnel being deployed to assist with casualty management, including tactics, procedures and who they will be assisting for casualties of a major incident Communicate the casualty management plan to other personnel	Amend

Fire control personnel should:

Referenc	Tactical action	Comment
	Provide the incident commander with details of the location of casualties or zero responders who are assisting casualties of a major incident, including details of the condition of the casualty if known	New

Control measure - Casualty care: Mass casualties of major incidents

The ambulance on-scene commander will direct and co-ordinate the casualty management plan (CMP) to deliver life-saving care. As non-ambulance emergency responders will have varying levels of first aid knowledge and training, they should be tasked appropriately.

Maximising the number of emergency responders to deliver mass casualty care aims to save lives. Multi-agency teams may deliver basic clinical care or be tasked with the removal or transfer of casualties to or from:

- Casualty collection points (CCP)
- Casualty clearing stations (CCS)
- Casualty loading points (CLP)

Ambulance responders will direct and oversee the treatment provided by other emergency responders.

Personnel should be aware of the tactical options that may be deployed when delivering mass casualty care for a major incident. The tactical response is flexible, and commanders may amend tactics according to threat and risk. All emergency responders should be advised about the safest routes in and out of the scene to reach and rescue casualties.

The aim of deploying emergency responders is to rapidly assess and treat casualties, then move on to the next casualty if required. Personnel need to understand that they may not be able to stay with a casualty after providing basic treatment.

The CMP will detail the multi-agency tactical options in use, including:

- Deployment of specialist responders
- Deployment of non-specialist responders
- Triage and triage labelling
- Treat and take casualties
- Treat and leave casualties

Initial casualty care

Members of the public, with the necessary knowledge, skills and access to equipment, can deliver care in the critical minutes following a casualty being injured and before professional emergency services arrive on-scene. This action can help to fill or mitigate the 'care gap'.

There may be equipment provided at a public venue that can be used by 'zero responders' (somebody at the scene of the incident who can provide first aid) or 'first responders' (such as a police officer or firefighter with first aid or more advanced trauma care skills). Fire control personnel or ambulance control may be providing zero responders with initial medical advice.

Emergency responders should be trained, exercised and equipped to be able to operate effectively. They should be familiar with the equipment they may need to use, including trauma kits, tourniquets, rapid evacuation stretchers and defibrillators.

<u>Deployments should be undertaken safely, but at pace, balancing the need for the safety of emergency responders with the need to improve the chances of survival and recovery of casualties with serious injuries.</u>

Triage and triage labelling

All emergency services in attendance should be prepared to perform the initial triage, especially if there are multiple casualties of major incidents.

To avoid the repeated assessment of casualties, especially at complex incidents, appropriate triage labelling should be used. For more information about the triage process, refer to Search, rescue and casualty care — Carry out triage.

Treat and take casualties

Once a casualty has been assessed and treated, they should immediately be removed so that they can receive further treatment. Depending on the circumstances, nature of injuries and the availability of resources, urgent removal of casualties direct to a CLP should be considered.

Removal or transfer of casualties to either a CCP or CCS will commence on the instruction of the ambulance on-scene commander.

Casualties may have received or applied first aid prior to removal from the scene. This could include the use of medical or improvised tourniquets, which may be under clothing. Although a thorough check for these should be made in the CCP, if personnel are handing over a casualty who they know has a tourniquet applied, they should bring this to the attention of a medical responder.

Consideration should be given to the use of any appropriate equipment or vehicles that are available, to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties. This may include the use of stretchers or skeds, as well as improvised casualty carrying equipment. It may be necessary to request additional equipment for this purpose, depending on the number of casualties. For more information refer to Search, rescue and casualty care – Use casualty transport equipment.

Treat and leave casualties

If casualty numbers are high, the CMP may require the use of the 'treat and leave' option. This will involve emergency responders providing rapid and minimal clinical intervention, focused on controlling major haemorrhage or using basic airway control techniques, such as placing casualties into the recovery position. These actions aim to provide the maximum benefit to the greatest number of casualties.

Uninjured people and ambulant casualties

Emergency responders should not allow members of the public to distract them from treating the maximum number of casualties possible. Therefore, uninjured people and ambulant casualties should be told to leave the scene by the safest route.

However, some uninjured people will want to stay and assist casualties, especially off-duty medical staff or emergency responders, or first aiders. If appropriate, emergency responders can instruct these people to assist a casualty, for example by applying potentially life-saving dressings.

If there has been an explosion, people may be suffering from visual or hearing impairment, which may make it difficult for them to comply with instructions. They may need physical assistance to help them leave the scene.

<u>Uninjured people who are distressed or confused may not follow instructions from emergency responders; they should be given directions to leave the scene by the safest route in a firm and clear manner.</u>

<u>Details should be captured about the people who leave or are evacuated from the hazard area without requiring triage.</u> To make this process efficient, there should be a joint decision about

who will undertake this task, what information will be captured and how it will be recorded.

Consideration should be given about how to share the information appropriately and sensitively.

For more information refer to Operations – Evacuation and shelter.

Welfare or shelter arrangements may be required for people affected by the incident, either directly or indirectly. Depending on the scale and nature of the incident, it may be necessary to identify and arrange suitable locations and logistics to provide shelter for large numbers of people. For more information refer to Seek assistance for dealing with people: Major incidents.

Communication

Information communicated to, or withheld from, people can influence their behaviour.

Communicating with people, particularly those in groups or crowds, is essential to maintain order and manage behaviour. In emergencies, the key communications objective will be to deliver accurate, clear and timely warnings, information and advice to people, so they feel confident, safe and well-informed. For more information refer to Warn, inform and advise people: Major incidents.

Searching for casualties

A thorough search of the scene is necessary to ensure that everyone is located and led or assisted to safety. The search plan should be devised and led by the fire and rescue service, informed by the CMP. If the search will be multi-agency resourced, it needs to be co-ordinated to ensure it is carried out efficiently. For more information refer to Search, rescue and casualty care — Effective search management.

Fire and rescue service clinical governance for casualty care

As part of risk management planning, fire and rescue services may identify the requirement to provide casualty care that is over and above the first aid regulations when responding to a major incident. If this preplanning decision is taken, it is strongly advised that they obtain clinical governance leadership from a healthcare professional. This person should have the competencies to lead and co-ordinate clinical governance for the organisation, to ensure that any casualty care provided is of an appropriate standard and to support personnel in its delivery.

For more information refer to Search, rescue and casualty care – Risk assess and adopt the appropriate level of casualty care.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
	Determine how many personnel should be competent in providing the type of casualty care that may be required for a major incident	New

Consider obtaining appropriate clinical governance to enable personnel to provide casualty care for a major incident	New
Ensure relevant personnel receive training about the delivery of multiagency casualty care for a major incident	New
Consider equipping fire and rescue service vehicles with an appropriate type and number of stretchers or skeds for mass casualty management for major incident	New
Consider equipping fire and rescue service vehicles with first aid equipment suitable for treating mass casualties of a major incident	New

Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
	Take direction from the ambulance on-scene commander about the deployment of personnel to assist with casualties of a major incident	New
	Ensure personnel are aware of the location and purpose of the casualty collection points, casualty clearing stations and casualty loading points for a major incident	New
	Ensure personnel are aware of the tactical options that are to be used for casualties of a major incident, and are briefed about any changes in the tactical response	New
	Ensure personnel understand that they may not be able to stay with a casualty of a major incident after providing basic treatment	New
	Ensure personnel are aware of the triage process and labelling in use for casualties of a major incident	New
	Ensure personnel understand the need to follow ambulance responder instructions about the removal or transfer of casualties of a major incident to an appropriate location	New
	Ensure personnel understand that when handing over a casualty of a major incident who has a tourniquet applied, they should bring this to the attention of a medical responder	New
	Determine what equipment or vehicles are available to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties of a major incident; this may include stretchers, skeds or improvised equipment	New

Consider requesting additional equipment to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties of a major incident	New
Deploy personnel who are able to provide assistance with a treat and leave response for casualties of a major incident if required	New
Ensure personnel understand the need to instruct uninjured people or ambulant casualties to leave the scene of a major incident and to be aware that they may need assistance	New
Ensure personnel understand when it may be appropriate for uninjured people to remain and assist with first aid for casualties of a major incident	New
Develop and co-ordinate a search plan for the scene of a major incident, to ensure all uninjured people and casualties have been found, if required by the casualty management plan	New

Appendix A – Relocated content

Incident command: Control measure - Interpersonal communication

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Good interpersonal communication skills are essential for effective incident command; communication is the tool used by commanders to facilitate many aspects of their role. Interpersonal communication skills are used to transfer information between incident commanders and other people. Effective use of these skills will ensure that what is said and emphasised is supported by the way it is said and the body language of the speaker.

Effective communication between incident commanders and others is of primary importance at an incident. The quality of communication moderates the degree to which people communicate, co-operate and co-ordinate with each other.

Effective interpersonal communicators should:

- · Actively listen to others
- · Communicate with clarity and confidence
- · Adopt the most appropriate communication style for the situation
- · Verify information communicated to them to avoid making assumptions
- Avoid barriers to effective communication
- · Ensure their verbal and non-verbal communication aligns
- · Check for confirmation of understanding

Fire and rescue services should be aware that the culture of their organisation can influence behaviours on and off the incident ground. This may affect the way in which incident commanders communicate with others and the way in which personnel respond.

The manner in which an incident commander communicates may affect the perception of them in terms of their competence, confidence and trustworthiness. This perception can influence the actions and behaviours of others, which may impact on several important aspects of command, including:

- How information is managed in support of incident commanders
- · How information is received by others
- The quality and frequency of information that is shared with incident commanders
- · The transfer of command
- · The extent of personal, team and organisational learning from incident reviews

Fire and rescue services should reference the important characteristics of effective interpersonal communicators in relevant policies.

Communication can be a direct one-way process such as an order, which may need to convey a sense of urgency. Communication can be a simple two-way process that involves an exchange of information; effective interpersonal communication skills can be used to ensure that the information received has also been understood, by using active listening and confirmatory questions.

When transferring command, briefing or debriefing, incident commanders should communicate clearly and concisely, following a recognised structure. This assists others, including personnel, command support functions, fire control rooms and other agencies, to engage, follow and understand the information and to identify when something may have been inadvertently omitted.

Commanders should check the other person's understanding of important communications to ensure there is a shared understanding of the information.

F<u>or more</u> information <u>refer to</u> <u>Incident command: Knowledge, skills and competence: Interpersonal communication</u>.

Operational and fire control personnel should be made aware of the limitations of the secure digital network in their service. To avoid communication systems being overwhelmed, especially during a multi-agency incident or major incident, personnel should follow standard communication protocols and keep radio and mobile communication to a minimum.

It may be beneficial to obtain advice from a communications tactical adviser to avoid radio and mobile communications becoming congested at larger or protracted incidents.

STRATEGIC ACTIONS

Fire and rescue services should:

Reference	Strategic action	Comment
31527	Establish the command competencies, training, validation and revalidation required for interpersonal communication skills	
31528	Ensure their organisational culture supports the use of good interpersonal communication between all personnel	
20469	Ensure operational and fire control personnel are made aware of the limitations of the secure digital network in their service	Relocated and revised

TACTICAL ACTIONS

Incident commanders should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment

Use interpersonal communication skills and behaviours to demonstrate their competence, instil confidence, and foster trust with	
others	
Value and support others to establish open, two-way communication to gather and share information using interpersonal communication skills	
Using interpersonal communication skills, apply the most appropriate communication style to suit the audience or situation	
Use interpersonal communication skills when communicating objectives, priorities and tactics to be adopted to resolve an incident	
Provide regular situation updates to all responders by using interpersonal communication skills and protocols, such as M/ETHANE	
Apply interpersonal communication skills and use a recognised structure when transferring command, briefing or debriefing	
Obtain advice from a communications tactical adviser to avoid radio and mobile communications becoming congested at larger or protracted incidents	Relocated and revised
	demonstrate their competence, instil confidence, and foster trust with others Value and support others to establish open, two-way communication to gather and share information using interpersonal communication skills Using interpersonal communication skills, apply the most appropriate communication style to suit the audience or situation Use interpersonal communication skills when communicating objectives, priorities and tactics to be adopted to resolve an incident Provide regular situation updates to all responders by using interpersonal communication skills and protocols, such as M/ETHANE Apply interpersonal communication skills and use a recognised structure when transferring command, briefing or debriefing Obtain advice from a communications tactical adviser to avoid radio and mobile communications becoming congested at larger or

All personnel should:

Reference	Tactical action	Comment
20471	Follow standard communication protocols and keep radio and mobile communication to a minimum	Relocated

Appendix B - Content to be archived

Hazard – Ineffective multi-agency working [REMOVE – CONTENT RELOCATED TO HAZARD – MAJOR INCIDENTS AND RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES]

Previous major incidents have identified the ineffectiveness of single agency working which has led to a number of public inquires and national learning. As a result, the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework (Edition 2) has been produced to provide a framework for multiagency working.

Whenever they work together—and especially at major incidents—joint agencies need to ensure that they have the most coherent and effective joint response possible.

Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means that pre-determined arrangements can be established early, as it can take time for effective operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaration of a major incident triggers a strategic and tactical response from each affected emergency service and other responder agencies.

Information on the police response for major incidents can be found in the Authorised Professional Practice for Civil emergencies. The National Ambulance Resilience Unit's (NARU) Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response Group (EPRRG) are the ambulance's emergency preparedness lead for England, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland.

In the early stages of a major incident, one service may be in attendance first and responders may carry out tasks that are not normally their agency's responsibility. It is essential that appropriate command and control arrangements between agencies, in line with joint situational awareness, are established as soon as practicable.

UK Operations: Defence contribution to Resilience and Security (third edition) incorporates UK government policy on military aid to the civil authorities (MACA). There are two notable points contained within it that modify how Defence contributes military support for resilience and security:

Defence is not seen as the 'last resort' option; rather, it must be ready and configured to play an early role in providing civil resilience

In an effort to simplify the process and expedite requests for support, terminology for how and where Defence can support the civil authorities is rationalised under a single term: military aid to the civil authorities (MACA)

Defence has a key role to play supporting lead government departments, devolved administrations and civil authorities as they prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptive challenges and major national events. This joint doctrine publication provides both a military and non-military audience with the necessary guidance and practical understanding on how Defence can contribute military support in dealing with natural hazards, major incidents or malicious attacks against the UK and Crown Dependencies. Note: Whilst the UK armed forces use the terms tactical and operational to describe command levels, their hierarchy is the reverse with a military operational commander being senior to a tactical commander. For further information on command hierarchy see The Foundation for Incident Command — Levels of command.

Hazard – Ineffective strategic response arrangements to support major incidents [REMOVE – CONTENT RELOCATED TO HAZARD – MAJOR INCIDENTS AND RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES]
Hazard – Overwhelmed/overloaded communications systems [REMOVE – IN FIRE CONTROL GUIDANCE: MULTIPLE CALLS AND MULTIPLE INCIDENTS]
Control measure – Manage congestion of digital network communications on the incident ground [REMOVE – IN FIRE CONTROL GUIDANCE: MULTIPLE CALLS AND MULTIPLE INCIDENTS, AND MULTI-AGENCY]
Control measure – National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) and National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC) [REMOVE – RELOCATED TO NATIONAL COORDINATION AND ADVISORY FRAMEWORK AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE]
Control measure – Identifying the need for enhanced logistics support [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN INCIDENT COMMAND]
Control measure – National Resilience: Provide enhanced logistics support [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN INCIDENT COMMAND]
Control measure – Carry out triage [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN SEARCH, RESCUE AND CASUALTY CARE]
Control measure – Use casualty transport equipment [REMOVE – PUBLISHED IN SEARCH, RESCUE AND CASUALTY CARE]
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