



National
Operational
Guidance

Major incidents

The link to the consultation survey is

<https://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/MajorincidentsPR2022/>

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1 Introduction

2 This National Operational Guidance highlights key actions for fire and rescue service responders in the
3 event of a major incident. It is 'context' guidance; it addresses the hazards that relate specifically to the
4 scale of major incidents rather than the activity that needs to take place. Guidance dealing with the
5 hazards of the activity of major incidents such as flooding, CBRN(e) events or a large scale fire are
6 covered elsewhere within the National Operational Guidance framework.

7 Fire and rescue services and other emergency responders do not use terms such as disaster or crisis to
8 describe a large scale emergency. They respond to incidents, or major incidents, and this guidance set
9 out the additional activities or responsibilities that may be required to manage a major incident. It is
10 important that the individuals who could be first on scene for their respective responder agency are able
11 to declare a major incident according to service and local arrangements, and that they understand the
12 benefits of doing so early.

13 The definition of a major incident is "an event or situation with a range of serious consequences which
14 requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency". They
15 are likely to be larger, more complex, endanger more people or threaten larger areas, and will require
16 additional levels of command, control and co-ordination. This will be likely to involve many emergency
17 services and other responding agencies in a long and high impact event. This fire and rescue service
18 context guidance should therefore be read in conjunction with National Operational Guidance: [Incident](#)
19 [command](#) and the [Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles](#).

20 Legislation

21 [The Civil Contingencies Act](#) (CCA) places a duty on fire and rescue services as Category 1 responders
22 to prepare for and respond to major incidents. The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework
23 aligns the fire and rescue service to the same duties within the CCA, although it is not designated as a
24 Category 1 responder.

25 The act divides local responders into two categories depending on the extent of their involvement in civil
26 protection work and places a proportionate set of duties on each.

27 Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response. They are subject to
28 the full set of civil protection duties and are required to:

- 29 • Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
- 30 • Put emergency plans in place
- 31 • Put business continuity management arrangements in place
- 32 • Put arrangements in place to make information available to the public about civil protection
33 matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an
34 emergency
- 35 • Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
- 36 • Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency
- 37 • Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business
38 continuity management (local authorities only)

39 Category 2 organisations are co-operating bodies that, while less likely to be involved in the heart of
40 planning work, will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector.

41 The voluntary sector is not a category 1 or 2 responder but may support a major incident. There are
42 emergency responder guides for the public sector across the governments and devolved administrations
43 (e.g. [Emergency Preparedness Chapter 14 The Role of the Voluntary Sector](#) and [Ready Scotland –](#)
44 [Voluntary Response guide](#)). They explain their role and what fire and rescue services should do to
45 include them in their emergency response.

46 **Devolution**

47 The Act applies to the whole of the UK and reflects the various devolution settlements.

48 **Part 1 – Local arrangements for civil protection**

49 Part 1 of the Act applies to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish Ministers if they
50 relate to devolved matters. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a devolved matter and therefore
51 the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, certain responders in Scotland operate in reserved areas,
52 with Regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers. More information can be found here.

53 In Wales, UK ministers will make legislation and issue guidance in relation to responders in Wales.
54 However, the Act requires UK ministers to obtain the consent of the Welsh Government before taking
55 action in relation to a responder in Wales which falls within devolved competence.

56 In Northern Ireland, the fire and rescue service is not designated as a Category 1 responder and so Part
57 1 does not apply to Northern Ireland in the same way as it applies in the rest of the UK. It does apply to
58 certain bodies in Northern Ireland who exercise non-devolved functions (e.g. the Maritime and
59 Coastguard Agency and the Police Service of Northern Ireland). In addition, the Northern Ireland
60 Administration has developed the [Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework](#), which ensures that
61 responders falling within transferred competence act in line with the duties set out in the Act.

62 **Part 2 – Emergency powers**

63 Emergency powers are a reserved matter. They focus on the use of special legislative measures that
64 might be necessary to deal with the effects of the most serious emergencies. However, Part 2 ensures
65 the governments and devolved administrations will be consulted wherever possible if emergency powers
66 are to be used in their territory. It allows emergency powers to be used in Scotland, Wales or Northern
67 Ireland alone for the first time, though the use of emergency powers remains with Westminster.

68 Concordats setting out in more detail how these arrangements will work in practice have been agreed
69 with Welsh and Scottish ministers. The signed concordats can be viewed on the governments and
70 devolved administrations' websites as well as on the UK Resilience site, Resilience Direct.

71 [Concordat between the UK government and the Scottish ministers](#)

72 [Concordat between the UK government and the Welsh ministers](#)

73 The Act is supported by two sets of guidance:

- 74 • [Emergency Preparedness](#): statutory guidance dealing with the pre-emergency planning phase
- 75 • [Emergency Response and Recovery](#): non-statutory guidance describing the multi-agency
76 framework for responding to, and recovering from, emergencies in the UK

77
78 Table 1 Legislation matrix

Legislation/arrangements	England	Northern Ireland	Wales	Scotland
Civil Contingencies Act 2004	Yes	Yes (for PSNI and MCA) The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework 2011 applies to the fire and rescue service	Yes	Yes Schedule 1 Specifically Part 2 - Category 1 Responders: Scotland and Part 4 - Category 1 and 2 Responders: Scotland
Emergency preparedness guidance	Yes	Yes (specifically Chapter 12)	Yes (specifically Chapter 11)	Yes (specifically Chapter 10)
Emergency response and recovery Guidance	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Preparing Scotland Guidance	No	No	No	Yes
National co-ordination and Advisory Framework	Yes	Yes	Yes	Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and The Chief Fire Officers Association Memorandum of understanding
Government arrangements	Resilience and Emergencies Division	Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements	Welsh Government Liaison Team	Scottish Government Resilience Response

79 **The Human rights Act (1988)**

80 There are a number of articles within this Act that are relevant to fire and rescue services.

81 Article 2 of the Convention is particularly relevant to a fire and rescue service's planning and response to
82 a major incident. It stipulates everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. European human rights
83 case law has confirmed that if a local authority fails to take reasonable measures that would have
84 prevented or mitigated the consequences of a foreseeable 'natural' disaster and deaths ensue as a
85 result of that disaster, then this amounts to a violation of the right to life protected by Article 2. This
86 emphasises the importance of interoperability and contingency planning both between fire and rescue
87 services and other Category 1 and 2 responders.

88 Police service commanders are very likely to refer to the Human Rights Act in planning or responding to
89 an incident. The most likely articles they will consider are: Article Two – The right to life, Article Six – the
90 right to a fair trial and Article Eight – the right to a private and family life.

91 **Risk management plan**


92 Each fire and rescue authority or service has to decide their strategic direction via their risk management
93 plan and adoptive powers under each country’s relevant legislation to plan for and respond to incidents
94 within their areas and in other areas as reflected in their risk management plans. The National Planning
95 Assumptions should be considered by local emergency planning groups to take into account foreseeable
96 incidents that will fall into the term ‘major incidents’ and plan accordingly. Fire and rescue services will
97 also need to consider these planning assumptions as part of their risk management plan. See National
98 Operational Guidance: [Operations – Failure to identify foreseeable risk](#).

99 **Responsibility of fire and rescue services**

100 Fire and rescue services are responsible, under legislation and regulations, for developing policies and
101 procedures and to provide information, instruction, training and supervision to their personnel about
102 foreseeable hazards and the control measures used to reduce the risks arising from those hazards.

103 This guidance sets out to provide fire and rescue services with sufficient knowledge about the potential
104 hazards their personnel could encounter when attending incidents. Fire and rescue services should
105 ensure their policies, procedures and training cover all of the hazards and control measures contained
106 within this guidance.

107 **Relevant knowledge**



108

109 Image 1: Relevant doctrine

JESIP Joint Doctrine – the interoperability framework

As well as improving joint working between fire and rescue services and other emergency services, this guidance emphasises the need for all responding organisations to work in a joint and coordinated approach. See [JESIP Vision - “Working Together – Saving Lives”](#)

Five key principles of joint working

The Joint Doctrine sets out five principles to be applied by responders when they are determining an appropriate course of action in responding to and co-ordinating an emergency. These principles are not hierarchical and can be applied in any order throughout the incident.




Figure 2 - Principles for joint working

Image 2: JESIP Principles

The five principles are equally relevant from a major incident perspective and relate to operations at the scene as well as at remote locations. In terms of strategic actions relating to an incident, the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG) or equivalent is likely to be the means by which the principles are applied at a strategic level.

Co-locate – at a strategic coordination centre (SCC) as part of a strategic coordinating group (SCG)

Communicate clearly – with multiple agencies working at the SCC, and representatives from each attending the SCGs it is vital to use plain English and avoid jargon, acronyms or technical language that is not commonly understood

- 128 **Coordinate** across the agencies – one of the first requirements of an SCG will be to agree priorities and
129 objectives using JESIP
- 130 **Jointly understand risk** – at the SCG this is likely to be risk to the wider community, to infrastructure, to
131 the local economy or other significant but strategic risks, rather than just those present at the scene of
132 operations
- 133 **Shared situational awareness** at the SCC using the [M/ETHANE](#) message from the scene, the Joint
134 Decision Model and locally agreed multi-agency plans and processes

135 **Hazard - Civil emergencies**

136 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

137 Local responders work within a common framework based on the structure provided by their government
138 or devolved administration through the relevant legislation (see Table 1: Legislation matrix). They make
139 their own decisions in the light of local circumstances and priorities about what planning arrangements
140 are appropriate in their areas.

141 Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between Category 1 and 2
142 responders or reciprocal arrangements for Northern Ireland. They should also be conducted according to
143 a practical doctrine beginning with anticipation and assessment of risk to enable effective response and
144 recovery arrangements.

145 Although the military and voluntary organisations are not classified as category 1 or 2 responders under
146 the CCA, they may have an important role to play in responding to a major incident. As part of the work
147 of the local emergency planning groups, they should be invited to take part in planning, training,
148 awareness, testing and exercising wherever possible. This will ensure that voluntary organisations are
149 aware of and work within the relevant command structures maintaining assertive, safe and effective
150 operations.

151 **Control measure - Civil protection duties**

152 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

153 The Cabinet Office has produced guidance (see [Table 1: Legislation matrix](#)) for applicable sections for
154 governments and devolved administrations. This non-statutory guidance is targeted at all personnel who
155 may become involved in emergencies. It aims to develop a shared understanding of multi-agency
156 response and recovery arrangements across responding agencies.

157 While civil protection duties are set out in the legislation, the detail of what those duties mean, and how
158 they should be performed, is delivered through the Regulations. The act and regulations are supported
159 by the Emergency Preparedness guidance, which includes guidance to which the organisations covered
160 by the Act must have regard.

161 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

162 Fire and rescue services should:

- 163 • Ensure that their arrangements comply with the requirement of the Act. The main civil protection
164 duties for fire and rescue authorities as Category 1 responders (or reciprocal arrangements for
165 Northern Ireland) are as follows:
 - 166 ○ Risk assessment
 - 167 ○ Business continuity management (BCM)
 - 168 ○ Emergency planning
 - 169 ○ Maintaining public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public
 - 170 ○ Co-operation
 - 171 ○ Information sharing

- 172 • Ensure that the organisation is resilient, or has resilience arrangements in place, to be able to
173 manage the ongoing major incident, as well as maintain business continuity in the rest of the
174 organisation for the duration of the incident or until special arrangements are no longer required

175 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

- 176 • There are no tactical actions associated with this control measure.

177 **Hazard - Overwhelmed/overloaded communications systems**

178 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

179 For generic guidance on communication systems either within fire control rooms or at an incident
180 ground. See National Operational Guidance: [Operations – Failure to handle emergency calls and](#)
181 [mobilise resources in a timely manner](#) and National Operational Guidance: [Incident command –](#)
182 [Communication strategy](#).

183 **Overwhelmed communications systems in fire control rooms**

184 Due to the effects of a major incident, the fire and rescue service fire control room could experience
185 disruption to the telephone links from the local telephone exchange, resulting in a loss of 999 calls. This
186 could be as a result of either spike or spate conditions.

187 **Overloaded emergency services radio communications system**

188 A digital radio network is used by all three emergency services as well other non-blue light organisations.
189 It provides a range of features including interoperable voice communications and wide area
190 communications. However, the digital network does have capacity limitations as the capacity on local
191 base sites is built for business as usual plus a 20 per cent headroom. This means that during a major
192 incident, where a much larger than normal amount of resources may attend, the carrier network could
193 become congested or exceeded if not managed correctly. This could result in users being denied
194 access. Fire and rescue services should make arrangements to avoid such congestion at an incident
195 ground.

196 **Control measure - Manage congestion of digital network communications on the incident** 197 **ground**

198 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

199 During major incidents, the ability to communicate intraoperably and interoperably is essential and
200 because of the nature of major incidents the channels used to communicate can become many and
201 complex. All of the three emergency services have trained operational communications advisers who are
202 able to assist in managing the digital network communications. In most cases this is done by providing
203 incident commanders with advice and, if necessary, producing a communications plan which takes into
204 account the needs of the incident as well as the capacity of the local digital network base site for radio
205 and mobile communications. The network monitoring centre (NMC) can also assist in managing capacity
206 and will provide appropriate advice and information throughout the duration of a major incident.

207 To reduce the potential impact of loss or congestion of the digital radio network during multi agency
208 incidents, incident commanders and control rooms should consider an early request for a multi-agency
209 talk group via police control.

210 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

211 Fire and rescue services should:

- 212 • Have 24/7 access to an operational communications adviser
- 213 • Ensure operational staff and fire control staff are fully aware of the limitations of the secure digital
214 network and correct training is in place

- 215 • Have procedures and arrangements to inform the NMC and to mobilise an operational
216 communications adviser when a major incident is declared

217 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

218 All personnel should:

- 219 • Follow standard communication protocols and keep radio and mobile communication to a
220 minimum

221 At the scene of an incident, tactical incident commanders should:

- 222 • Obtain advice from an operational communications adviser to avoid radio and mobile
223 communications becoming congested at an incident

224 **Hazard - Ineffective multi-agency working**

225 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

226 Previous major incidents have identified the ineffectiveness of single agency working which has led to a
227 number of public inquiries and national learning. As a result, the [Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability](#)
228 [Framework \(Edition 2\)](#) has been produced to provide a framework for multi-agency working.

229 Whenever they work together – and especially at major incidents – joint agencies need to ensure that
230 they have the most coherent and effective joint response possible.

231 Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means that pre-determined
232 arrangements can be established early, as it can take time for effective operational structures, resources
233 and protocols to be put in place. Declaration of a major incident triggers a strategic and tactical response
234 from each affected emergency service and other responder agencies.

235 Information on the police response for major incidents can be found in the [Authorised Professional](#)
236 [Practice for Civil emergencies](#). The National Ambulance Resilience Unit's (NARU) Emergency
237 Preparedness, Resilience and Response Group (EPRRG) are the ambulance's emergency
238 preparedness lead for England, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland.

239 In the early stages of a major incident, one service may be in attendance first and responders may carry
240 out tasks that are not normally their agency's responsibility. It is essential that appropriate command and
241 control arrangements between agencies, in line with joint situational awareness, are established as soon
242 as practicable.

243 [UK Operations: Defence contribution to Resilience and Security \(third edition\)](#) incorporates UK
244 government policy on military aid to the civil authorities (MACA). There are two notable points contained
245 within it that modify how Defence contributes military support for resilience and security:

- 246 • Defence is not seen as the 'last resort' option; rather, it must be ready and configured to play an
247 early role in providing civil resilience
- 248 • In an effort to simplify the process and expedite requests for support, terminology for how and
249 where Defence can support the civil authorities is rationalised under a single term: military aid to
250 the civil authorities (MACA)

251 Defence has a key role to play supporting lead government departments, devolved administrations and
252 civil authorities as they prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptive challenges and major
253 national events. This [joint doctrine publication](#) provides both a military and non-military audience with the
254 necessary guidance and practical understanding on how Defence can contribute military support in
255 dealing with natural hazards, major incidents or malicious attacks against the UK and Crown
256 Dependencies. Note: Whilst the UK armed forces use the terms tactical and operational to describe
257 command levels, their hierarchy is the reverse with a military operational commander being senior to a
258 tactical commander. For further information on command hierarchy see The Foundation for Incident
259 Command – [Levels of command](#).

260 **Control measure - Multi- agency co-location**

261 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

262 When commanders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and coordination
263 face to face. This allows the establishment of jointly agreed objectives and a coordinated plan.

264 The benefits of co-location apply equally at all levels of command.

265 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

266 Fire and rescue services should:

- 267 • Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all levels
268 of response staff

269 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

270 At the strategic co-ordinating group, commanders should:

- 271 • Liaise with tactical incident commanders as soon as possible and confirm the established
272 Forward Command Post (FCP)

273 **Control measure - Multi-agency communication**

274 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

275 Meaningful and effective communication between responders and responder agencies underpins
276 effective joint working.

277 See [Control measure – Multi-agency](#)

278 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

279 Fire and rescue services should:

- 280 • Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training and exercising for all levels of
281 response staff

282 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

283 Strategic and tactical incident commanders should:

- 284 • Exchange reliable and accurate information about hazards, risks and threats
- 285 • Communicate clearly using plain English
- 286 • Ensure information shared is free from acronyms and other potential sources of confusion
- 287 • Use multi-agency briefings to gain an understanding of the capabilities of other responding
288 agencies
- 289 • Ensure information shared is understood and agreed by all involved in the response

290 **Control measure - Multi-agency co-ordination**

291 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

292 Co-ordination underpins joint working by avoiding potential conflicts, preventing duplication of effort and
293 minimising risk. It involves commanders discussing resources and the activities of each responder
294 agency, agreeing who should be the lead agency at any given time and who should chair co-ordinating
295 groups, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident.

296 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

297 Fire and rescue services should:

- 298 • Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training and exercising for all levels of
299 response staff

300 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

301 At the strategic co-ordinating group, commanders should:

- 302 • Where agreed, chair/attend co-ordinating meetings and make sure they take place regularly

303 **Control measure – Joint understanding of risk**

304 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

305 Each responding agency may see, understand and treat risks differently. By jointly understanding risks
306 and associated mitigating actions, organisations can promote the safety of responders and reduce the
307 impact that risks may have on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

308 See The Foundation for [Incident Command – Safety Management](#)

309 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

310 Fire and rescue services should:

- 311 • Embed JESIP Principles within policy, procedure, training, awareness and exercising for all
312 levels of response staff
- 313 • Ensure staff are trained in operational risk assessment and understand the fire and rescue
314 service Firefighter safety maxim

315 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

316 Tactical incident commanders should:

- 317 • Complete an appropriate risk assessment and share the outcomes with other responding
318 agencies

319 Strategic and tactical incident commanders should:

- 320 • Where appropriate, contribute to developing a shared risk assessment with other responding
321 agencies

322 **Control measure – Share situational awareness: Major incidents**

323 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

324 Shared situational awareness is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate
325 consequences and the longer-term implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the
326 available capabilities and priorities of the emergency services and responding agencies.

327 Shared situational awareness is not always easy to achieve and all the inherent uncertainties and
328 obstacles that limit individual situational awareness are operating in the background. Interaction of
329 individuals, a team or multiple teams also increases the level of difficulty. Some common barriers to
330 achieving effective shared situational awareness are:

- 331 • Concepts not commonly understood
- 332 • Terminology not commonly understood
- 333 • Unawareness of the use of differing metrics and measurements being used by different teams
- 334 • Graphical representations (e.g. signs and symbols) not commonly understood
- 335 • Natural team assumptions made about other teams going unchallenged or unacknowledged
- 336 • Operating procedures and objectives of one team not understood by others
- 337 • Information not shared amongst teams
- 338 • Expertise held by one team not made available to the collective effort
- 339 • Challenge and critique suppressed by dominance of one person/team (group think)

340 It is important to emphasise that shared situational awareness does not imply that everything that is
341 known by involved parties should be shared. This would be grossly inefficient and not everybody needs
342 to know everything.

343 Information management during major incidents is extremely challenging and can be problematic. It is
344 then further complicated by the collective nature of multi-agency working and the sharing of information
345 across internal and external boundaries. It should be recognised that it is at these boundaries that
346 friction, miscommunication, misunderstanding, frustration and breakdowns can occur.

347 Different organisations and professions use terminology differently in this field. For example, the term
348 'evidence' has a very specific meaning in a policing context but has a more general meaning across
349 much of the rest of the public sector. Similarly, the term 'intelligence' in a military and policing context
350 refers to information that has been through an agreed process of analysis and has subsequently been
351 graded to a standard agreed by all as to its validity and authenticity. Clarifying what is meant by specific
352 terms when working across boundaries is essential.

353 To enhance the effectiveness, interoperability and situational awareness of those involved in managing
354 major incidents, the common methodology of creating a common operating picture (COP), should be
355 adopted. A COP that is appropriate to the operating context is a powerful point of reference for the
356 attainment of shared situational awareness.

357 A COP is a product, an output or a structured display of information where shared situational awareness
358 can be achieved across multi-agency partners to provide and agree a common end to a joint response.
359 This kind of shared knowledge and insight is built not just by the provision of information but also
360 interacting through asking questions, clarifying uncertainties and challenging assumptions.

361 During major incidents it should be recognised that the actual form of a COP will vary between
362 organisations and contexts. Some will be graphical or map-based, others more textual. Some will be
363 interactive, others static. Some will emphasise real time data and others will include only validated data,
364 thereby imposing a time lag on inclusion. What, and how much, is shared depends upon the common
365 objectives which an SCG/TCG are working towards and the level of interaction and interdependence
366 between them in doing so.

367 Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. Further information can
368 be found in National Operational Guidance: [Incident command – Situational awareness](#).

369 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

370 Fire and rescue services should:

- 371 • Develop procedures, training, awareness initiatives and exercising for all levels of response staff
372 to enhance situational awareness

373 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

374 Strategic and tactical incident commanders should:

- 375 • Develop shared situational awareness with other responding agencies and control rooms using
376 the common operating picture methodology
- 377 • Communicate outcomes of the common operating picture to the relevant internal and external
378 agencies using the M/ETHANE message structure
- 379 • Use concepts that are commonly understood by all agencies
- 380 • Use terminology that is commonly understood by all agencies
- 381 • Confirm the use of commonly understood metrics and measurements used by different teams
- 382 • Ensure graphical representations (e.g. signs and symbols) are commonly understood
- 383 • Challenge and/or acknowledge natural team assumptions both internally and externally to clarify
384 understanding
- 385 • Confirm operating procedures and objectives to ensure they are understood by all teams
- 386 • Engender information sharing amongst teams
- 387 • Encourage the sharing of relevant expertise of all available teams

388 **Hazard - Ineffective strategic response arrangements to support major**
389 **incidents**

390 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

391 Major incidents are likely to be complex, protracted, and involve many different agencies in their
392 resolution. The scale of such incidents, the impact on large numbers of people over a wide area and the
393 potential demand this will put on local resources mean that additional levels of response arrangements
394 will be required. Without a higher degree of co-ordination, communication and command and control
395 ensuring effective joint working at every level of the incident, the risk to the public, responders and to the
396 successful resolution of the incident will be increased.

397 Strategic co-ordination arrangements are designed to support and compliment tactical and operational
398 command, not replace them. Strategic co-ordinating groups should always operate at an appropriate
399 level and degree of detail to be effective.

400 **Control measure – Local emergency planning group arrangements**

401 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

402 The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) and Framework (or devolved equivalent) places requirements on
403 responding agencies to make arrangements for the strategic co-ordination of major incidents and places
404 emergency planning at the heart of the civil protection duty on Category 1 responders. The Act requires
405 Category 1 responders to maintain plans for preventing emergencies, reducing, controlling or mitigating
406 the effects of emergencies and taking other action in the event of emergencies. They should draw on risk
407 assessments and have regard to the arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of
408 an emergency.

409 See Control Measure - [Warn, inform, instruct and update people: Major incidents](#)

410 Local plans should determine whether an emergency has occurred and make provision for training and
411 exercising of key staff. Category 1 responders should involve Category 2 responders. They are also
412 specifically required to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations not subject to the
413 Act's requirements to ensure developed plans are effective. Procedures should also be put in place to
414 ensure that the plan is reviewed periodically and kept up-to-date.

415 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

416 Fire and rescue services must:

- 417 • Develop a procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred
- 418 • Make provision for training key staff; and provision for exercising the plan to ensure it is effective
- 419 • Participate in their local emergency planning group

420 Fire and rescue services should:

- 421 • Ensure that the plan is reviewed periodically and kept up-to-date
- 422 • Train all relevant personnel in the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) and
423 Framework (or devolved equivalent)
- 424 • Train all relevant personnel in the role of co-ordinating groups

- 425 • Embed the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) in their ways of working
- 426 • Train all relevant personnel on the current National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework
- 427 (NCAF) arrangements and the range of local and national resilience assets and other specialist
- 428 assets that can be deployed as a national capability
- 429 • As part of the emergency planning group, ensure an adequate programme of multi-agency
- 430 training, exercising and planning
- 431 • Ensure that an appropriate level of planning for foreseeable major risks is in place

432 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

433 Strategic commanders should::

- 434 • Access appropriate local plans during a major incident to influence decision making
- 435 • Work with tactical incident commanders and other members at the co-ordinating group to develop
- 436 a common operating picture (COP) and joint understanding of risk based on related local
- 437 emergency planning assumptions

438 Tactical incident commanders should:

- 439 • Access the appropriate level and type of support from strategic commanders at major incidents
- 440 • Share situational awareness with tactical and strategic commanders to inform a common
- 441 operating picture (COP)

442 **Control measure - Strategic co-ordinating groups**

443 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

444 At a major incident the co-ordination of multi-agency resources will be the most effective way of resolving
 445 the situation. All emergency planning groups are required to have arrangements for the strategic
 446 coordinating groups. These groups are established at a pre-agreed strategic coordination centre (SCC)
 447 and comprised of strategic leaders from all the response and recovery agencies that are or may become
 448 involved. In this guidance we refer to these as co-ordinating groups. Such a group, operating under the
 449 auspices of the Civil Contingencies Act and Framework (or devolved equivalent) and with the Joint
 450 Emergency Services Interoperability Principles at the centre of their thinking and actions will ensure the
 451 best possible response to and recovery from the incident, enhancing public and responder safety and
 452 improving the outcomes. A co-ordinating group will usually be chaired and managed by the police
 453 strategic commander but may be led by other agencies as appropriate depending on the nature of the
 454 incident. This group will also co-ordinate any requests for national assets, including military assistance.
 455 They will also ensure that both the response and recovery phases of the incident are given equal
 456 importance and the transition is managed effectively.

457 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

458 Fire and rescue services should:

- 459 • Identify, train, exercise and equip personnel to operate in a strategic co-ordinating environment,
- 460 in line with National Operational Guidance: [Incident command](#)

- 461 • Ensure that strategic commanders are familiar with co-ordinating group establishment and ways
462 of working, and that they can support the establishment and continuation of a coordinating group
463 for as long as is necessary
- 464 • Ensure that strategic commanders who are sent to a co-ordinating group have an appropriate
465 level of authority to make decisions on behalf of their organisation

466 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

467 At the strategic co-ordinating group, commanders should:

- 468 • Delegate appropriate actions to tactical incident commanders to deliver the groups' objectives

469 Tactical incident commanders should:

- 470 • Carry out delegated actions to deliver co-ordinating groups' objectives

471 **Control measure – Tactical co-ordinating groups**

472 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

473 At a major incident, a co-ordinating group at the tactical level should be established to ensure tactical
474 commanders or managers communicate and co-ordinate effectively with each other and with strategic
475 and operational functions.

476 Tactical coordinating groups can be convened at the scene of an incident or a remote location (e.g. a
477 police building); this will depend on the type of incident and speed of escalation. They will include
478 appropriately qualified commanders of each agency committed within the area of operations who have
479 relevant decision making powers and will undertake tactical co-ordination of the response.

480 Although each of the most senior officers at the tactical level will have specific service or agency
481 responsibilities, they should together deliver tactical multi-agency management of the incident. They
482 should ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and co-ordination required to
483 deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, they should
484 not become directly involved in the detailed operational tasks being discharged at the operational level.

485 The chair of the group must create time for regular briefing, consultation and tasking meetings with
486 counterparts and key liaison officers. To support the chair and other members in these functions,
487 responders may consider the creation of a support group to assist with administration.

488 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

489 Fire and rescue services should:

- 490 • Identify, train, exercise and equip personnel to operate in a tactical co-ordinating environment in
491 line with National Operational Guidance: [Incident command](#)
- 492 • Ensure that tactical commanders both remote and on-scene are familiar with coordinating group
493 establishment and ways of working, and that they can support the establishment and continuation
494 of a co-ordinating group for as long as is necessary
- 495 • Ensure that tactical commanders who are sent to a coordinating group have an appropriate level
496 of authority to make decisions on behalf of their organisation

497 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

498 At the tactical coordinating group, tactical commanders should:

- 499 • Assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of operational commanders
- 500 • Plan and co-ordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken
- 501 • Obtain additional resources if required
- 502 • Establish effective communications with both on-scene commanders and any strategic
- 503 coordinating group

504 Incident commanders should:

- 505 • Determine priorities for allocating available resources

506 **Control measure - Additional resources: Major incidents**

507 [This control measure should be read in conjunction with Additional resources](#)

508 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

509 Protracted or widespread major incidents will involve large numbers of fire and rescue service personnel,
510 vehicles and equipment over prolonged periods of time. This requires significant resilience and logistical
511 arrangements to be managed successfully. This scale of operations is likely to be outside of that
512 normally experienced by crews at an incident, including fire control room(s) and normal incident support
513 arrangements that are in place for day to day activities. Operational support for ongoing major incidents
514 requires an additional level of support to manage the incident successfully. This will require scalable
515 support arrangements and systems, including command support as well as sufficient numbers of trained
516 personnel to sustain extended periods of operation. See National Operational Guidance: [Incident](#)
517 [command](#).

518 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

519 Fire and rescue services should:

- 520 • Ensure that they have scalable command support arrangements for all incidents, however large
- 521 or protracted
- 522 • Consider the provision of a major incident room or support cell to provide additional support to fire
- 523 control, and strategic, tactical and operational commanders
- 524 • Ensure that sufficient resources are available and considered within risk management plans and
- 525 that planning assumptions and exercising includes preparation for major incidents

526 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

527 Tactical incident commanders should:

- 528 • Ensure that they are aware of the type and level of support that an ongoing major incident will
- 529 receive and how the structural arrangements work
- 530 • Plan ahead at the incident to predict and request resource requirements as far in advance as
- 531 practicable

532

- Establish clear lines of communication with all the relevant parties that are in place to assist them

533 **Hazard - Major resource requirements**

534 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

535 Most emergencies in the UK are dealt with at a local level by emergency services, local authorities and
536 local resilience partners. In some instances, the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that it
537 places significant demands on local fire and rescue services and may require the direct involvement by
538 central government. Such incidents may occur over a protracted period of time and require extensive
539 use of:

- 540 • Resources
- 541 • Logistical support
- 542 • Specialist advice and guidance

543 Large or complex incidents which may require a higher level of engagement and central government
544 involvement have been defined within three broad types (or levels). Further information can be found in
545 [Responding to Emergencies – The UK Central Government Response – Concept of Operations](#). Other
546 responding agencies have similar national co-ordination roles.

547 **Control measure - National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) and mutual**
548 **aid arrangements**

549 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

550 The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) co-ordinates fire and rescue service
551 National Resilience assets. Home Office (HO) National Resilience and Fire Directorate (NRFD) and the
552 Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) work with other government departments, partner
553 organisations and devolved administrations during no notice and rising tide major incidents to provide
554 policy advice, ministerial briefings, co-ordination across government and management of
555 communications. NCAF enables decision makers, both locally and nationally, to receive clear and
556 unambiguous advice on how best to co-ordinate the fire and rescue service response to relevant
557 emergencies.

558 Further information can be found in [The National Coordination and Advisory Framework \(NCAF\)](#)
559 [England and the Supporting Guidance to NCAF](#).

560 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

561 Fire and rescue services should:

- 562 • Integrate NCAF fully into response strategies and arrangements
- 563 • Train and exercise for responding to major and complex incidents incorporating NCAF
564 arrangements

565 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

566 At the strategic co-ordinating group, commanders should:

- 567 • Seek appropriate advice from tactical advisers to establish resource requirements
- 568 • Implement the NCAF arrangements

- 569 • Identify and agree the establishment of multi and single agency strategic holding areas using
570 specific functional officers

571 **Control measure - National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) and National Resilience**
572 **Fire Control (NRFC)**

573 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

574 The NCAF electronic support system overseen by NRAT and National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC)
575 based in Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service maintains a 24/7 overview of the availability and
576 deployment of National Resilience assets. Before and during an incident, the NRFC and NRAT monitors,
577 manages and co-ordinates the mobilisation of national resilience assets in conjunction with NRAT, the
578 CFRA National Resilience Duty Officer, and supporting fire and rescue authorities using the Electronic
579 Supporting System (ESS). It will also co-ordinate the deployment of the National Strategic Advisory
580 Team (NSAT) who provide advice and support to co-ordinating groups, where required.

581 Further information can be found in [Responding to Emergencies – The UK Central Government](#)
582 [Response – Concept of Operations](#).

583 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

584 Fire and rescue services should:

- 585 • Implement standard procedures for reporting to the NRFC
586 • Provide the NRFC with daily electronic updates on the availability of National Resilience assets
587 using the NCAF Electronic Support System (NCAF ESS)
588 • Establish and maintain communications with NRFC at all times

589 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

590 At the strategic co-ordinating group, commanders should:

- 591 • Liaise with the NRAT duty officer
592 • Establish contact where necessary with NSAT

593 **Control measure - Government liaison**

594 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

595 In England the Home Office (HO) Fire Duty Officer and the Resilience and Emergencies Division provide
596 the key arrangements for government liaison.

597 In some circumstances the scale or complexity of an emergency will be such that some degree of central
598 government support or co-ordination becomes necessary. On these occasions, the Home Office will co-
599 ordinate the government response policy arrangements for emergencies involving fire and rescue
600 services.

601 The policy arrangements will be delivered by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT)
602 Operations Support Team for no notice major incidents during the initial 48 hours. The HO National
603 Resilience and Fire Directorate (NRFD) Operational Support Team will deliver the response to

604 emergencies policy arrangements for rising tide incidents and for no notice incidents after the first 48
605 hours.

606 In both circumstances, the Home Office Fire Duty Officer is the first point of contact in government for a
607 range of responsibilities that are within the scope of NCAF. They maintain close communications with
608 the NRFC, the Chair of the NFCC, NSATs, NRAT and other relevant government departments. The HO
609 Fire Duty Officer monitors developing or emerging issues and incidents, and provides the necessary
610 advice and support.

611 The Home Office Fire Duty Officer is a critical link to the OSCT and NRPD operations centres which
612 enable strategic decision makers at a national and local level to carry out their role in an informed
613 manner. These centres comprise of government department policy officials and government liaison
614 teams. In consultation with the chair of the NFCC and/or the NSAT, they will provide situational
615 awareness to The Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) and across central government departments.
616 In addition, they co-ordinate advice for ministers and engage with government liaison officers (GLOs) via
617 the Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) who provide strategic coordinating groups (SCGs) with
618 a single point of contact for central government assistance.

619 Liaison officers will be deployed across the UK to strategic co-ordinating groups to provide a link
620 between local responders and the government. The Government Liaison Team (GLT) and Government
621 Liaison Officer (GLO) A framework for engagement explains how the government will deploy liaison
622 officers providing the link between local responders and central government departments and agencies
623 responsible for resilience issues. They will support the local and national emergency management
624 arrangements during and after an emergency and beforehand if the nature of the incident allows. In
625 devolved areas, this role is fulfilled by liaison teams from the devolved administrations who link into
626 COBR via their respective governments.

627 The decision to deploy liaison officers will be taken following discussion between the relevant
628 government or devolved administration and the lead government department. Each government or
629 administration has its own response arrangements and protocols for government liaison.

630 Government liaison officers (GLO) will attend any convened co-ordinating group to provide a point of
631 contact for government and assist the exchange of information. They will contribute to the national
632 appreciation of the situation and identify whether there are likely to be issues arising or capability gaps
633 emerging which may require devolved or central government support or input. They enable joint working
634 with partners to identify priorities and provide advice to COBR, lead government departments or
635 devolved administrations to support national discussions on the deployment of scarce resources across
636 the affected area.

637 In addition to the GLO, the chair of the NFCC and/or the NSAT will also provide situational awareness to
638 COBR and across central government departments. They provide the Home Secretary and other
639 ministers in COBR with advice in accordance with central government's requirements. Similar advisory
640 roles are fulfilled by senior fire and rescue service officers in the devolved administrations. Further
641 explanation of this requirement is set out in the [National coordination and advisory framework for the fire
642 service](#).

643 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

644 Fire and rescue services should:

- 645 • Have procedures to ensure appropriate reporting and communications arrangements with
646 relevant government departments

- 647 • Establish and maintain a relationship with the government resilience division

648 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

649 At strategic coordinating groups, commanders should liaise with government liaison officers to:

- 650 • Share relevant and timely information with central government
- 651 • Establish priorities and provide advice to COBR when required
- 652 • Request deployment of additional resources where appropriate

653 **Control measure - Identifying the need for enhanced logistics support**

654 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

655 The primary function of the enhanced logistics support (ELS) capability is to enhance the fire and rescue
656 service command and control capability, by allowing effective and scalable deployment of National
657 Resilience resources to any national level incident.

658 The capability has personnel with the necessary knowledge and skills to manage the organisational and
659 control aspects at the nominated strategic holding area (SHA) or multi-agency strategic holding area
660 (MASHA) for the incident.

661 The ELS capability will be requested by a National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) officer, based on
662 the needs of the incident and the National Resilience capabilities (NR) attending the incident.

663 The success and effectiveness of the ELS capability is dependent on the suitability of the SHA or
664 MASHA; these should be established as detailed in the [Guide to the Identification, Inspection and
665 Establishment of Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Areas](#). Further information can be found on the website,
666 [Multi-agency strategic holding areas: a guide](#).

667 SHAs and MASHAs are identified by individual fire and rescue services, in conjunction with statutory
668 resilience forums. The SHA and MASHA addresses and mapping co-ordinates are held on the National
669 Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) electronic support system. This information is used by
670 the National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC) when mobilising National Resilience assets.

671 The equipment provided by the ELS resources includes:

- 672 • Systems for communications and IT
- 673 • Computer systems and printing facilities
- 674 • Lighting
- 675 • Electrical systems and support systems
- 676 • Warning systems
- 677 • Identification signs

678 ELS can provide an enhanced briefing facility (EBF) for use within the MASHA or SHA. This is a tent
679 structure that includes:

- 680 • Rest facilities for firefighters, including tables and chairs
- 681 • Lighting and heating (heating provided in conjunction with Mass Decontamination Units)

682 • Briefing facilities, including display and projection equipment

683 The ELS functions include:

- 684 • Operations support
 - 685 ○ Safety briefing of personnel
 - 686 ○ Inter-service liaison
 - 687 ○ Resource co-ordination
 - 688 ○ Liaison with the incident commander
 - 689 ○ Marshalling within the MASHA or SHA
- 690 • Logistics support
 - 691 ○ Co-ordination and provision of sufficient resources to the MASHA or SHA
 - 692 ○ Personnel welfare and consumables
- 693 • Planning support and information management
 - 694 ○ Proposing and reviewing information
 - 695 ○ Planning resource and relief plans
 - 696 ○ Planning meetings, briefings and debriefings
- 697 • Communications support
 - 698 ○ Communication and recording of actions and decisions
 - 699 ○ Maintenance of relevant logs within the MASHA or SHA using online asset management
 - 700 software

701 The affected fire and rescue service should mobilise a liaison officer to the SHA or MASHA to assist with
702 welfare and communication issues.

703 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

704 Fire and rescue services should:

- 705 • Have systems in place to request ELS resources from National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC)
- 706 • Identify appropriate locations for the National Resilience enhanced logistical support equipment
707 to be located

708 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

709 Incident commanders should:

- 710 • Mobilise a strategic holding area liaison officer to assist with welfare and communication issues

711 **Control measure - National Resilience: Provide enhanced logistics support**

712 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

713 The enhanced logistics support officer (ELSO) role is carried out by a National Resilience Assurance
714 Team (NRAT) officer. Their responsibilities include managing enhanced logistics support (ELS) activities
715 and logistics activities including:

- 716 • Managing the strategic holding area (SHA) or multi-agency strategic holding area (MASHA) in
- 717 liaison with the affected fire and rescue service
- 718 • Managing ELS briefings and updates
- 719 • Providing liaison between:
- 720 ○ The SHA or MASHA
- 721 ○ Affected fire and rescue service
- 722 ○ Home Office Operations Centre
- 723 ○ National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC)
- 724 • Facilitating requests for support from the incident commander using the agreed communications
- 725 channels
- 726 • Liaising with other NRAT officers
- 727 • Managing the logistical needs of the SHA or MASHA
- 728 • Liaising with and providing logistical support as required to the affected fire and rescue service,
- 729 including welfare issues and liaison with local authority partners
- 730 • Establishing appropriate communication links with key stakeholders

731 The enhanced logistics support role is to support the ELSO by:

- 732 • Co-ordinating the mobilised resources into, within, and out of the SHA or MASHA; mobilisation
- 733 requests should be directed through the affected fire and rescue service fire control room or via
- 734 the communication channel agreed with the incident commander
- 735 • Facilitating logistical support for incidents including:
- 736 ○ Urban search and rescue (USAR)
- 737 ○ Mass decontamination (MD)
- 738 ○ Flood response
- 739 ○ High volume pumps (HVP)
- 740 ○ Hazardous materials, including CBRN(e)
- 741 ○ Marauding terrorist attack (MTA) personnel
- 742 • Co-ordinating crew reliefs and facilitate affected fire and rescue service welfare arrangements
- 743 under the request and direction of the affected fire and service's incident commander
- 744 • Conducting briefings, safety briefings and debriefings in the SHA or MASHA under the request
- 745 and direction of and the request of the affected fire and service's incident commander
- 746 • Facilitating the maintenance, repair and replacement of National Resilience equipment and
- 747 vehicles, in order to maintain the required level of resources for the duration of the incident
- 748 • Facilitating the structured return of personnel and equipment to their fire and rescue service
- 749 under the request and direction of and the request of the affected fire and service's incident
- 750 commander

751 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

752 National Resilience should:

- 753 • Prepare, communicate and distribute awareness material describing the benefits of ELS to the
754 wider fire and rescue service, as well as to other agencies and interested parties

755 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

756 Specialist responders should:

- 757 • Fulfil the roles of the enhanced logistics support officer (ELSO) and the enhanced logistics
758 support personnel

759 **Hazard - Public awareness**

760 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

761 During major incidents it is important to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to the
762 public to:

- 763 • Reassure those who may or may not be affected
- 764 • Provide public safety information
- 765 • Avoid mass panic
- 766 • Reduce the burden of requests for information
- 767 • Preserve the reputation of the organisation

768 Good public communication is vital to the successful handling of any emergency and will ensure public
769 confidence is increased and ensure they feel well informed.

770 Co-ordination of information flow among stakeholders is a key issue during any emergency and will
771 improve the consistency of the information provided by the different agencies involved. In the confusion
772 that often follows a major incident, it can be a difficult and lengthy process to establish clear, concise and
773 accurate facts and figures about what has happened. However, the media will constantly request this
774 information and may seek to obtain it from any official or unofficial source they can.

775 Providing an inconsistent message to the media and the public may demonstrate the lack of joint
776 working and shared situational awareness across emergency responders. Great care should be taken to
777 avoid this as inconsistency may also lead to a loss of confidence in the responding agencies handling
778 the incident.

779 Good public communication may include production and distribution of a core media brief for distribution
780 among key stakeholders, central co-ordination of interviews, or even a centralised press office. It could
781 also mean providing additional press officers by one agency to support the efforts of another agency that
782 may be coming under particular pressure.

783 **Control measure - Warn, inform, instruct and update people: Major incidents**

784 [This control measure should be read in conjunction with Warn, inform and advise people](#)

785 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

786 For generic guidance on warning and informing the public that are directly affected by an incident see
787 National Operational Guidance: [Operations – Warn, inform and advise people](#).

788 Electronic media is generally the fastest way to broadcast a message and it is a useful way to get out
789 very detailed information, in particular for those at work or who have no immediate access to television
790 or radio during the day. It will need to be regularly updated during an incident or emergency. In addition,
791 fire and rescue services' own websites and social media can also be used to stream press conferences.
792 The information is constantly available and it serves as an audit log to show that information was
793 provided at certain times.

794 The release of sensitive information (such as the number and details of those involved) must be strictly
795 controlled and should follow the established multi-agency process between the relevant organisations
796 such as the police, disaster victim identification (DVI) and the coroner.

797 The UK Resilience section on the Cabinet Office website and other sites can be a central source of
798 information for the media inside and outside the United Kingdom, including press releases, briefings,
799 statistics, response figures, maps, graphics and instructions. It can also be used to distribute emergency
800 plans and transmit alerts and warnings.

801 The scale and nature of any emergency will dictate the level of national involvement in its handling,
802 particularly in communications. If ministerial involvement becomes necessary, then the News Co-
803 ordination Centre (NCC) will be set up by staff in the Cabinet Office. The NCC will function alongside the
804 government department leading the response and liaise closely with staff from the Central Office of
805 Information News and Public Relations at the scene of the emergency, if outside London.

806 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

807 Fire and rescue services should:

- 808 • Have established protocols with other category 1 and 2 responders to:
 - 809 ○ Agree the process to be used to identify the lead responder to warn, inform and advise the
810 public on any other type of emergency
 - 811 ○ Agree the identity of lead responders to warn, inform and advise the public on those
812 scenarios which can reasonably be anticipated
 - 813 ○ Agree joint working procedures and allocation of responsibilities in support of the lead
814 responder for warning, informing and advising
 - 815 ○ Agree the trigger points for the handover of the lead responsibility for warning, informing and
816 advising from one responder body to another and the procedures to achieve this
 - 817 ○ Agree how services or products for warning, informing and advising (e.g. equipment for media
818 centres) will be sourced
- 819 • As appropriate, agree with local companies and organisations the circumstances in which their
820 facilities or resources (e.g. premises, call centres), may be made available to the responder
821 bodies, to help deliver advice and information to the public

822 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

823 At the strategic co-ordinating group, commanders should:

- 824 • Agree protocols for sharing information and brief relevant personnel

825 **Control measure - Media Liaison Officer (MLO)**

826 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

827 Attendance of an experienced media liaison officer (MLO), at the scene should help to ease pressure
828 from the media. It is vital that this person is able to quickly establish a procedure for working with media
829 requests and for regularly briefing them on developments. Rumour and conjecture will flourish in a
830 vacuum, and it is far better that the MLO gains the trust and confidence of the media by providing regular
831 updates on events, even if there is little new to say.

832 Demonstrating awareness of the media's need to meet deadlines or broadcasting live reports will assist
833 the MLO in establishing credibility with the media at the scene. This is important as they may need to

834 seek the media's co-operation in, for example, organising pooled access to the incident site for filming or
835 broadcasting urgent appeals for blood donors or details of evacuation arrangements.

836 It may be appropriate to nominate senior officers from responding agencies who are outside the main
837 command structure to act as the primary lead for media interviews. This will remove some pressure from
838 the incident commander and ensure the consistency of the message.

839 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

840 Fire and rescue services should:

- 841 • Have arrangements for an experienced media liaison officer (MLO) to be able to attend incidents
- 842 • Have trained staff available to co-ordinate media interaction

843 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

844 Tactical incident commanders should:

- 845 • Liaise with media liaison officers (MLO) and strategic commanders on co-ordinating ongoing
846 media interaction

847 **Hazard - Multiple casualties**

848 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

849 This hazard should be read in conjunction with National Operational Guidance - [Multiple casualties](#)

850 **Control measure - Plan reception centres**

851 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

852 Depending on the scale and nature of the incident, suitable locations and logistics for the safe reception
853 of large numbers of people may need to be identified and arranged. Reception centres in the form of
854 survivor reception centres, emergency rest centres and humanitarian assistance centres are designed to
855 cater for the needs of all casualties and others involved.

856 Experience has shown that in the immediate aftermath of an incident many people will travel to the
857 scene or to meeting points, such as travel terminals, if they believe their family or friends may have been
858 involved in an emergency. Friends and relatives who may be feeling intense anxiety, shock or grief, need
859 a sympathetic and understanding approach. Appropriate and effective liaison and control must be in
860 place to ensure that information is accurate, consistent and non-contradictory.

861 Local authorities work with statutory and specialist agencies and the voluntary sector who can provide
862 additional specialist assistance at a large scale incident or one which requires additional logistical and
863 public support. Such agencies include:

- 864 • Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum
- 865 • Red Cross — emergency response
- 866 • Disaster Action
- 867 • Salvation Army Trust
- 868 • Samaritans
- 869 • St. John Ambulance / St. Andrews Ambulance (Scotland)
- 870 • Royal Voluntary Service — formerly Women's Royal Voluntary Service

871 For further information, see: [Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying
872 the Civil Contingencies Act 2004](#)

873 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

874 Fire and rescue services should:

- 875 • Make appropriate arrangements with local authorities and partner agencies for pre-planned public
876 reception centres as part of the community risk assessment
- 877 • Develop local guidance and appropriate arrangements on the available support services for
878 people affected by emergency incidents
- 879 • Ensure that incident commanders have an understanding of the processes and arrangements for
880 local emergency public support services

881 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

882 Incident commanders should:

- 883 • Carry out timely liaison with partner agencies on the establishment of reception centres Instigate
884 local arrangements for emergency public support services

885 **Control measure - Carry out triage**

886 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

887 The core principle of triage is to do the most for the most. The initial triage method in a multiple casualty
888 situation is the triage sieve. Triage sieves can be applied to either adults or children.

889 At the point when it has been identified that multiple casualties will require treatment, the fire control
890 room should be notified so that the required resources can be mobilised. It may be appropriate to
891 declare a major incident using the JESIP [M/ETHANE](#) model.

892 The triage sieve will identify immediately life-threatening problems based on the C < A B C > system,
893 and correctly prioritise casualties for treatment. Not doing this will potentially risk lives.

894 Fire and rescue services should be prepared to employ triage sieves if there are multiple casualties or at
895 a major incident.

896 As a principle, at a poorly resourced incident, minimal casualty care is provided if there are multiple
897 casualties. The following actions can be achieved without breaching the core principle of triage:

- 898 • Quickly turn a casualty to protect their airway
- 899 • Encourage self-help
- 900 • Encourage a bystander to apply direct pressure

901 The Ambulance Clinical Practice Guidelines (JRCALC) acknowledge that now ambulance services are
902 all practising C < A B C > in their initial patient assessment, the standard triage sieve needs to take
903 account of the importance of initial assessment and treatment of catastrophic haemorrhage.

904 The diagram below is the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU) Triage Sieve, which was
905 published for use by all ambulance staff at a major incident.

906 The priorities are described as:


- 907 • P1 or red tags (immediate) are used to label those who cannot survive without immediate
908 treatment but who have a chance of survival
- 909 • P2 or yellow tags (observation) are for those who require observation (and possible later re-
910 triage). Their condition is stable for the moment and they are not in immediate danger of death.
911 These casualties will still need hospital care and would be treated immediately under normal
912 circumstances.
- 913 • P3 or green tags (wait) are reserved for the 'walking wounded' who will need medical care at
914 some point, after more critical injuries have been treated.

915 The JESIP casualty triage has an additional priority:

- 916 • P4 or P1E (expectant) is used for those whose injuries are so extensive that they will not be able
917 to survive given the care or resource that is available. This is only to be used under authorisation

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of the Medical Incident Officer. They alone have the responsibility to match these casualties' injuries with the number and type of the other casualties and the remaining resources available to the hospitals.



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922 Triage Sieve Source: National Ambulance Service Medical Directors Group (NASMeD)

923 The same triage principles apply to children. Paediatric triage tape is available, which groups children by
924 length, weight and age and provides normal physiological values for respiratory rate and pulse in each of
925 the groups to carry out the triage process.

926 Having labelled the casualty with their priority, casualties are handed over to medical responders. A
927 record or log of the numbers of each priority should be kept and the fire control room notified.

928 When referring to casualties and the above priorities at the scene of an incident, everyone should be
929 sensitive to those who could overhear the information; this could include relatives, members of the public
930 or the media.

931 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

932 Fire and rescue services should:

- 933 • Provide relevant personnel with details of how to carry out a triage sieve for adults or children

934 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

935 Incident commanders should:

- 936 • Identify the number of casualties requiring medical attention and notify the fire control room
- 937 • Consider declaring a major incident for multiple casualties
- 938 • Carry out or assist with triage of casualties
- 939 • Record the outcome of the triage and discreetly communicate this information to medical
940 responders and the fire control room

941 **Control measure - Mass casualty and fatality plans**

942 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

943 Dealing with a mass casualty incident requires the planning, co-operation and response of numerous
944 partner agencies. These incidents have the potential to rapidly overwhelm services and careful pre-
945 planning and a co-ordinated response has been shown to provide the best outcome for casualties.

946 Mass casualty plans are designed as an effective response to major incidents where conventional
947 sudden impact events, or an emergency which results in mass casualties occur simultaneously in
948 multiple locations. Plans are normally activated by the ambulance service of where the incident occurs.
949 Conventional incidents are defined as those that cause traumatic injuries (involving burns, fractures,
950 bleeding etc.) and/or fatalities and do not contain any CBRN (e) elements. See National Operational
951 Guidance: Hazardous Materials – Exposure of the public to hazardous materials.

952 The number of casualties which determines the term ‘mass’, will depend on the geographical makeup of
953 the area where the incident occurs and the number of casualties that local resources can normally deal
954 with.

955 Because of the dynamics of a major incident, the activation of mass casualty plans will need to be based
956 on the nature and severity of the trauma suffered, the ratio of ambulance and medical resources
957 available and the accessibility and appropriateness of clinical expertise and resources available within
958 the critical timeframe to reduce mortality from injury. It is therefore difficult to map options against fixed
959 casualty thresholds; the options implemented will vary from one scenario to the next but should be based
960 on pre-agreed emergency preparedness arrangements which outline agreed multi agency actions and
961 responsibilities in responding to mass casualty incidents.

962 The level of fire and rescue services participation in the implementation of any mass casualty plan will
963 need to be agreed based on the nature and hazards present at an incident and any specialist resources
964 that may be required. See control measures Multi-agency communication and Multi-agency co-ordination

965 Once a mass casualty incident has been declared it may be necessary for all relevant response
966 organisations to activate their own major incident plans (if they have not already done so). They should
967 then establish a strategic coordinating group to identify the requirements necessary to maintain or

968 increase, if necessary, the capability of the essential emergency services to sustain safe levels of
969 service.

970 The casualty management plan must be discussed with partner agencies, ensuring that all on-scene
971 commanders are aware of the contents. The plan should include:

972 • Tactical options to be conducted (treat and leave or treat and extricate)

973 • Composition of the teams delivering casualty care

974 • Initial locations for casualty collection points (CCP) and casualty clearing stations (CCS)

975 • The casualty management plan must be included as part of the joint decision making process
976 and briefings, prior to staff being deployed into the warm zone, ensuring that all staff are aware of
977 the tactics and procedures to be followed

978 See Control Measure - [Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment](#).

979 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

980 Fire and rescue services should:

981 • Identify fire and rescue service roles, resources and assets required to support any mass
982 casualty or mass fatality plans

983 • Ensure that staff are suitably trained in the tactical options used as part of a casualty or fatality
984 management plan

985 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

986 Tactical incident commanders should:

987 • Jointly agree a casualty management plan, taking account of the tactical options available

988 • Communicate hazards identified in the inner cordon or hazard zone

989 • Support other on-scene commanders with the nomination of casualty collection point (CCP) and
990 casualty clearing station (CCS) locations

991 • Communicate the casualty management plan to other personnel

992 All personnel should:

993 • Carry out the tactical options included in the jointly-agreed casualty management plan

994 **Control measure - Use casualty transport equipment**

995 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

996 Under the 'LAST' acronym, Transport is the final element to facilitate the casualty receiving appropriate
997 and definitive medical care. It should provide the removal of casualties to a place of relative safety. It is
998 important to remember that the casualty should be protected from any harm during this part of the
999 operation.

1000 Information that may be relevant and important for casualties to be safely and effectively transported,
1001 should be passed to the medical responders as part of the casualty handover. For further information
1002 refer to Handover of a casualty to a medical responder.

1003 Rescues may need to be carried out using fire and rescue service equipment for extricating or
1004 transporting the casualty. The use of suitable equipment such as basket stretchers, scoop stretchers or
1005 equivalent should be considered.

1006 Any equipment used should aim to reduce manual handling issues for personnel, while also reducing the
1007 risk of deterioration of the casualty's condition. Making a request for suitable resources or equipment
1008 from other agencies should be considered.

1009 **Stretchers**

1010 When using stretchers, the following points should be addressed:

- 1011 • The stretcher and associated equipment must be fit for its intended use
- 1012 • The stretcher and associated equipment must always be used within a safe system of work
- 1013 • Consideration of additional loading in the rescue environment due to the use of emergency
1014 responders as stretcher attendants
- 1015 • The need for physical protection to prevent injury of the casualty
- 1016 • Warm clothing or covering for the casualty to prevent hypothermia

1017 Generally, unconscious casualties and those with major or spinal injuries should be transported by
1018 stretcher in a horizontal position; movement in a vertical position should only be used temporarily in
1019 order to negotiate obstacles.

1020 **Motorised vehicles**

1021 It may be beneficial to consider the use of suitable motorised vehicles to assist personnel to extricate
1022 and transport the casualty. Requests for suitable resources or vehicles from other agencies should be
1023 considered.

1024 The benefits of using motorised vehicles to transport casualties include:

- 1025 • Improved access and egress to the scene of operations
- 1026 • Reduced impact on the ongoing operations of other fire and rescue services or other agencies
- 1027 • To prevent deterioration of the casualty
- 1028 • Reduction in manual handling issues

1029 There may be restrictions, such as insurance arrangements, on fire and rescue service vehicles being
1030 used to transport casualties to a place of relative safety, including hospitals. Fire and rescue services
1031 should have a corporate policy that clearly states whether this practice is allowed or prohibited. If it is
1032 allowed, the policy should include clear guidelines about when it would be an appropriate and justified
1033 action.

1034 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

1035 Fire and rescue services should:

- 1036 • Ensure that relevant personnel are aware of the casualty transport equipment available, and how
1037 to request it
- 1038 • Ensure that relevant personnel are aware of the motorised casualty transport available, and how
1039 to request it

- 1040 • Have a corporate policy that clearly states whether fire and rescue service vehicles can or cannot
1041 be used to transport casualties

1042 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

1043 Incident commanders should:

- 1044 • Consider using appropriate fire and rescue service equipment to extricate or transport the
1045 casualty
- 1046 • Consider requesting appropriate equipment from other agencies to extricate or transport the
1047 casualty
- 1048 • Consider using appropriate motorised vehicles to transport the casualty
- 1049 • Consider requesting appropriate motorised vehicles from other agencies to transport the casualty
- 1050 • Follow service policy regarding the transportation of casualties in fire and rescue service vehicles