NFCC National Fire Chiefs Council

National Operational Guidance

National Operational Guidance: Planned review

National Operational Guidance topic
Marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA)
Change originator
National Operational Guidance: Content team
Change requested
Each section of National Operational Guidance is reviewed on a routine basis. The current *National Operational Guidance for Marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA)* was published in August 2017. The then Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (now Homeland Security) determined that this publication should have a restricted status, so it is only available on ResilienceDirect.   Since then, the supporting *Marauding Terrorist Attack Joint Operating Principles (MTA JOPs) Edition 2* have been updated and were published in December 2020.   Interim National Operational Guidance for non-specialist personnel inadvertently attending an MTA is temporarily published within the Operations guidance. However, when this reviewed guidance is published, the refined interim hazard and control measure will be included with the main publication and will be removed from the Operations guidance.   Under consideration of the latest National Risk Register, which is derived from the National Security Risk Assessment, the proposal is for this National Operational Guidance to be renamed *Terrorist attacks.* However, an explanation in the introduction of the guidance will explain that it applies to static and marauding terrorist attacks, and could be applied to other forms of malicious attacks. MTA forms a subset of terrorist attacks and, certainly in the first stages of an attack, it may be difficult to determine the nature and motivation of the attack.   As this revised National Operational Guidance will apply to all personnel, the guidance needs to be delivered in a format to make it suitable to publish as unrestricted content. The draft guidance will be accompanied by a draft training specification when seeking approval for publication.   Because the baseline version of the MTFA guidance was restricted, it has not been possible to produce a draft with tracked changes, as this would have restricted consultation and review of the updated content.   Guidance and training for specialist responding personnel will be delivered through a restricted *Concept of Operations for MTA* publication, which will be published separately and securely.

The accompanying training specification will be developed after consultation of the guidance is complete.

Changes proposed	Rationale for change
Renaming of guidance from *Marauding terrorist firearms attack* to *Terrorist attacks*	• To apply the categorisation used in the National Risk Register and the National Security Risk Assessment • To encompass terrorist attacks that may be static or marauding • To ensure the guidance can be adapted to malicious attacks that are not terrorist-related
The draft guidance is for non-specialist frontline personnel	• To enable the guidance to be published as open reference material on the ukfrs.com website • Guidance for specialist MTA personnel will be contained in a separate *Concept of Operations for MTA*, which will be published securely
The draft training specification is for non-specialist frontline personnel	• To enable the training specification to be published as open reference material on the ukfrs.com website • Training for specialist MTA personnel will be published separately and securely

Consultation process

- Peer review by:
    - NFCC MTA User Group
    - NFCC MTA Working Group
- Open consultation from 1 July 2022 to 12 August 2022

Governance process

☐ Approval to commence consultation given by NFCC Operations Committee Click or tap to enter a date.

☐ Approved by NFCC Operational Guidance Forum Click or tap to enter a date.

☐ Approved by NFCC Operations Committee Click or tap to enter a date.

☐ Approved by NFCC Steering Group Click or tap to enter a date.

Impacts on other National Operational Guidance products

- Operations – removal of the interim guidance for *Non-specialist personnel inadvertently attending a marauding terrorist attack*

Terrorist attacks

(review of Marauding terrorist firearms attack guidance)

The link to the consultation survey is
https://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/TA-C2022/

Draft 0.8 (for consultation)

July 2022

Content

1 Introduction

Following a terrorist attack, or marauding terrorist attack (MTA), the overarching aim of the emergency services is to provide a co-ordinated response that will:

- Save life by:
  - Neutralising the threat
  - Delivering emergency medical care
  - Rescuing or removing casualties and survivors
- Deal with fires and other hazards
- Manage a return to normality as soon as practicable

The focus of this guidance is on the direct impact of attacks on involved members of the public and how the fire and rescue service can respond. Attacks may occur at any publicly accessible locations, including transport networks.

Especially in the early stages of an incident, it may be difficult to determine the nature and motivation of an attack, or even to confirm whether it is an intentional or accidental event. It is critical that any attempts to classify the incident do not prevent or delay an appropriate multi-agency emergency response.

Structure of guidance for terrorist attacks

1. The primary source of guidance is the JESIP publication, *Responding to a marauding terrorist attack: Joint operating principles for the emergency services, Edition 2, December 2020 (MTA JOPs)*. The JOPs are designed to assist the emergency services in delivering an effective and co-ordinated multi-agency response to an MTA.

   The JOPs publication belongs to the Counter Terrorism Police, backed by the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC), the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE) and the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). It is published as 'Official – Sensitive'.

2. This guidance contains the fire and rescue service content that is relevant to all operational and fire control personnel. The guidance belongs to the NFCC and is unrestricted.

3. The *Concept of Operations for MTA* provides procedural and training content for specialist MTA responding personnel. The guidance belongs to National Resilience, part of the NFCC, and is published as 'Official – Sensitive'.

Preparedness for operational activity

Fire and rescue services should consider the strategic-level guidance contained in [Corporate guidance for operational activity](#) when preparing for a response to terrorist attacks.

Relevant operational and fire control personnel should have an appropriate level of understanding of the JESIP principles, and how to apply them. The principles are:

- Co-locate
- Communicate
- Co-ordinate
- Jointly understand risk

38   • Shared situational awareness

Intraoperability and interoperability

40 Terrorist attacks will always require a multi-agency response and will often require cross-border
41 assistance. For more information refer to:

42   • Incident command – Intraoperability and interoperability

43   • Operations – Communication to support intraoperability and interoperability

44 Intraoperability and interoperability are heavily reliant on emergency responders being co-located; this is
45 one of the JESIP principles. There are many benefits of co-location, such as improved communication
46 and understanding that support joint working. With the use of technology, co-location can be virtual, at
47 least initially, to prevent delays in joint working and decision-making. However, the co-location of
48 responders should occur as soon as reasonably practicable.

49 Fire and rescue services should understand how national frameworks and mutual aid arrangements can
50 support the local, regional or national response to terrorist attacks.

Learning

52 The lessons identified from terrorist attacks, or from training and exercises for such incidents, need to be
53 methodically captured, preferably while events are fresh in the minds of those involved.

54 All debriefs should involve the full range of operational and fire control personnel, to ensure the lessons
55 identified are captured from every aspect of the response. For more information refer to Incident
56 command – Hold debriefing or post-incident reviews.

57 Fire and rescue services should consider sharing learning from incidents, training and exercises. This
58 may be within the service to improve their own policies, procedures and training, or through the National
59 Operational Learning process. For more information refer to Corporate guidance for operational activity –
60 Operational learning.

61 Lessons from multi-agency incidents should be captured and uploaded to Joint Organisational Learning
62 (JOL Online). JOL should also be used to capture notable practice; this is where emergency responders
63 have found and wish to share a solution that works well to address an interoperability issue

Risk management plan

65 Each fire and rescue authority must develop their strategic direction through their risk management plan.
66 To determine the extent of their services, strategic managers will consider their statutory duties and the
67 foreseeable risk within their area.

68 Work to identify risk and prepare operational plans should consider all stakeholders, including local
69 emergency planning groups and the fire and rescue service risk management plan.

Responsibility of fire and rescue services

71 Fire and rescue services are responsible, under legislation and regulations, for developing policies and
72 procedures and to provide information, instruction, training and supervision to their personnel about
73 foreseeable hazards and the control measures used to mitigate the risks arising from those hazards.

74 This guidance sets out to provide fire and rescue services with sufficient knowledge about the potential
75 hazards their personnel could encounter when attending suspected or confirmed terrorist attack

76 incidents. Fire and rescue services should ensure their policies, procedures and training cover all of the
77 hazards and control measures contained in this guidance.

78 **Public disorder**

79 The impacts of terrorist attacks on the public and personnel may be similar to those of public disorder,
80 which can involve the use of weapons, objects and incendiary devices. For more information refer to
81 Operations – Public order.

82 **Physical hazards**

83 Personnel deployed to a terrorist attack may be subject to a variety of physical hazards, including:

84 • The actions of attackers, including their use of conventional or improvised weapons

85 • The impact of wearing enhanced levels of personal protective equipment (PPE)

86 • Noise, such as from crowds of people, activated alarms or police activity

87 • Manual handling when rescuing or removing casualties and survivors

88 • The presence of body fluids

89 For more information refer to:

90 • Operations – Physiological stress

91 • Operations – Heat illness in personnel

92 • Operations - Noise

93 • Operations – Manual handling

94 • Operations – Infectious diseases

95 **Psychological hazards**

96 The psychological hazards experienced by personnel when attending or monitoring a terrorist attack
97 should be considered when carrying out risk assessments or developing a tactical plan. For more
98 information refer to:

99 • Operations – Psychological hazards

Hazard – Non-specialist personnel inadvertently attending terrorist attacks

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

Terrorist attacks, including marauding terrorist attacks (MTA), can be fast-moving, violent incidents where attackers aim to find and kill or injure as many people as possible; they usually occur without any notice or warning but may be planned. An attack, including a terrorist attack or an MTA, may be random or aimed at specific groups, for example relating to race or religious beliefs. Attacks may be planned or spontaneous events.

During the initial stages of an ongoing attack, it is possible that personnel arrive on-scene in the belief that they have been mobilised to a non-malicious incident, which could result in their injury or death unless appropriate control measures are applied.

An attack may include a wide range or combination of methodologies, from lower sophistication to higher complexity attacks. This could involve one or more of the following attack methodologies:

- Bladed weapon

- Vehicle as a weapon

- Fire as a weapon

- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or grenades

- Firearms

- Siege, including the taking of hostages to prolong an attack or impede rescue operations

- Chemicals, such as acids or alkalis

Terrorist attacks, including MTA, may include a combination of approaches, such as:

- A lone attacker, multiple attackers or multiple groups of attackers

- Arrival at a location on foot, in a vehicle or an attack perpetrated by location insiders

- Entering a location without using force, or forcing entry using an IED, a vehicle, coercion of someone with access to the location, or a combination of these actions

In the initial stages of an ongoing attack, it will be extremely difficult to get an accurate picture of what is happening. It may take some time to confirm that the incident is a determined attack involving single or multiple attackers.

It may be difficult to determine the location and number of attackers, or even to determine who they are in a crowd of people. It is feasible that the emergency services have been purposefully lured to the location as targets for the attackers.

Although initial attending personnel may have been trained to respond to an ongoing terrorist attack or MTA, they may not be carrying or wearing the appropriate equipment, including enhanced levels of personal protective equipment (PPE).

133   **Control measure – Apply Stay Safe principles for terrorist attacks**

134   *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

135   If initial attending personnel inadvertently attend an ongoing suspected terrorist attack or marauding
136   terrorist attack (MTA), an appropriate risk assessment should be carried out to determine the tactical
137   mode for initial attending personnel. This should be based on:

138   - The attack methodologies

139   - The presence and number of attackers or terrorists

140   - The presence and number of people, including casualties

141   - The presence or imminent arrival of specialist support

142   For more information refer to Incident command – Select the tactical mode.

143   If the risk assessment determines it is safe to do so, initial attending personnel who have not received
144   specialist training, or who are not wearing enhanced levels of personal protective equipment (PPE),
145   should not delay rescuing casualties or carrying out life-saving activities.

146   However, if the risk assessment determines the need to adopt a defensive mode of operation, initial
147   attending personnel may need to withdraw to a place of safety and notify the fire control room of their
148   location. In this situation, they should consider if they can assist casualties as they leave the hazard
149   area, including the removal of casualties who are unable to walk. This will need to be a dynamic
150   decision, based on the nature of the threat and an assessment of risks versus benefits, and may take
151   place before zones are established.

152   If there are other emergency services in attendance, the incident commander should attempt to liaise
153   with them to determine if they suspect or know that the incident is a terrorist attack or MTA.

154   Initial attending personnel should consider their own safety and that of other emergency responders and
155   the public when applying the JESIP 'STAY SAFE' principles for non-specialist responders, in order to:

156   - See

157   - Tell

158   - Act

159   The 'Tell' element of the principles includes communicating with the fire control room, ideally using the
160   JESIP M/ETHANE model to provide information about the incident. This will enable the fire control room
161   to:

162   - Appropriately control further mobilisation to the incident

163   - Relay the M/ETHANE information to the police

164   - Gain an understanding of the numbers and location of personnel involved in the incident

165   - Contact the duty National Inter-agency Liaison Officer (NILO), or equivalent as detailed in service
166   policies

167   As the police will assume overall control of a terrorist attack or an MTA, personnel should follow any
168   advice or instructions provided by the police, either via the fire control room or from on-scene police
169   officers.

170 The fire control room should determine if any personnel are en route to or attending other incidents in the
171 area, who could become involved. If so, they should immediately notify the commanders of those
172 incidents so that they can consider using alternative access or egress routes to avoid the suspected
173 terrorist attack or MTA.

174 The fire control room should keep commanders of other nearby incidents updated, so that they can
175 determine the necessity to carry out a tactical withdrawal of personnel.

176 The fire control room should also notify the police about any fire and rescue service resources that are
177 en route to or attending other incidents in the area.

178 If safe to do so, personnel should encourage other people to follow the Action Counters Terrorism (ACT)
179 'Advice To Stay Safe' to:

- 180 • **Run** to a place of safety. This is a far better option than to surrender or negotiate. If there's
181 nowhere to go then…

- 182 • It's better to **hide** than to confront. Remember to turn your phone to silent and turn off vibrate.
183 Barricade yourself in if you can. Then finally and only when it's safe to do so…

- 184 • **Tell** the police by calling 999

185 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

186 Fire and rescue services should:

- 187 • Ensure that all operational and fire control personnel have access to the current JESIP 'STAY
188 SAFE' principles for non-specialist responders

- 189 • Ensure that all operational and fire control personnel have access to the current Action Counters
190 Terrorism 'Advice To Stay Safe'

- 191 • Consider participating in multi-agency training and exercises for terrorist attacks and marauding
192 terrorist attacks

193 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

194 All personnel should:

- 195 • Immediately notify the incident commander or the fire control room if they suspect the incident is
196 an ongoing terrorist attack or MTA

- 197 • Prioritise the rescue of casualties and carrying out life-saving activities, if safe to do so at a
198 suspected ongoing terrorist attack or MTA

- 199 • Consider withdrawing to a place of safety and notifying the fire control room of their location if
200 their safety is immediately threatened by a suspected ongoing terrorist attack or MTA

- 201 • Consider assisting casualties of the suspected ongoing terrorist attack or MTA as they leave the
202 hazard area, based on the nature of the threat and an assessment of risks versus benefits

- 203 • Consider their own safety and that of other emergency responders and the public when applying
204 the JESIP 'STAY SAFE' principles for non-specialist responders during a suspected ongoing
205 terrorist attack or MTA

- 206 • If safe to do so, encourage other people to follow the Action Counters Terrorism 'Advice To Stay
207 Safe' during a suspected ongoing terrorist attack or MTA

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- Follow any advice or instructions provided by the police, either via the fire control room or by on-scene police officers during a suspected ongoing terrorist attack or MTA

210 Incident commanders should:

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- Carry out an appropriate risk assessment to determine the tactical mode for initial attending personnel inadvertently attending a suspected ongoing terrorist attack or MTA

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- Attempt to liaise with other emergency services in attendance to determine if they suspect or know that the incident is a terrorist attack or MTA

215 Fire control personnel should:

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- Appropriately control further mobilisation to the incident during a suspected terrorist attack or MTA

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- Relay M/ETHANE messages to the other emergency service control rooms about a suspected terrorist attack or MTA

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- Gather information about the numbers and location of personnel involved in a suspected terrorist attack or MTA

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- Contact the duty National Inter-agency Liaison Officer (NILO), or equivalent as detailed in service policies, about a suspected terrorist attack or MTA

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- Relay advice or instructions provided by the police to the on-scene incident commander about a suspected terrorist attack or MTA

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- Notify commanders en route to or attending nearby incidents about a suspected terrorist attack or MTA and its location

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- Make the police aware of fire and rescue service resources that are en route to or attending nearby incidents during a suspected terrorist attack or MTA

Hazard – Terrorist attacks

230

231 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

232 Especially in the early stages of an incident, it may be difficult to determine the nature and motivation of
233 an attack, or even to confirm whether it is intentional or accidental. It is critical that any attempts to
234 classify the incident do not prevent or delay an appropriate multi-agency emergency response.

235 The current *Responding to a marauding terrorist attack: Joint operating principles for the emergency*
236 *services* (MTA JOPS) allows for the possibility of specialist or non-specialist emergency responders
237 needing to be deployed into the hot zone. However, is should be recognised that there will potentially be
238 high risks associated with this deployment. This risk may be somewhat mitigated if armed police officers
239 are available to escort emergency responders, but their attendance cannot be guaranteed.

240 **Marauding terrorist attacks**

241 A marauding terrorist attack (MTA) may involve one or more attackers or terrorists attacking people in
242 their vicinity, and then deliberately searching for more victims by moving around buildings or other
243 populated areas. There may be attacks at multiple sites, potentially with a time gap, which may not
244 appear to be linked. Attackers may also search for victims without moving, for example by discharging a
245 firearm from a vantage point into a public place.

246 Any agency can declare a suspected terrorist attack or major incident. However, only the police can
247 formally declare a terrorist attack or MTA. This declaration is designed to inform and prepare other
248 emergency services about the incident and initiate a multi-agency response. An MTA is likely to be
249 declared as a major incident for one or more of the emergency services.

250 The declaration of an MTA may indicate that:

251 • Emergency service partners are required, including mobilisation of their specialist responders

252 • Regional or national armed resources or specialist military assets may need to be mobilised

253 • National Counter Terrorism Policing network and partners will be required

254 • Fire National Resilience assets may be required

255 **Terrorist attacks**

256 The police may not need to declare a terrorist attack as an MTA if the incident can be effectively dealt
257 with under 'business as usual' arrangements. This could be the case if, for example, the threat is not
258 ongoing. However, the police should still share relevant information with the other emergency services,
259 using a M/ETHANE message to inform shared situational awareness. Terrorist attacks will usually
260 require an appropriate multi-agency response.

261 **Malicious attacks**

262 If a malicious attack is determined to not be terrorist-related, the police should adjust their declaration of
263 an MTA and inform other emergency services. However, this change of declaration may not change the
264 level of multi-agency response that is required for the incident.

265 **Control measure – Multi-agency response to terrorist attacks**

266 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

267 **JESIP principles**

268 The response to all multi-agency incidents should be based on the JESIP principles; these are essential
269 as the foundation for responding to a terrorist attack. The exact response will be determined by the type
270 and scale of the attack.

271 M/ETHANE messages should always be used to share information as they provide a common structure
272 for on-scene responders and control rooms. The initial M/ETHANE message from on-scene responders,
273 who may be unaware of the nature of the incident, will provide an early scene assessment. This should
274 be used by incident commanders to co-ordinate an effective response.

275 Effective response arrangements and decision-making are underpinned by the JESIP principles for joint
276 working, as defined in the JESIP Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework. Joint decision-making
277 should use the Joint Decision Model (JDM).

278 **Identification and declaration of a marauding terrorist attack**

279 Any emergency service can report a suspected terrorist attack or marauding terrorist attack (MTA) to the
280 police. Taking this step should include the immediate sharing of all relevant information with other
281 emergency service control rooms.

282 When the police declare that the incident is an MTA, they should immediately share this classification
283 with other emergency services. Any delay in making or sharing an MTA declaration will affect the speed
284 and effectiveness of an appropriate response.

285 The declaration of an MTA should include details about the attack methodology used, threatened or
286 suspected. This essential information needs to be communicated to all emergency services to ensure
287 there is appropriate and proportionate mobilisation of responders, as well as a joint understanding of risk
288 and shared situational awareness.

289 Indications that a terrorist attack or marauding terrorist attack is occurring may include:

290   • Reports of terrorist attack methodologies being used or threatened:
291   o As multiple calls into control rooms
292   o Through social media surges
293   o At iconic sites
294   o In crowded buildings or places
295   o Against famous people
296   o Against security staff, military personnel or emergency responders
297   • Attackers shouting religious or ideological slogans
298   • Attackers actively and deliberately seeking out new victims
299   • Multiple sites of attack:
300   o Simultaneously
301   o In quick succession

302   o Over a more extended period of time

303 **Responsibilities of agencies**

304 **The police** will lead on the overall response to a terrorist attack or MTA; they will deploy appropriate
305 resources to identify, locate and confront the threat. The police will retain overall responsibility for co-
306 ordinating the multi-agency response, but each agency retains the responsibility to deliver their statutory
307 duty.

308 Normally the police response will be that of a 'Home Office police force'. However, if an attack takes
309 place in the operating environment of a 'non-Home Office police force', they will take an active role in
310 responding to the incident and may have primacy. These forces include:

311 • British Transport Police (BTP)

312 • Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC)

313 • Ministry of Defence Police (MDP)

314 **The fire and rescue service** will retain lead responsibility for their core functions, such as firefighting,
315 rescue and hazard management activities, as a result of a terrorist attack or MTA. The fire and rescue
316 service may need to provide resources and equipment to deal with these core functions. For more
317 information refer to Fires and other hazards: Terrorist attack.

318 The fire and rescue service may be required to assist the ambulance service with casualty management;
319 this includes the treatment, removal or transfer of casualties who have been injured in the attack. For
320 more information refer to Casualty care: Terrorist attacks.

321 It is foreseeable that the fire and rescue service may be required to carry out their core functions and
322 casualty management at the same time. If this is the case, the on-scene commanders will need to agree
323 priorities, based on available information and the primary aim to save life.

324 **National Inter-agency Liaison Officers** (NILOs) undergo training that enables them to act in a
325 command or tactical adviser role for terrorist attacks, MTAs or other counter terrorism events. All NILOs
326 have national security vetting at a minimum of Security Check (SC) level. The NILO network is aligned
327 with UK Counter Terrorism Policing, with dedicated NILOs attached to each region.

328 **The ambulance service** retains the lead responsibility for casualty management at a terrorist attack or
329 MTA. The priority is the rapid deployment of emergency responders, to provide immediate life-saving
330 intervention to as many casualties as possible, within the shortest possible time. The aim is to maximise
331 casualty survival until definitive care can be provided.

332 **Mobilisation**

333 The multi-agency response should reflect the attack methodology and the threat. It should consider the
334 need for specialist and non-specialist responders, and the time it will take to mobilise them to the
335 incident.

336 In preparation for such incidents, all emergency services should identify and appoint appropriately
337 trained and equipped responders, with well-rehearsed plans, to carry out key command and support
338 functions.

339 **Communication**

340 As a priority, the police will instigate the pre-planned tri-service communication link between the
341 emergency service control rooms. The link should be kept open and resourced appropriately for the

342 duration of the incident; it should not be terminated until all parties agree that it is appropriate to do so.
343 This line of communication should be resilient, with its use being practiced and tested regularly.

344 All communication between agencies should be free from acronyms and use plain language. The
345 information shared should include:

- 346 • A declaration about the type of attack, including a clear description of the attack methodology
- 347 • A M/ETHANE message
- 348 • The location of rendezvous points (RVPs) and forward command points (FCPs)
- 349 • Details of safe approach routes
- 350 • The known or believed location and direction of movement of suspected attackers
- 351 • Any other information that enables an effective co-ordinated response

352 **Co-location and co-ordination**

353 Effective command requires multi-agency co-location at a number of locations. Any location used by the
354 emergency services should be checked and secured against potential threats, including secondary
355 devices or discarded improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with protection measures implemented where
356 applicable. The security of designated locations should be continuously reviewed and communicated
357 between commanders.

- 358 • Rendezvous point (RVP): The police control room will, as a matter of priority, liaise with
359   ambulance and fire control rooms to jointly agree an RVP for the initial response. The RVP
360   should:
- 361   o Be located in the cold zone
- 362   o Be easy to locate
- 363   o Enable the rapid deployment of resources and assets to the scene
- 364   o Be of suitable size and configuration to meet the operational requirement
- 365   o Be regularly reviewed by commanders
- 366 • Forward command point (FCP): Commanders are responsible for identifying a suitable FCP for
367   the deployment of emergency service responders. The FCP should:
- 368   o Be located in the cold zone
- 369   o Be regularly reviewed by commanders

370 There may need to be more than one FCP, depending on the attack methodology that may be multi-
371 sited. Even though the location of FCPs may change during an incident, it is vital that command and
372 control structures are maintained to ensure co-ordination of the incident and the safety of emergency
373 service responders.

374 If there is insufficient time to establish an FCP, emergency service responders may need to be deployed
375 following the establishment of a joint understanding of risk.

- 376 • Tactical Co-ordinating Groups (TCG) and Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCG): Some
377   command roles will need to attend meetings of these groups. For more information refer to:
- 378   o The JESIP publication, Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework
- 379   o Incident command: Knowledge, skills and competence – Levels of command

380 • Counter Terrorism Police Operations Room (CTPOR): If established, suitably vetted responders
381   from the ambulance service and fire and rescue service should attend to support the police CT
382   Commander. Tri-service attendance at the CTPOR will ensure:

383   o Appropriate intelligence and information sharing between partner agencies

384   o Co-operation and understanding amongst agencies on matters of organisational capacity,
385   capability and command

386   o A reduction in risk to emergency service responders and the public

387 **Fire and rescue service command**

388 Fire and rescue services need to ensure they are represented at all meetings and briefings; if the
389 incident commander needs to remain on-scene, this role may be assigned to a NILO or a nominated
390 member of the incident command team.

391 The person attending an off-site meeting needs to be empowered to make decisions on behalf of their
392 service. If the command authority remains on-scene, communication between the two service
393 representatives needs to be robust.

394 National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) may be appointed to liaise with and support the incident
395 commander; the NILO may provide the incident commander with tactical advice.

396 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

397 Fire and rescue services should:

398 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
399   in applying the JESIP principles to support the delivery of a multi-agency response to a terrorist
400   attack

401 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

402 Incident commanders should:

403 • Be prepared to respond for requests from the police for assistance with firefighting, rescue and
404   hazard management activities when responding to a terrorist attack

405 • Be prepared to provide equipment, including firefighting equipment, to deal with activities
406   assigned to the fire and rescue service when responding to a terrorist attack

407 • Be prepared to deploy personnel to assist the ambulance service with the treatment, removal or
408   transfer of casualties who have been injured in a terrorist attack

409 • Agree with other on-scene commanders on the priorities for personnel, based on available
410   information and the primary aim to save life

411 • Ensure they, a National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILO) or a nominated member of the
412   incident command team attend and participate in all multi-agency meetings and briefings for a
413   terrorist attack

414 • Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) when responding to terrorist attacks

415 • Record decisions made, and consider the appropriate use of decision logs when responding to
416   terrorist attacks

417   **Control measure – Understanding deployment into MTA zones**

418   *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

419   The aim of deploying into MTA zones should be to minimise the risk to the public, including casualties,
420   while maximising the safety of emergency responders.

421   At incidents involving terrorist attacks, including marauding terrorist attacks (MTA), defining the zones
422   within the area facilitates the appropriate deployment of emergency responders. The JESIP Joint
423   Decision Model (JDM) should be used to define the zones, through establishing shared situational
424   awareness and a joint understanding of risk. Developing a Common Operating Picture (COP), which
425   should consider the threats and risks to emergency responders and members of the public, will support
426   ongoing joint decision-making.

427   It may not be necessary to use all three zones. Decisions to define the zones should be dynamic and
428   based on the attack methodology and the threat. The deployment of personnel into the zones should be
429   based on the joint understanding of risk and the need to save life.

430   On-scene commanders should jointly agree and define the limits of exploitation (LoE). An LoE is defined
431   as a further point at which some emergency responders can operate. The LoE will be jointly agreed
432   between commanders as part of an ongoing joint assessment of risk.

433   All relevant personnel should be briefed to ensure they understand the LoE and the zones in use. Any
434   changes to the LoE or zones should be promptly provided to all relevant personnel.

435   The zones are defined as:

436   - Hot zone: An area assessed to contain a credible and continuing threat to life, including the
437   presence of attackers with weapons
438   - Warm zone: An area where the attackers are not believed to be present at this time, but an
439   identified threat to life remains
440   - Cold zone: An area where no known threat exists or where appropriate control measures have
441   been implemented; some cold zones will not require any control measures

442   Commanders should decide if, how and when their emergency responders can be deployed; this should
443   be based on a risk assessment, which is informed by the nature of the attack, including:

444   - The number of attackers
445   - The methodology of the attack
446   - The number of people at risk

447   The deployment of non-specialist responders should be restricted to the cold and warm zone, up to the
448   defined LoE. The deployment of non-specialist responders into the hot zone should be avoided.

449   Specialist responders, who undergo extensive training for the role, can be deployed in to the cold, warm
450   and hot zones as part of a multi-agency response, subject to their competence for operating safely in the
451   hot zone.

452   In the event that non-specialist responders find themselves in the hot zone, they should take feasible
453   actions to save life, while protecting their own safety as they leave it.

454 The size, location and necessity for zones should be continuously reviewed. Every effort should be made
455 to reclassify zones to accurately reflect the constantly evolving threat and risk. Zones should be no larger
456 than necessary and their size should relate directly to the attack methodology. For example, if there is a
457 firearms threat, the hot and warm zones may be considerably larger than those for an incident involving
458 a hostile vehicle attack.

459 Application of the JDM will determine whether and what zones are required. The aim should be to move
460 the hot zone to warm and the warm zone to cold as soon as it is practicable and safe to do so.

461 As soon as it is confirmed that any threat has been controlled, this information should be shared
462 immediately with all responding agencies.

463 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

464 Fire and rescue services should:

465 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
466   in applying the JESIP principles to support the deployment of personnel into MTA zones

467 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

468 Incident commanders should:

469 • Apply the JESIP principles including the Joint Decision Model (JDM) for a terrorist attack

470 • Jointly agree and define the limits of exploitation (LoE) and the zones in use for a terrorist attack

471 • Brief all relevant personnel to ensure they understand the limits of exploitation (LoE) and the
472   zones in use for a terrorist attack

473 • Promptly provide all relevant personnel with details of any changes to the limits of exploitation
474   (LoE) or zones for a terrorist attack

475 **Control measure – Safe system of work: Terrorist attacks**

476 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

477 **Shared situational awareness and joint understanding of risk**

478 The JESIP principles of shared situational awareness and jointly understanding risk are continual
479 processes that should be followed for a terrorist attack or marauding terrorist attack (MTA). The JESIP
480 Joint Decision Model (JDM) should be used to consider and reconcile potentially differing priorities and
481 to develop a working strategy.

482 All relevant commanders should be co-located and included in these processes. The absence of a
483 commander from one or more of the emergency services should not delay this, although it may
484 significantly impact on the deployment decisions made. While co-location should occur as soon as
485 reasonably practicable, initial virtual alternatives, through the use of technology, may help to prevent
486 delays.

487 The absence of police information and intelligence at a forward command point (FCP) or rendezvous
488 point (RVP) could affect deployment decisions by the fire and rescue service and ambulance service. To
489 mitigate this, proactive measures should be taken to enable the deployment of the responders on-scene
490 is not delayed.

491 Establishing a joint understanding of risk is necessary to ensure that all responders are aware of the
492 nature of the threat and the risks they may encounter. Other organisations that have deployed resources
493 to the scene of the terrorist attack or MTA, should be involved in establishing a joint understanding of
494 risk. This may include, for example, military specialists. Commanders will need to take this into account
495 when developing their plans.

496 **Briefings**

497 Multi-agency briefings should include as a minimum:

498 • Information and intelligence, such as included in M/ETHANE messages

499 • Risk assessment, such as:

500 ○ Known or perceived threats and risks

501 ○ What personal protective equipment (PPE) is required

502 ○ Zone and LoE

503 • Powers, policies and procedures, such as:

504 ○ Casualty management plan

505 ○ Fires and other hazards plan

506 ○ Communications plan

507 • Identification of options and contingencies, such as:

508 ○ Deployment of specialist or non-specialist responders

509 ○ Team structure and size

510 ○ Call signs

511 ○ Team identifiers

512 ○ Casualty management plan locations

513 ○ Procedure for loss of communications

514 ○ Agreed signals for emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal of responders

515 • Recommend actions to take and review what happened; decisions and actions should be
516 reviewed

517 • Ongoing use of the JDM to inform decision-making as information changes or new information
518 becomes available

519 • Preservation of evidence; all responders should be aware of the need to preserve evidence
520 during a terrorist attack or MTA

521 **Responsibilities**

522 It is the responsibility of the police to:

523 • Establish a forward command point (FCP) at a suitable location, which has:

524 ○ Suitable areas for each emergency service and their support teams, to enable them to
525 operate independently

526 ○ The capacity to hold regular and structured briefings regarding the development of plans and
527 contingencies

528 • Identify zones and appropriate limits of exploitation (LoE) to support interoperable working

529 • Jointly agree and clearly stipulate the furthest points (LoE) to which emergency responders will
530 operate within each zone

531 • Brief responders about the threats, hazards, risks and zones; to support rapid deployment, it is
532 preferable that briefings:

533 o Are conducted jointly, with input from all emergency services

534 o Apply the JESIP Joint Decision Model (JDM) principles

535 It is the responsibility of the fire and rescue service to:

536 • Brief relevant personnel about threats, hazards, risks and zones, including LoE

537 • Appoint National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) to liaise with and support the incident
538 commander; the NILO may provide the incident commander with tactical advice

539 • Ensure they are represented at all FCP briefings; if the incident commander needs to remain on-
540 scene, this role may be assigned to a NILO or a nominated member of the incident command
541 team

542 • Record decisions made, including the rationale about deploying or withholding resources; this
543 should be supported by the appropriate use of decision logs

544 Fire control and on-scene personnel should liaise to:

545 • Establish what survival guidance should be provided to people at risk in the terrorist attack

546 • Ensure the survival guidance being given to people at risk reflects and supports the current multi-
547 agency tactical plans

548 If fire control rooms are in contact with people at risk in a terrorist attack, they may be able to gather
549 information about the incident and relay this to on-scene personnel. They should ensure that providing
550 the information does not put the caller at greater risk. On-scene personnel should relay any information
551 gathered from calls received by the fire control room to the appropriate police commander.

552 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

553 Fire and rescue services should:

554 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
555 in applying the JESIP principles to support the development of a safe system of work for terrorist
556 attacks

557 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

558 Incident commanders should:

559 • Ensure they, a NILO or a nominated member of the incident command team attend and
560 participate in the forward command point (FCP) briefings for the terrorist attack

561 • Jointly agree the limits of exploitation (LoE) as the furthest points to which emergency responders
562 will operate within each zone

563 • Ensure relevant personnel are briefed about threats, hazards, risks, zones, limits of exploitation
564 (LoE) and the multi-agency plans for the terrorist attack

565	•	Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) during terrorist attacks

566	•	Record decisions made, and consider the appropriate use of decision logs for a terrorist attack

567 568	•	Liaise with the fire control room to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in a terrorist attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

569 570	•	Relay to the appropriate police commander any information gathered about a terrorist attack from calls received by the fire control room

571 Fire control personnel should:

572 573	•	Liaise with the incident ground to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in a terrorist attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

574 575	•	Gather information about the incident from people at risk in a terrorist attack and relay it to the incident commander, but only if this does not put callers at greater risk

576 **Control measure – Emergency evacuation and tactical withdrawal of responders:**
577 **Terrorist attacks**

578 **This control measure should be read in conjunction with Incident command – Emergency**
579 **evacuation and tactical withdrawal of responders**

580 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

581 Commanders should be kept informed about the progress of the multi-agency tactical plans, including
582 the casualty management plan (CMP), to maintain joint situational awareness across organisations. This
583 may indicate a requirement for casualty extrication to pause, or for emergency responders to evacuate
584 or withdraw from the area.

585 There should be a multi-agency plan that enables emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal of
586 responders which:

587	•	Evacuates the responders who are at highest risk, while protecting escape routes

588	•	Removes responders from areas where the risk has become too high

589 The plans should also include:

590	•	The method of initiating an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal of responders

591	•	The method for carrying out a roll call

592 593	•	The communications that are required when an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal of responders have been initiated

594 595	•	The actions that would need to be taken if personnel are unaccounted for after an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal of responders

596 597	•	The procedure for recommencing activity after an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal of responders

598 If there is an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal declared, personnel should consider if they
599 can assist casualties as they leave the hazard area, including the removal of those who are unable to
600 walk. This will need to be a dynamic decision, based on the nature of the threat and an appropriate risk
601 assessment.

602 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

603 Fire and rescue services should:

604 • Provide personnel with suitable equipment to convey an evacuation signal during a terrorist
605 attack

606 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

607 Incident commanders should:

608 • Ensure personnel know what the plans and signals are for the emergency evacuation and tactical
609 withdrawal of responders at a terrorist attack

610 • Ensure personnel know the location of the muster point for a terrorist attack and communicate its
611 new location if it is relocated

612 • Carry out a roll call of personnel at the scene following an emergency evacuation of responders
613 at a terrorist attack

614 • Ensure personnel do not re-enter the terrorist attack hazard area following an emergency
615 evacuation of responders or an evacuation signal, unless instructed to do so

616 • Ensure personnel understand what actions they may be able to take to help casualties of the
617 terrorist attack in the event of an emergency evacuation or tactical withdrawal from the hazard
618 area

Hazard – CBRN or explosive attacks

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)

Due to the unique nature of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attack, there is a separate JESIP publication, Responding to a CBRN(e) event: Joint operating principles for the emergency services. CBRN hazards may be distributed using an explosive device.

However, attackers may use lower sophistication chemicals that require a combined marauding terrorist attack (MTA) and CBRN response.

Improvised explosive devices

Information and intelligence may indicate that there is a threat of an improvised explosive device (IED) or that an IED has exploded or partially exploded.

If an IED has been detonated, there may be a risk of further explosions or a remaining explosive hazard from the IED.

Control measure – Safe system of work: CBRN or explosive attacks

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

Assessment of the attack

In the event of a suspected or potential chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attack, an assessment should be carried out by applying the 'STEP 1-2-3 Plus' process. This will help to determine what actions should be taken. For more information refer to the Home Office publication, Initial operational response to a CBRN incident, which includes the following steps:

Step 1 One person incapacitated with no obvious reason:

- Approach using standard protocols

Step 2 Two people incapacitated with no obvious reason:

- Approach with caution using standard protocols

Step 3 Three or more people in close proximity, incapacitated with no obvious reason:

- Use caution and follow step 'Plus'

Actions following the attack

Plus – Carry out appropriate life-saving activity, which may include:

- **Evacuate** – Get people away from the scene of contamination

- **Communicate and advise** – Immediate medical advice and reassurance that help is on its way

- **Disrobe** – Remove clothing

- **Decontaminate** – Improvised decontamination:
  - o Dry decontamination when a non-caustic agent is suspected

652　　　　o　Wet decontamination when a caustic agent is suspected

653　People who have potentially been affected by CBRN materials should be instructed about how to follow
654　the 'REMOVE REMOVE REMOVE' process, if they are able to do so:

655

656　Figure: Poster explaining the 'REMOVE REMOVE REMOVE' process

657　Fire control and on-scene personnel should liaise to:

658　• Establish what survival guidance should be provided to people at risk in a CBRN or explosive
659　attack

660　• Ensure the survival guidance being given to people at risk reflects and supports the current multi-
661　agency tactical plans

662 If fire control rooms are in contact with people at risk in a CBRN or explosive attack, they may be able to
663 gather information about the incident and relay this to on-scene personnel. They should ensure that
664 providing the information does not put the caller at greater risk. On-scene personnel should relay any
665 information gathered from calls received by the fire control room to the appropriate police commander.

666 By the time personnel arrive at the incident, people may already be leaving the hazard area, disrobing
667 and carrying out improvised decontamination.

668 Information about the suspected or potential CBRN event should be gathered on arrival at the incident
669 and provided to the fire control room. Updates on the situation should be provided at regular intervals
670 and whenever further or updated information becomes available.

671 Incident commanders should liaise on a regular basis with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs)
672 if CBRN hazards are involved and consider any tactical advice provided by them.

673 JESIP principles should be applied, including effective situation reporting using the M/ETHANE model.
674 This is vital to ensure that correct information is exchanged appropriately with all involved agencies, to
675 support shared situational awareness.

676 For more information refer to:

677 • The JESIP publication, Responding to a CBRN(e) event: Joint operating principles for the
678   emergency services

679 • GOV.UK REMOVE: guidance on hazardous substance exposure

680 • Hazardous materials – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive: CBRN(e)

681 • Hazardous materials - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (explosive) event

682 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

683 Fire and rescue services should:

684 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
685   in applying the JESIP principles to support the development of a safe system of work for CBRN
686   or explosive attacks

687 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

688 Incident commanders should:

689 • Follow the 'STEP 1-2-3 Plus' process to assess a suspected or potential CBRN event

690 • Carry out appropriate life-saving activity for a suspected or potential CBRN event

691 • Instruct people who have potentially been affected by CBRN materials on how to follow the
692   'REMOVE REMOVE REMOVE' process, if they are able to do so

693 • Apply JESIP principles when carrying out situation reporting and developing shared situational
694   awareness for CBRN events

695 • Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) regarding CBRN incidents

696 • Liaise with the fire control room to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in a
697   CBRN attack reflects and supports the multi-agency plans

698 • Relay to the appropriate police commander any information gathered about a CBRN attack from
699   calls received by the fire control room

700 Fire control personnel should:

701 • Liaise with the incident ground to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in a
702   CBRN attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

703 • Gather information about the incident from people at risk in a CBRN attack and relay it to the
704   incident commander, but only if this does not put callers at greater risk

705 **Control measure – Safe system of work: Improvised explosive devices**

706 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

707 An initial cordon of between 100m and 400m should be established and maintained around an exploded,
708 unexploded or partially exploded improvised explosive device (IED). The distance should be based on
709 factors including whether the device has exploded and the estimated size of the device, and may need to
710 be revised. For more information refer to Hazardous materials – Cordon controls: Hazardous materials.

711 There may be a risk of further explosions or a remaining explosive hazard from an IED. A risk
712 assessment may determine that the cordon distance should be treated as an exclusion zone. Guidance
713 should be obtained from the police or army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

714 If there are casualties present within the hazard area, their rapid treatment and movement should remain
715 a priority. People should be moved away from the location of the IED as quickly as possible, although
716 this will be a slower process if non-ambulatory casualties need to be moved.

717 A safe system of work, following an appropriate risk assessment using JESIP principles, should consider
718 taking the following precautions:

719 • Using respiratory protection, due to the presence of dust, smoke, debris or CBRN hazards

720 • Using any available hard cover

721 • Avoiding touching or moving objects unnecessarily

722 • Deploying the minimum number of personnel, for the minimum amount of time to the hazard
723   area, to protect and save life

724 Incident commanders should liaise on a regular basis with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs)
725 if an IED is involved and consider any tactical advice provided by them.

726 Fire control and on-scene personnel should liaise to:

727 • Establish what survival guidance should be provided to people at risk in the IED hazard area

728 • Ensure the survival guidance being given to people at risk reflects and supports the current multi-
729   agency tactical plans

730 If fire control rooms are in contact with people at risk in the IED hazard area, they may be able to gather
731 information about the incident and relay this to on-scene personnel. They should ensure that providing
732 the information does not put the caller at greater risk. On-scene personnel should relay any information
733 gathered from calls received by the fire control room to the appropriate police commander.

734 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

735 Fire and rescue services should:

736 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
737   in applying the JESIP principles to support the development of a safe system of work for
738   improvised explosive devices

739 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

740 Incident commanders should:

741 • Establish and maintain an appropriate cordon around the improvised explosive device

742 • Carry out a risk assessment to determine if the cordon distance around an improvised explosive
743   device should be treated as an exclusion zone

744 • Seek guidance about an improvised explosive device from the police or army explosive ordnance
745   disposal (EOD)

746 • Carry out an appropriate risk assessment using JESIP principles before deploying personnel into
747   the improvised explosive device hazard area to treat and move casualties

748 • Ensure personnel use appropriate respiratory protection when entering an improvised explosive
749   device hazard area

750 • Ensure personnel use any hard cover available when entering an improvised explosive device
751   hazard area

752 • Ensure personnel avoid touching or moving objects unnecessarily in an improvised explosive
753   device hazard area

754 • Deploy the minimum number of personnel for the minimum amount of time to the improvised
755   explosive device hazard area, to treat and move casualties

756 • Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) regarding improvised explosive device
757   incidents

758 • Liaise with the fire control room to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in an
759   improvised explosive device hazard area reflects and supports multi-agency plans

760 • Relay to the appropriate police commander any information gathered about an improvised
761   explosive device from calls received by the fire control room

762 Fire control personnel should:

763 • Liaise with the incident ground to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in the
764   improvised explosive device hazard area siege reflects and supports multi-agency plans

765 • Gather information about the incident from people at risk in the improvised explosive device
766   hazard area and relay it to the incident commander, but only if this does not put callers at greater
767   risk

768 Hazard – Sieges

769 *HAZARD KNOWLEDGE*

770 Attackers may use sieges or hostage-taking with the aim to prolong an attack or impede rescue
771 operations. Sieges may be used in conjunction with other attack strategies, including the use of
772 weapons, explosives and fire setting.

773 As sieges are static in nature, adherence to zones, limits of exploitation (LoE) and the directions of the
774 police is essential.

775 Control measure – Safe system of work: Sieges

776 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

777 It is the responsibility of the police to:

778 • Declare a siege is in progress

779 • Establish a forward command point (FCP) at a suitable location, which has:

780 o Suitable areas for each emergency service and their support teams, to enable them to
781 operate independently

782 o The capacity to hold regular and structured briefings regarding the development of plans and
783 contingencies

784 • Appoint commanders, such as a siege ground commander or outer scene commander

785 • Identify zones and appropriate limits of exploitation (LoE) to support interoperable working

786 • Jointly agree and clearly stipulate the furthest points (LoE) to which emergency responders will
787 operate within each zone

788 • Brief responders about the threats, hazards, risks and zones; to support rapid deployment, it is
789 preferable that briefings:

790 o Are conducted jointly, with input from all emergency services

791 o Apply the JESIP Joint Decision Model (JDM) principles

792 It is the responsibility of the fire and rescue service to:

793 • Brief relevant personnel about threats, hazards, risks and zones, including LoE

794 • Appoint National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) to liaise with and support the incident
795 commander; the NILO may provide the incident commander with tactical advice

796 • Be represented at all FCP briefings; if the incident commander needs to remain on-scene, this
797 role may be assigned to a NILO or a nominated member of the incident command team

798 • Record decisions made, including the rationale about deploying or withholding resources; this
799 should be supported by the appropriate use of decision logs

800 Fire control and on-scene personnel should liaise to:

801 • Establish what survival guidance should be provided to people at risk in the siege

802 • Ensure the survival guidance being given to people at risk reflects and supports the current multi-
803 agency tactical plans

804 If fire control rooms are in contact with people at risk in a siege, they may be able to gather information
805 about the incident and relay this to on-scene personnel. They should ensure that providing the
806 information does not put the caller at greater risk. On-scene personnel should relay any information
807 gathered from calls received by the fire control room to the appropriate police commander.

808 Military medical personnel may need to be deployed for casualties involved in a siege. The ambulance
809 on-scene commander and military medical lead should discuss the potential for joint working to
810 maximise the casualty care options available.

811 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

812 Fire and rescue services should:

813 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
814 in applying the JESIP principles to support the development of a safe system of work for sieges

815 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

816 Incident commanders should:

817 • Ensure they, a NILO or a nominated member of the incident command team attend and
818 participate in the forward command point (FCP) briefings for the siege

819 • Ensure relevant personnel are briefed about threats, hazards, risks, zones, limits of exploitation
820 (LoE) and the multi-agency plans for the siege

821 • Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) during sieges

822 • Record decisions made, and consider the appropriate use of decision logs for a siege

823 • Liaise with the fire control room to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in a
824 siege reflects and supports multi-agency plans

825 • Relay to the appropriate police commander any information gathered about a siege from calls
826 received by the fire control room

827 Fire control personnel should:

828 • Liaise with the incident ground to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk in a
829 siege reflects and supports multi-agency plans

830 • Gather information about the incident from people at risk in a siege and relay it to the incident
831 commander, but only if this does not put callers at greater risk

Hazard – Fires and other hazards: Terrorist attacks

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

As part of a terrorist attack or marauding terrorist attack (MTA), there may be fires or other hazards that require a response from the fire and rescue service. These could include:

- Fires or explosions in modes of transport, buildings or other structures
- Abandoned or crashed modes of transport
- Collapse or partial collapse of buildings or other structures
- The need for a search and rescue plan
- Presence of hazardous materials

When dealing with these types of hazards, personnel should be aware of the potential risks from the presence of:

- Attackers
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- Hidden or disguised devices that may cause harm when triggered

The response will also need to take into account the:

- Multi-agency plan
- Safety of the public, personnel and other emergency responders
- Need to preserve evidence of the crime scene

Control measure – Firefighting: Terrorist attacks

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

The fire and rescue service may be asked to develop a plan and deliver a specialist response for dealing with fires, during or following a terrorist attack or marauding terrorist attack (MTA). Personnel will require appropriate firefighting equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE) to provide this response.

Firefighting activity should include control of fire, while considering the need to preserve evidence. If possible and safe to do so, fires should be extinguished without delay and simple actions taken to prevent the spread of fire or smoke.

Firefighting should not commence until a joint understanding of risk has been established. The operational plan to deploy personnel for firefighting should be subject to the application of the Joint Decision Model. The plan should be communicated to all on-scene commanders.

Firefighting tactics can be either offensive or defensive:

- Offensive firefighting – this may include the use of structural firefighting equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE), ballistic PPE and breathing apparatus (BA)
- Defensive firefighting – this can be used to prevent firespread by applying firefighting activities from a position outside of the hazard area, or by deploying fixed firefighting jets or ground monitors

867 The fire and rescue service may be able to provide advice to the police about fire development and
868 behaviour. They may also be able to provide advice on fixed installations, such as sprinklers, ventilation
869 systems or fire-engineered solutions; it may be possible to use these to control the spread of fire or
870 smoke.

871 Incident commanders should liaise on a regular basis with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs)
872 if firefighting during a terrorist attack or MTA is required, and consider any tactical advice provided by
873 them.

874 Advanced firefighting guidance for use during a terrorist attack or MTA is provided in the specialist
875 National Resilience publication, *The Concept of Operations for MTA*. If advanced firefighting capabilities
876 are or may be required, attendance of specialist teams should be requested through National Resilience
877 Fire Control.

878 Fire control and on-scene personnel should liaise to:

879 • Establish what fire survival guidance should be provided to people at risk

880 • Ensure the fire survival guidance being given to people at risk reflects and supports the current
881 multi-agency tactical plans

882 If fire control rooms are in contact with people at risk in the terrorist attack, they may be able to gather
883 information about the fire and relay this to on-scene personnel. They should ensure that providing the
884 information does not put the caller at greater risk. On-scene personnel should relay any information
885 gathered from calls received by the fire control room to the appropriate police commander.

886 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

887 Fire and rescue services should:

888 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
889 in applying the JESIP principles to support firefighting during or following a terrorist attack

890 • Consider providing firefighting equipment and PPE for dealing with fires during or following a
891 terrorist attack

892 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

893 Incident commanders should:

894 • Participate in the development of a joint understanding of risk before deploying personnel to deal
895 with a fire at a terrorist attack

896 • If appropriate, deploy personnel with appropriate firefighting equipment and PPE to deal with a
897 fire at a terrorist attack

898 • Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) regarding firefighting at a terrorist
899 attack

900 • Provide advice to the police about fire development and behaviour at a terrorist attack

901 • Provide advice to the police about fixed installations that may be able to be used to control a fire
902 at a terrorist attack

903 • If appropriate, use fixed installations to control a fire at a terrorist attack

904   •   Identify when advanced firefighting capabilities are or may be required at a terrorist attack and
905   request the attendance of specialist fire and rescue service teams using National Resilience
906   protocols

907   •   Liaise with the fire control room to ensure fire survival guidance being given to people at risk in a
908   terrorist attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

909   •   Relay to the appropriate police commander any information gathered about a fire at a terrorist
910   attack from calls received by the fire control room

911 Fire control personnel should:

912   •   Liaise with the incident ground to ensure fire survival guidance being given to people at risk in a
913   terrorist attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

914   •   Gather information about the fire from people at risk in a terrorist attack and relay it to the incident
915   commander, but only if this does not put callers at greater risk

916 **Control measure – Fire and rescue service response to other hazards: Terrorist attacks**

917 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

918 The fire and rescue service may be asked to develop a plan and deliver a specialist response for dealing
919 with other hazards, during or following a terrorist attack or marauding terrorist attack (MTA). Personnel
920 will require appropriate equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE) to provide this response.

921 The on-scene commanders need to agree on the priorities for the fire and rescue service. This should
922 consider the resources available, in terms of the number and capabilities of personnel and the
923 equipment available.

924 The fire and rescue service may be able to provide advice to the police about other hazards and their
925 potential impact on casualties, survivors and emergency responders.

926 Incident commanders should liaise on a regular basis with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs)
927 if other hazards require a fire and rescue service response during a terrorist attack or MTA, and consider
928 any tactical advice provided by them.

929 Personnel should not commence dealing with other hazards until a joint understanding of risk has been
930 established. The operational plan to deploy personnel for dealing with other hazards should be subject to
931 the application of the Joint Decision Model. The plan should be communicated to all on-scene
932 commanders.

933 Fire control and on-scene personnel should liaise to:

934   •   Establish what survival guidance should be provided to people at risk of other hazards

935   •   Ensure the survival guidance being given to people at risk reflects and supports the current multi-
936   agency tactical plans

937 If fire control rooms are in contact with people at risk in the terrorist attack, they may be able to gather
938 information about other hazards and relay this to on-scene personnel. They should ensure that providing
939 the information does not put the caller at greater risk. On-scene personnel should relay any information
940 gathered from calls received by the fire control room to the appropriate police commander.

941 **Abandoned or crashed modes of transport**

942 Consideration should be given to the presence of attackers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or
943 hidden or disguised devices in the mode of transport.

944 For more information refer to:

945 • Transport – Transport incidents

946 • Transport – People within the transport network

947 • Transport – Objects involved in a mode of transport collision

948 • Transport – Failure to preserve and secure the transport incident scene for investigation

949 There may be the need to search for or rescue casualties from the mode of transport. For more
950 information refer to:

951 • Search, rescue and casualty care – Lack of co-ordinated search plan: Modes of transport

952 • Search, rescue and casualty care – Trapped casualty: Mode of transport

953 **Collapse or partial collapse of buildings or other structures**

954 Consideration should be given to the presence of attackers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or
955 hidden or disguised devices in the building or other structure.

956 For more information refer to Height, structures and confined spaces - Unstable or collapsed structure.

957 There may be the need to search for or rescue casualties from collapsed or partially collapsed buildings
958 or other structures. For more information refer to:

959 • Search, rescue and casualty care – Lack of co-ordinated search plan: Unstable or collapsed
960 structure

961 • Search, rescue and casualty care – Accessing a casualty

962 **Search and rescue plan**

963 When carrying out searches and rescues, consideration should be given to the presence of attackers,
964 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or hidden or disguised devices in the search area.

965 The fire and rescue service may be asked to assist with developing and delivering a search and rescue
966 plan. Search and rescue plans are normally developed in collaboration with police search advisers
967 (PolSA).

968 For more information refer to:

969 • Search, rescue and casualty care – Lack of co-ordinated search plan: All searches

970 • Search, rescue and casualty care – Accessing a casualty

971 **Hazardous materials**

972 Consideration should be given to the presence of attackers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or
973 hidden or disguised devices when responding to the presence of identified or suspected hazardous
974 materials.

975 Personnel should be aware of, and prepare for, the risk of being contaminated by or exposed to
976 hazardous materials. It may be beneficial to request the advice or assistance of a hazardous materials
977 tactical adviser. National Resilience assets may also be required, such as:

978 • Mass decontamination unit

979 • Detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) advisers and equipment

980 Casualties, survivors and emergency responders may need to be evacuated from the scene, disrobed
981 and decontaminated.

982 For more information refer to:

983 • Hazardous materials guidance

984 • Hazardous materials – Health hazards guidance

985 • Hazardous materials – Physical hazards guidance

986 • Hazardous materials – Exposure of responders to hazardous materials

987 • Hazardous materials - Contaminated members of the public

988 • Hazardous materials - Exposed members of the public

989 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

990 Fire and rescue services should:

991 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
992 in applying the JESIP principles to support a response to other hazards during or following a
993 terrorist attack

994 • Consider providing equipment and PPE for dealing with other hazards during or following a
995 terrorist attack

996 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

997 Incident commanders should:

998 • Participate in the development of a joint understanding of risk before deploying personnel to deal
999 with other hazards at a terrorist attack

1000 • If appropriate, deploy personnel with appropriate equipment and PPE to deal with other hazards
1001 at a terrorist attack

1002 • Liaise with National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) regarding other hazards at a terrorist
1003 attack

1004 • Provide advice to the police about other hazards and their potential impact at a terrorist attack

1005 • Identify when National Resilience assets are or may be required at a terrorist attack and request
1006 their attendance

1007 • Liaise with the fire control room to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk of other
1008 hazards in a terrorist attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

1009 • Relay to the appropriate police commander any information gathered about other hazards at a
1010 terrorist attack from calls received by the fire control room

1011 Fire control personnel should:

1012 • Liaise with the incident ground to ensure survival guidance being given to people at risk of other
1013 hazards at a terrorist attack reflects and supports multi-agency plans

1014   • Gather information about other hazards from people at risk in a terrorist attack and relay it to the
1015   incident commander, but only if this does not put callers at greater risk

Hazard – Casualties of terrorist attacks

HAZARD KNOWLEDGE

Terrorist attacks or marauding terrorist attacks (MTA) may result in a large number of casualties. The injuries sustained, which may be life-threatening, will vary depending on the attack methodology. The injuries may be very different to those resulting from non-malicious incidents.

It is acknowledged that any incident that results in people being injured, including a terrorist attack, results in a 'care gap'. This can be regarded as the time between when the casualty sustained their injuries and when they receive definitive medical treatment from a medical responder.

The speed at which casualties are treated and moved from the point of injury into definitive care will affect survival rates. Some casualties may require immediate intervention to prevent their death. Early intervention, based on an assessment of the risks and benefits, is required to maximise survival rates.

A different approach to casualty care may be required, in order to balance high casualty numbers with the availability of emergency responders who can provide life-saving care.

Personnel need to be aware that they may be asked to assist with treating a suspected or confirmed attacker or terrorist.

If there are casualties with significant trauma injuries, there will be a risk of infectious disease transmission. For more information refer to Operations – Infectious diseases.

The managing of casualties should take into account the need to maintain the scene for investigation purposes; for more information refer to:

- Operations – Compromised investigations: Poor scene preservation
- Operations – Compromised investigations: Ineffective or inappropriate actions

Due to the nature of injuries to the casualties, and the number of casualties, personnel may be subject to physiological stress. The psychological hazards of the incident may affect operational, non-operational and fire control personnel. For more information refer to:

- Operations – Physiological stress
- Operations – Psychological hazards

Control measure – Casualty management plan: Terrorist attacks

CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE

The ambulance service will approve the casualty management plan (CMP) to save life. A CMP, which may initially be basic in nature, should be developed before the deployment of responders. As the incident progresses, the CMP should be formalised, reviewed, adjusted and approved by the tactical commander as part of the ambulance tactical plan.

While the ambulance service retains lead responsibility for the management of casualties, decisions regarding the deployment of responders and the locations or zones of deployment will be made as part of a joint assessment of risk conducted by the police, ambulance and fire and rescue service on-scene commanders.

1052 The CMP forms part of the joint decision-making process, which ensures that all commanders
1053 understand its contents and implications. The current CMP should be included in deployment briefings,
1054 to ensure that emergency responders are aware of the tactics and procedures to be followed,
1055 emphasising the overarching aim of rapid deployment to save life. Any changes to the CMP need to be
1056 promptly shared with partner agencies.

1057 In order to mitigate the care gap, personnel may be able to provide assistance to the ambulance service
1058 to deliver the CMP, by treating and removing casualties. All personnel should be briefed before being
1059 deployed to carry out casualty management. They may be deployed with ambulance responders to
1060 assist with casualty management; military medics may also be deployed.

1061 **Injured attackers**

1062 If an injured attacker who has already been processed by the police is encountered by personnel, they
1063 should assist the ambulance service by providing medical treatment as required, preferably with the
1064 assistance of the police.

1065 If an injured suspected attacker is encountered by personnel, they should notify the police immediately.
1066 Personnel should provide the police with details of the person's description, location and reason for
1067 concern, for example if the casualty has a weapon. The advice of the police or a risk assessment may
1068 indicate the need for personnel to withdraw to a safe distance, until the police have processed the
1069 casualty.

1070 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

1071 Fire and rescue services should:

1072 • Ensure all incident commanders and National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are practiced
1073   in applying the JESIP principles to support a casualty management plan for a terrorist attack

1074 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

1075 Incident commanders should:

1076 • Ensure they are fully aware of the current casualty management plan, including the role of
1077   personnel and the tactics and procedures to be followed for casualties of a terrorist attack

1078 • Ensure they are kept informed about progress of the casualty management plan and of any
1079   requirement for personnel to withdraw from or evacuate the area of a terrorist attack

1080 • Brief personnel being deployed to assist with casualty management, including tactics, procedures
1081   and who they will be assisting for casualties of a terrorist attack

1082 • Ensure personnel understand what to do if they encounter a processed injured attacker or an
1083   injured suspected attacker following a terrorist attack

1084 **Control measure – Casualty care: Terrorist attacks**

1085 *CONTROL MEASURE KNOWLEDGE*

1086 The ambulance on-scene commander will direct and co-ordinate the casualty management plan (CMP)
1087 to deliver life-saving care. As non-ambulance emergency responders will have varying levels of first aid
1088 knowledge and training, they should be tasked appropriately.

1089 Maximising the number of emergency responders to deliver mass casualty care aims to save lives. Multi-
1090 agency teams may deliver basic clinical care or be tasked with the removal or transfer of casualties to or
1091 from:

1092 • Casualty collection points (CCP)

1093 • Casualty clearing stations (CCS)

1094 • Casualty loading points (CLP)

1095 Ambulance responders will direct and oversee the treatment provided by other emergency responders.

1096 Personnel should be aware of the tactical options that may be deployed when delivering mass casualty
1097 care following a terrorist attack. The tactical response is flexible, and commanders may amend tactics
1098 according to threat and risk.

1099 The aim of deploying emergency responders is to rapidly assess and treat casualties, then move on to
1100 the next casualty if required. Personnel need to understand that they may not be able to stay with a
1101 casualty after providing basic treatment.

1102 The CMP will detail the tactical options in use, including:

1103 • Deployment of specialist responders with ballistic personal protective equipment (BPPE)

1104 • Deployment of non-specialist responders

1105 • Triage and triage labelling

1106 • Immediate removal of casualties

1107 • Treat and leave casualties

1108 • Treat and take casualties

1109 **Mitigating the care gap**

1110 In order to mitigate the care gap, emergency responders should be trained, exercised and equipped to
1111 be able to operate effectively within the appropriate zones. They should be familiar with the equipment
1112 they may need to use, including trauma kits, tourniquets, rapid evacuation stretchers and defibrillators.

1113 There may be equipment provided at a public venue that can be used by 'zero responders' (somebody at
1114 the scene of the incident who can provide first aid) or 'first responders' (such as a police officer or
1115 firefighter with first aid or more advanced trauma care skills).

1116 Deployments should be undertaken safely, but at pace, balancing the need for the safety of emergency
1117 responders with the need to reduce the duration of the care gap, and thereby improve the chances of
1118 survival and recovery of casualties with serious injuries.

1119 **Triage and triage labelling**

1120 Only ambulance responders will perform the initial triage of casualties and determine their prioritisation
1121 for treatment; this includes the justification for declaring that a casualty is deceased.

1122 To avoid the repeated assessment of casualties, especially at complex incidents, appropriate triage
1123 labelling should be used. For more information about the triage process, refer to Search, rescue and
1124 casualty care – Carry out triage.

1125 **Immediate removal of casualties**

1126 Once a casualty has been assessed and treated, they should immediately be removed so that they can
1127 receive further treatment. Depending on the circumstances, nature of injuries and the availability of
1128 resources, urgent removal of P1 casualties direct to a CLP should be considered. P1 casualties are
1129 those who cannot survive without immediate treatment but who have a chance of survival.

1130 Removal or transfer of casualties to either a CCP or CCS will commence on the instruction of the
1131 ambulance on-scene commander.

1132 Casualties may have received or applied first aid prior to removal from the scene. This could include the
1133 use of medical or improvised tourniquets, which may be under clothing. Although a thorough check for
1134 these should be made in the CCP, if personnel are handing over a casualty who they know has a
1135 tourniquet applied, they should bring this to the attention of a medical responder.

1136 Consideration should be given to the use of any appropriate equipment or vehicles that are available, to
1137 assist with the removal or transfer of casualties. This may include the use of stretchers or skeds, as well
1138 as improvised casualty carrying equipment. It may be necessary to request additional equipment for this
1139 purpose, depending on the number of casualties. For more information refer to Search, rescue and
1140 casualty care – Use casualty transport equipment.

Treat and leave casualties

1142 If casualty numbers are high, the CMP may require the use of the 'treat and leave' option. This will
1143 involve emergency responders providing rapid and minimal clinical intervention, focused on controlling
1144 major haemorrhage or using basic airway control techniques, such as placing casualties into the
1145 recovery position. These actions aim to provide the maximum benefit to the greatest number of
1146 casualties.

Uninjured people and ambulant casualties

1148 Emergency responders should not allow members of the public to distract them from treating the
1149 maximum number of casualties possible. Therefore, uninjured people and ambulant casualties should be
1150 told to leave the scene by the safest route.

1151 However, some uninjured people will want to stay and assist casualties, especially off-duty medical staff
1152 or emergency responders, or first aiders. If appropriate, emergency responders can instruct these people
1153 to, for example, apply potentially life-saving dressings.

1154 If there has been gunfire or explosions, people may be suffering from visual or hearing impairment,
1155 which may make it difficult for them to comply with instructions. They may need physical assistance to
1156 help them leave the scene.

1157 Uninjured people who are distressed or confused may not follow instructions from emergency
1158 responders; they should be given directions to leave the scene by the safest route in a firm and clear
1159 manner.

Searching for casualties

1161 Some people, including uninjured people and casualties, may remain hidden from emergency
1162 responders, as they have followed the JESIP 'STAY SAFE' public advice of 'Run, Hide, Tell'.

1163 A thorough search of the scene is necessary to ensure that everyone is located and led or assisted to
1164 safety. The search plan should be devised and led by the fire and rescue service, informed by the CMP.
1165 If the search will be multi-agency resourced, it needs to be co-ordinated to ensure it is carried out

1166 efficiently. For more information refer to <u>Search, rescue and casualty care – Effective search</u>
1167 <u>management</u>.

1168 **Fire and rescue service clinical governance for casualty care**

1169 As part of risk management planning, fire and rescue services may identify the requirement to provide
1170 casualty care that is over and above the first aid regulations when responding to a terrorist attack. If this
1171 decision is taken, it is strongly advised that they obtain clinical governance leadership from a healthcare
1172 professional. This person should have the competencies to lead and co-ordinate clinical governance for
1173 the organisation, to ensure that any casualty care provided is of an appropriate standard and to support
1174 personnel in its delivery.

1175 For more information refer to <u>Search, rescue and casualty care – Risk assess and adopt the appropriate</u>
1176 <u>level of casualty care</u>.

1177 *STRATEGIC ACTIONS*

1178 Fire and rescue services should:

1179 • Determine how many personnel should be competent in providing the type of casualty care that
1180   may be required following a terrorist attack

1181 • Consider obtaining appropriate clinical governance to enable personnel to provide casualty care
1182   following a terrorist attack

1183 • Ensure relevant personnel receive training about the delivery of multi-agency casualty care
1184   following a terrorist attack

1185 • Consider equipping fire service vehicles with an appropriate type and number of stretchers or
1186   skeds for mass casualty management following a terrorist attack

1187 • Consider equipping fire service vehicles with first aid equipment suitable for treating mass
1188   casualties of a terrorist attack

1189 *TACTICAL ACTIONS*

1190 Incident commanders should:

1191 • Take direction from the ambulance on-scene commander about the deployment of personnel to
1192   assist with casualties of a terrorist attack

1193 • Ensure personnel are aware of the location and purpose of the casualty collection points (CCP),
1194   casualty clearing stations (CCS) and casualty loading points (CLP) following a terrorist attack

1195 • Ensure personnel are aware of the tactical options that are to be used for casualties of a terrorist
1196   attack, and are briefed about any changes in the tactical response

1197 • Ensure personnel understand that they may not be able to stay with a casualty of a terrorist
1198   attack after providing basic treatment

1199 • Ensure personnel are aware of the triage process and labelling in use for casualties of a terrorist
1200   attack

1201 • Ensure personnel understand the need to follow ambulance responder instructions about the
1202   removal or transfer of casualties of the terrorist attack to an appropriate location

1203　　• Ensure personnel understand that when handing over a casualty of the terrorist attack who has a
1204　　　tourniquet applied, they should bring this to the attention of a medical responder

1205　　• Consider what equipment or vehicles are available to assist with the removal or transfer of
1206　　　casualties of the terrorist attack; this may include stretchers, skeds or improvised equipment

1207　　• Consider requesting additional equipment to assist with the removal or transfer of casualties of
1208　　　the terrorist attack

1209　　• Deploy personnel who are able to provide assistance with a treat and leave response for
1210　　　casualties of a terrorist attack if required

1211　　• Ensure personnel understand the need to instruct uninjured people or ambulant casualties to
1212　　　leave the scene of the terrorist attack and to be aware that they may need assistance

1213　　• Ensure personnel understand when it may be appropriate for uninjured people to remain and
1214　　　assist with first aid for casualties of the terrorist attack

1215　　• Develop and co-ordinate a search plan for the scene of the terrorist attack, to ensure all uninjured
1216　　　people and casualties have been found, if required by the casualty management plan