Building Regulations and Guidance Position Statement

1. Issue Identification

The Building Regulations 2010 set out ‘functional requirements’.[i] These are legally binding performance standards that must be met in buildings. The regulations are accompanied by a suite of statutory guidance called ‘approved documents’ and these set out how the regulations (functional requirements) can be satisfied in ‘common building situations’. However, there is no obligation to adopt the solutions presented in the approved documents.

Section 7 of the Building Act 1984 details that failure to comply with an Approved Document does not automatically mean someone is legally liable. Conversely, compliance with an Approved Document does not automatically mean someone is free from liability. However, failure to comply with an Approved Document may be used as evidence that building regulations were not followed: alternatively, compliance with an Approved Document may be used as evidence that the relevant requirements of the building regulations have been met.

The functional requirements can be satisfied through other pathways to demonstrate compliance for buildings where either Approved Document B (ADB) is not used or that are beyond the scope of the approved documents. This can be by following a relevant British Standard, or by relying on what is known commonly as a ‘performance-based design’. This functional nature of our Building Regulations is intended to encourage and support innovation. However, for such a system to be effective, it must be underpinned by several critical components, including:

keeping approved documents and associated guidance up to date
the competence of actors in the system
independent oversight or third-party safeguards.

A range of independent reviews and inquiries outlined below, have identified that these critical underpinning dependencies are missing from the current system.

2. NFCC Position

Buildings must be designed to meet the needs of the people who occupy them, rather than requiring individuals to adapt to the limitations of the built environment. To support this principle, guidance underpinning the Building Regulations must remain current, relevant, and appropriately applied.

A broader cultural shift is also essential, underpinned by enhanced occupational regulation, to ensure that accountability is clearly defined and understood across all parties, including developers, building control bodies, building owners, and fire and rescue services (FRSs). Furthermore, the building control system must be underpinned by robust mechanisms that safeguard the integrity of decision-making and ensure clarity of roles responsibilities, and accountability throughout the regulatory framework.

3. Recommendations

NFCC calls on the Government to:

Ensure that the Approved Documents are kept up to date, including to;
- Clarify the intended scope of ADB, including an unambiguous definition of ‘common building situations’.
- Require that new residential buildings must have an evacuation lift in the same transitional timeframe as a second staircase.
- Adopt a requirement that all passenger lifts that are due to be replaced or installed in new or existing buildings, should be evacuation lifts in line with available appropriate standards and guidance.
- Make it a requirement to retrofit sprinklers in all high-rise residential buildings 18 metres and above that are served by a single staircase.
- Conclude the current project work on ADB and set out a clear plan for continuous review, as highlighted in the GTI Phase 2 recommendations. The review of smoke control, and access facilities for fire and rescue services including water supplies should be prioritised.

Regulate competence of actors in the system, including:
- Examination of the occupational regulation recommendations of the GTI Phase 2 report.
- The creation of a Construction Skills Strategy as set out within NFCC’s Remediation Industry White Paper[ii].

Improve oversight and accountability in the new build process, including to:
- Ensure that building control bodies have the benefit of an appropriate level of safeguarding from commercial incentives.
- To ensure that comments made by the Fire and Rescue Service are addressed, place procedural guidance onto a statutory footing and promote greater consistency of enforcement of the Operational Standards Rules.
- Review the non-worsening provisions and introduce a requirement to improve fire safety measures, when buildings undergo a major refurbishment or change of use, for the purposes of means of escape from fire, and access for firefighting, as nearly as is reasonably practicable.

4. Supporting Evidence

Part 1: Keeping Approved Documents up to date

The statutory guidance covering fire safety matters in common buildings, is known as ADB. ADB contains many references and thresholds relating to traditional building methods dating back to the post war building studies: a set of technical reports published by the British Ministry of Works starting in 1944, with 33 volumes[iii],[iv] published between the mid 1940’s to mid 1950’s. It has not been sufficiently maintained and updated to keep pace with innovations in material, construction methods and societal changes, such as an aging population and people being cared for in their homes rather than traditional care settings.

Following the Grenfell Tower Fire, the Government commissioned Dame Judith Hackitt to undertake an Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety. The Independent Review published its final report in May 2018. This recommended that there should be no more than five years between reviews of ADB[v]. In 2018 a call for evidence to inform a full technical review of ADB[vi] was launched. The workplan was due to conclude after five years. However the planned work remains unfinished with aspects of ADB not having been reviewed as yet, such as section B5 – fire service access and facilities.

NFCC also note that following the 2009 fire at Lakanal House, in 2013 the coroner recommended retrofitting of sprinklers, and that ADB be reviewed, yet no such review was undertaken until the current and ongoing review.

Means of Escape in case of fire

The last full review of ADB was carried out when the Fire Precautions Act 1971 (as amended) (the FPA) was still in force. ADB enables building designs where safety depends heavily on post-occupancy management, without clearly defining what good management entails or setting limits around this.

ADB states the regulations can be met by achieving the intent that “All people can escape to a place of safety without external assistance”. Article 14(2)(a) of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO) states that “emergency routes and exits must lead as directly as possible to a place of safety”, with ‘a place of safety’ defined in Article 2 as “a safe area beyond the premises”. Guidance issued under Article 50 of the FSO also outlines that evacuation should be possible without the intervention of the FRS.

‘Stay put’ is an evacuation strategy which designers can choose to build to, but it is often misunderstood. Most purpose-built blocks of flats are designed to support stay put principles, where it is intended that fires remain contained within the flat of origin and common escape routes stay free from smoke and heat. This aims to allow residents in unaffected flats to remain safely in place unless they choose to leave or are instructed to do so by the fire service. NFCC supports wider use of the term “stay safe” in resident engagement, as it better reflects the principle and helps reduce public confusion.

If residents do choose to evacuate — whether through personal choice or on the advice of fire and rescue services — they must be able to do so safely and without assistance. FRSs are increasingly reporting[vii] that more residents are choosing to evacuate when fires occur elsewhere in the building, and the design must account for this reality.

The Government’s 2024 announcement introducing a second stair for new residential buildings over 18m was a welcome step. A second stair offers vital resilience, providing an alternative escape route and a separate route for fire service access. However, second stairs alone do not ensure that everyone can evacuate safely.

The design assumptions that still underpin much of ADB are based on a post-war housing model that does not reflect today’s diverse population. This creates tension with the Building Safety Act 2022, which requires dutyholders to demonstrate, as part of the new gateway process, how all residents can escape without external assistance. This is set out in the Fire and Emergency File (FEF), a mandatory submission for higher-risk buildings.

Although recent updates to ADB include consideration of evacuation lifts, they stop short of requiring them. This risks sending the message that compliance is possible even where some people, including those with disabilities, may not have a safe way out — a position that may conflict with functional requirements, the Equality Act 2010, and local frameworks such as the London Plan 2021, which requires evacuation lifts in buildings that include a lift.

Since the last full review of ADB, the FPA was replaced by the FSO, introducing greater reliance on individuals to self-regulate, moving away from prescriptive rules towards outcome-based approaches. This model depends on competent dutyholders making sound judgments, with less direct oversight from regulators — placing a high level of reliance in individual behaviour. In this context NFCC believe it would be more appropriate to build in a higher baseline of safety into the building’s fabric, including evacuation lifts, to build layers of safety that lessen the risk of human behaviour as a point of failure.

Greater emphasis is needed on inclusive design from the outset. The Grenfell Tower fire made clear the life-critical importance of ensuring people living with impairments or vulnerabilities can leave a building safely — a right as fundamental as entry.

Priorities within ADB

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report found “significant problems relating to Approved Document B that in our view call for urgent attention” including “the tension between functional requirements of the Building Regulations and the prescriptive language of the guidance and the propensity of many in the industry to treat the guidance as definitive”. “Most importantly we do not think that Approved Document B provides the information needed to design buildings that are safe in fire.”

In February 2025 the Government responded[viii] and committed to another consultation on ADB, as well as regular reviews of the Approved Documents. Any reviews undertaken must not be done in isolated sections and must work holistically together. Recent changes, like requiring sprinklers in new buildings over 11m and second staircases over 18m, are welcome steps, but the individual review of the changes have resulted in a document that could theoretically be used to create a poorly designed building which could arguably offer a lower level of safety. Whilst NFCC has strongly welcomed these measures, we agree that a more wholesale review is overdue with emphasis not just on what gets reviewed but how it gets reviewed.

ADB is a substantive document with many areas in need of update and integrated review. NFCC’s detailed response to the 2019 technical review is available on our website[ix]. Many points remain relevant, and the highlights below should be read alongside that full submission. Key areas that require considerable review include:

• A clear definition of scope: Although ADB states it applies to “common building situations,” this term is undefined. Clearer guidance is needed on both the scope and limits of ADB — including what it does cover, not just what it doesn’t to make it explicit and clear to its limitations of use. This should include specific thresholds, such as building height, and construction type to reduce ambiguity.

The Independent Review and GTI Phase 2 report highlighted widespread misinterpretation. FRSs report that ADB has been applied to buildings more appropriately designed through fire engineering — including extremely tall buildings over 200m. Other countries and approved documents[x] set clear limits: for example, Scotland’s technical handbooks apply only to buildings up to 60m in building height.

Options for reform could include upper height limits, restrictions on compartment size or basement depth, and exclusions for certain uses or vulnerable occupancy groups. Buildings with extensive mixed-use should also be considered out of scope.

However, there should also be clear and consistent guidance on how to apply ADB, ensuring it is not selectively interpreted or disregarded simply because it does not align with a proposed design. The practice of “cherry-picking” elements of ADB to justify non-compliant approaches undermines the purpose of the guidance. Therefore, the importance of holistically applying ADB should be more explicitly reinforced.

• Equity of evacuation: NFCC have emphasised the benefits of retrofitting sprinklers in all high-rise residential buildings over 18 metres that are served by a single staircase. Sprinklers and other suppression systems can buy crucial additional time in firefighting operations, and may mean that larger scale evacuations are not necessary. Accompanying critical systems such as smoke control provisions have yet to be reviewed and these play a significant part in the protection of escape routes. Also, whilst people with disabilities may be able to access buildings using passenger lifts, the same lifts are not always appropriate for escape (egress). Passenger lifts are not designed for the use of residents in an emergency; they may be required for use by the FRS, and risk opening on the fire floor. NFCC recommends the greater use of evacuation lifts as listed above to support equity of egress.

• The safety of firefighters, B5: A full review is required of access and facilities for the fire service. Firefighters should expect the fire safety systems of a building to provide the highest level of protection when entering buildings and afforded the best opportunity to save lives. This should consider vehicular access, water provisions, when firefighting shafts are provided, and ventilation provisions in corridors and basements. Changes in operational procedures and equipment carried by FRSs over decades have not been accompanied by reviews of design provisions in guidance.

• Access to water for firefighting purposes: The current provisions for water supply for firefighting are vague and inadequate, particularly in Volume 1: Dwelling Houses, which lacks equivalent requirements to those in Volume 2. NFCC recommends a fundamental review of these provisions, including:

A clear requirement for all buildings to have an adequate firefighting water supply, regardless of size or use
Clearer specification of appropriate pressures and flow rates, and backup systems.
Mandatory inclusion of hydrant details and water supply on completion paperwork.
Clarification of suitable hose laying routes within ADB.

• Management considerations: ADB doesn’t explicitly address management expectations or their link to functional requirements. Building design often assumes certain management practices. When safety relies on post-occupancy management, it shifts costs that could have been addressed at design stage onto Responsible Persons and leaseholders through higher service fees. In addition to the changes above, there should be clear guidance on what good management looks like across a range of premises types. With Government plans to expand commonhold structures[xi] it is even more critical to avoid over-burdening management with safety responsibilities, so residents aren’t forced to pay for safety, due to design shortcomings. Protections for leaseholders begin during the design and construction phases. Unrealistic management expectations should not be proposed in lieu of ethical and effective design.

Part 2: Competency

The current regulatory system relies on a high degree of competence[xii] of those applying the guidance within ADB. However, competence is largely unregulated across the construction sector including during the processes of the new gateway system.

FRSs report that interpretation within industry is often that ‘compliance’ with ADB is all that needs to be demonstrated without reference back to the functional requirements. ADB is often deemed to be the ‘maximum’ benchmark for fire with some under the impression a solution is appropriate, simply because ADB doesn’t explicitly say that it isn’t.

The Independent Review highlighted a culture of complacency and found that ‘in other parts of the world, those engaged to work on more complex buildings require a higher degree of competence and expertise – for example through certification and accreditation – than that required for work on small-scale or simple buildings’[xiii]. Industry were invited to propose a system for overseeing competence, with the review recommending the Government intervene should the proposal not provide sufficient assurance.

An Industry Competence Steering Group (ICSG) was established. In 2019, NFCC highlighted[xiv] that any oversight body should have a much broader remit and called for[xv] the new regime to include more robust oversight of competency standards, and licensing or third-party accreditation requirements for all key disciplines working on buildings in scope.

While some progress has been made, in much of the industry standards still rely on voluntary adoption, and the more recent Industry Competence Committee’s remit appears limited[xvi]. As noted by the ICSG, there remains a risk that the best in the industry become better, while still being ‘undercut’ by parts of industry that can avoid requirements to be properly competent.

Findings from the GTI Phase 2 report found ‘an industry that has not reflected and learned for itself’ with widespread low levels of competence across the construction industry. It noted many contractors and designers misunderstood statutory guidance as definitive legal requirements. Key GTI recommendations include:

Introducing a licensing scheme for principal contractors working on higher-risk buildings.
Legally recognising and regulating the fire engineering profession through an independent body.
Establishing a mandatory accreditation system for fire risk assessors, including standards for qualifications and ongoing professional development.
Urgently expanding high-quality, accredited master’s courses to grow the number of professional fire engineers.
Convening a group of expert practitioners to produce an authoritative statement on the required knowledge, skills and professional ethics of a competent fire engineer.

Currently, anyone can call themselves a fire engineer. Legally protecting the title could help drive demand for formal university courses, which may in turn encourage universities to expand their provision. Failure to implement the GTI’s recommendations and develop a national construction skills strategy could risk undermining the Government’s current policy objectives. However, competence is more than qualifications and speaks to the call for change within culture of the industry.

NFCC has recently published a Remediation Industry White Paper that calls on the Government to urgently undertake long-term strategic workforce planning through a cross-departmental Construction Skills Strategy.

Part 3: Building Control processes and Independent Oversight

New builds process

The Building Safety Act 2022 was passed to realise the Independent Review’s recommendations to drive the cultural change needed to ensure that planning and design takes into account how the building will be used once complete.

In the year ended March 2024, FRSs carried out 45,465 building regulations consultations.

During new builds, Building Control Bodies (BCBs) are required to consult FRSs. However, issues can arise if FRS advice is not acted upon consistently or where the approving authority choose to ignore or not agree with FRS comments/observations. NFCC members have reported many cases where failure to act on this advice has led to serious consequences once buildings are occupied — including prohibition notices, the need for waking watches, increased attendance levels from FRSs, and additional pressure on already stretched inspection teams.

The new regime was designed to address these issues by requiring more detailed evidence earlier in the process. Gateway Two, in particular, aims to frontload fire safety considerations, so that consultation at Gateway Three can be more efficient and effective.

For this to work, designs must properly reflect how fire safety will be managed in practice — especially around evacuation — and not rely on unrealistic assumptions about building management. However, there is currently no clear definition of what constitutes an “unrealistic” management expectation, and the Approved Documents don’t fully cover management responsibilities or evacuation planning.

Other guidance does exist, but its role within the regime is unclear and open to interpretation. Greater clarity is needed, with more weight given to relevant advice — particularly from FRSs during Gateway Two — to help embed safety across a building’s full lifecycle.

NFCC has also emphasised[xvii] the importance of considering compliance with the FSO during Gateway Two, including firefighting access and facilities, and future compliance with Safety Case duties and the Housing Act 2004. Compliance with the in-occupation regime in preparation of a Safety Case is also considered and commented on at Gateway Two further embedding the need to consider compliance with the FSO at this point of the regime. Doing so will help prevent delays for developers.

To support effective implementation, NFCC recommends clearer procedural guidance and strengthened competency requirements for all actors involved, including regulators. Procedural guidance should be placed onto a statutory footing, and consistency of enforcement of the Operational Standards Rules should be promoted.

Remediation and non-worsening

Current interpretation of the non-worsening provisions in the Building Regulations is not supporting a consistent drive for the improvement of safety standards in buildings. Fire and Rescue Services (FRSs) have reported that developers frequently exploit this provision to avoid incorporating key life safety systems, such as firefighting lifts and sprinklers, even where such measures could be included at minimal cost during refurbishment, extension, or partial redevelopment.

While sprinklers are now mandated in all new care homes, some developers may seek to circumvent this requirement by carrying out upgrades through phased or fragmented extensions, thereby avoiding the classification of the works as a major refurbishment. This approach can result in buildings that are significantly less safe than they could be under a comprehensive, holistic upgrade, yet still be defended under the premise that the building is “no worse than before.” Such practices undermine the spirit of progressive regulation and may place vulnerable residents at increased risk, despite clear opportunities to implement meaningful and proportionate fire safety improvements.

Relying on these non-worsening provisions— rather than proactively improving safety — shows that the culture change called for by the 2018 Independent Review is unlikely without regulatory intervention. As refurbishment activity increases, especially to meet climate and remediation goals, this approach risks leaving many older buildings with outdated fire safety measures, some of which may avoid scrutiny entirely. It also represents a direct conflict with the FSO and continual improvement approach.

In other systems like New Zealand’s, legislation allows for the gradual upgrade of existing buildings to meet current health and safety standards. This means that, during a change of use or alteration, a requirement is triggered to comply with the requirements for means of escape from fire as nearly as is reasonably practicable. This takes a risk-based approach on a case-by-case basis, and weights considerations of human safety[xviii]. We believe this approach should be applied, including for evacuation lifts.

Buildings with historical defects — where original building regulations were not met at the time of build — should not, under current law, be protected by non-worsening provisions. The provisions state that existing elements of a building altered by new work must not be made more unsatisfactory than they were before. However, this does not protect buildings that were originally constructed in breach of the regulations in force at the time. In such cases, the non-worsening principle does not apply — the original defect remains a breach of building control requirements and may need to be remedied as part of subsequent work. However, this does not appear to be well understood across the sector. Consideration should be given to how enforcement approaches can be strengthened and supported to ensure these buildings are brought up to current safety standards where reasonably possible.

Commercial interest in Building Control

The 1984 Building Act introduced commercial competition into building control by enabling the use of Approved Inspectors. Similar models adopted internationally — in New Zealand, Norway, Canada, and Australia — have led to serious building safety failures when not backed by strong independent oversight.

The GTI Phase 2 report has recommended (113.37) “that the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process.”

We would support an approach which encompasses greater accountability throughout the whole building control process. This could be achieved by placing greater emphasis on the importance of the existing guidance ‘Building Regulations and Fire Safety Procedural Guidance’. Giving it a greater basis of authority would mean that building control bodies would be minded to include consultation with FRSs and thorough plans and checks in all aspects of the approval process, which would include re-consulting with FRSs when there are changes.

Norway’s self-accreditation model was partially reversed in 2013 after widespread construction faults[xix]. In New Zealand, the 2002 Hunn Report[xx] exposed a cladding crisis, ultimately leading to a government compensation scheme estimated at $11 billion NZD[xxi]. Canada’s ‘Leaky Condo Crisis’ revealed systemic regulatory failures, prompting recommendations to reject self-regulation and instead license the industry. In Australia, post-Grenfell inquiries found that commercial pressures contributed to widespread non-compliance, leading to reforms in regulatory oversight and the creation of Cladding Safety Victoria.

A World Bank review[xxii] of 190 economies concluded that, where private sector involvement exists, it must be subject to strict safeguards — including independent oversight and no financial ties to the developer. This report found that, whilst there are benefits to involving private sector actors in building control, that “The delegation of such a key regulatory mandate to the private sector should always be coupled with strict oversight safeguards designed to hold public interest above private profits.”

NFCC hold concerns with secondary legislation under the Building Safety Act, which has reversed the commitment to remove client choice of regulator in major refurbishments in high-risk, mixed-use buildings similar to Grenfell Tower. NFCC believes that[xxiii] BCBs must be able to enjoy an appropriate level of safeguarding against commercial incentives. To protect the integrity of decision-making and reduce the risk of undue commercial influence, Government should consult on mechanisms to strengthen the independence of private building control bodies, and level the playing field between public and private bodies. These could include measures such as independent statutory inspections at key project stages, consistency in the schedules for inspection fees, and peer review. Government must bring greater parity into the process, and inspection regimes with both public and private subject to the same checks and balances especially around requirements to issue plan certificates.

Plans certificates enable private building control to certify that plans are in accordance with building regulations’ requirements. However plans certificates are currently mandatory only when the client requests one, and in practice they are estimated to be used in a small minority of cases. An important element of the new regime included reforms announced in 2023 to make plans certificates mandatory for any work – provided it falls under the building regulations – to all non higher risk buildings that fall under the FSO. However these changes are yet to be enacted. These intended changes would provide a key opportunity to prevent situations where enforcement by the FRS is necessary in new buildings upon occupation, and address a key area of inconsistency between public and private building control functions.

These measures could help ensure that decisions are made in the public interest as well as enhance professionalisation of the sector.

References

[i] Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010

[ii] Remediation: Fire Service Policy and Operations – NFCC Industry White Paper, 24 February 2025

[iii] Ministry of Works – Post War Building Studies No 20 – Fire Grading of Buildings, Part I: General Principles and Statutory Precautions, 1946

[iv] Ministry of Works – Post War Building Studies No 29 – Fire Grading of Buildings Part II: Firefighting Equipment, Part III: Personal Safety, Part IV: Chimneys and Flues – 1952

[v] Recommendation 6.2.b – Building A Safer Future – Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report – 17 May 2018

[vi] Technical Review of Approved Document B: a call for evidence – 18 December 2018

[vii] In the three years from 1st April 2019 to 31st March 2022, the London Fire Brigade reported 154 cases where 10 or more people evacuated from a block of flats of at least 6 storeys. Those 154 cases meant that nearly 8,500 residents chose to evacuate either before the London Fire Brigade arrived, or during a fire incident. These figures do not include the instances where less than 10 people evacuated.

[viii] Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report: Government Response – 26 February 2025

[ix] NFCC response – Technical Review of Approved Document B of the building regulations: a call for evidence – 1 March 2019

[x] For example, Approved Document A (ADA) sets clear limits where buildings above a certain height in a certain consequence class have to demonstrate full engineering.

[xi] Commonhold White Paper: The proposed new commonhold model for homeownership in England and Wales – GOV.UK

[xii] Improving competence and culture: Insights from the CROSS Expert Panel | CROSS

[xiii] Chapter 5, 5.2 – Building a Safer Future – Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report – 17 May 2018

[xiv] NFCC Response – Raising the Bar (interim report): Improving competence, building a safer future

[xv] NFCC Response – Building a safer future: proposals for reform of the building safety regulatory system – 31 July 2019

[xvi] Health and Safety Executive, “Industry Competence Committee (built environment)”, 24 October 2024

[xvii] NFCC Response – Consultation on implementing the new building control regime for higher-risk buildings and wider changes to the building regulations for all buildings – 12 October 2022

[xviii] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment NZ, “Building Performance – Change of use, alterations and extension of life”, 2017

[xix] Case study: Norway – lessons on competence – Building a Safer Future – Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report – 17 May 2018

[xx] Report of the overview group on the weathertightness of buildings to the Building Industry Authority

[xxi] PwC Weathertightness – estimating the cost report

[xxii] World Bank Group – Doing Business 2018 – Reforming to Create Jobs – Comparing Business Regulation for Domestic Firms in 190 Economies – 2018